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No. 43

SURVEY

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WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

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SURVEY

A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies

No. 43 **August 1962**

Editor: Walter Z. Laqueur **Associate Editor: Leopold Labedz**

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INTRODUCTION

Leopold Labedz

IT is forgotten today that during the war, when Wendell Willkie was challenging Roosevelt in a Presidential contest, there was much talk about One World. The world that emerged from the war was divided in two. But Stalin was quite candid in his *Conversations* with Djilas (much more so than with the Western statesmen in Teheran and Yalta): 'Whoever occupies a territory also imposes his own social system.' He did not, however, pay much attention to the possibility of the emergence of a third world.

It would not be quite correct to say that it was only after Stalin's death that his successors discovered *le tiers monde*. After all, Soviet interest in the underdeveloped countries dates back to the 1920 Congress of Baku. But there is little doubt that it is only since the death of the old dictator that a new determined effort, political and economic, has been made to influence the policy of the newly emergent states, to play a new, global role in the post-colonial era. What had previously been the concern of the Party was now taken over by the state, adding, from the Soviet point of view, a new dimension to international relations.

The general picture, as seen from Moscow today, is conveniently summarised in a survey of 'The Upsurge of the Workers' Movement in the Countries of Asia and Africa' (*Kommunist*, No. 6, 1962). It acknowledges that 'as a result of the relative numerical weakness and inadequate organisation of the proletariat in Asia and Africa during the struggle for political independence, the national bourgeoisie has established its hegemony in the liberation movement of many countries'. However, 'at the present stage of the liberation movement, when the majority of Asian and African countries have won their independence and the task of establishing an independent national economy comes to the forefront, the role of the proletariat becomes much more important . . . a real basis emerges for strengthening the unity of the working class and for consolidating its union with all the toilers, and with the peasantry in the first place'. While exaggerating the numerical growth of industrial workers in the countries of Asia and Africa (by lumping together in the total statistics countries like Japan and Guinea), and stressing the important part played in the political struggle there by the trade unions, the review firmly emphasises that 'for the countries of Asia and Africa, where peasants form up to 80 per cent of the population, the agrarian and peasant problem always was and remains one of the most important questions of the national revolution'. During the struggle for independence the peasants supported the national bourgeoisie, but now they are getting disappointed and looking for an alliance with the working class. This alliance should be 'the nucleus of a wide national democratic front, uniting the working class, the peasantry, the national bourgeoisie, and the progressive intelligentsia'. Its purpose will be to establish the state

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of national democracy, which constitutes a form of transition to a non-capitalist path of development for the countries of Asia and Africa, a form which 'will eventually open the prospect of the establishment of socialist society'. This, the review concludes, 'is the main task of the communists'.

What is the relation of this general scheme to the more intricate specific local conditions in various underdeveloped countries and what political consequences follow from it?

THERE is a curious parallel between the processes which led to the loss of political innocence by the Americans, and those by which the Russians, in the course of their policies towards the developing countries, are losing some of their doctrinal ignorance. General schemes of economic aid are no longer regarded in the West as the cure for all post-colonialist ills, independently of local social and political conditions. But although this particular Point Four for underdeveloped intellectuals is now largely accepted, the need for a systematic association between economic aid and social reform is far from being generally recognised. The Alliance for Progress is a step in this direction, but the means to implement it are not yet clear. If the Russians have difficulties with the 'national bourgeoisie', so have the Americans. Local vested interests, relying on the nationalist panacea ('aid with no strings attached'), and on a certain degree of blackmailing (by pointing to a communist danger or the possibility of *rapprochement* with the Soviet bloc), can both effectively extort aid and prevent its sensible use. Generally speaking, in all the underdeveloped countries, a viable political order depends no less on the present agricultural policy than on the future rate of industrialisation, and the chances of subversion are inversely proportional to the degree to which local political elites are ready to act upon this rather obvious observation.

This is not to say that the complex circumstances of so many different countries can be reduced to a single factor, the understanding of which will make a political solution of the problem easy. Wisdom, including political wisdom, depends, as we know from the time of Aristotle, on the ability to differentiate. Indeed, the very concept of 'underdeveloped countries' may by now be an obstacle to understanding, by focusing our attention too exclusively on just one characteristic, however important, of 'the revolution of rising expectations'. In doing so, the social, cultural, and historical backgrounds of different societies disappear behind a cloud of economic generalisations.

This is probably the greatest handicap for Soviet policy in these areas. It is not just bound to a cliché; it is tied to a dogma and has to live up to a scheme which is of very limited relevance to the particular countries with which it has to deal. Admittedly, it starts with certain advantages: it has a revolutionary theory, it can play upon social discontents and post-colonialist frustrations, it offers a myth of accelerated industrial development. But it also suffers from grave deficiencies: it does not understand

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the sociological or anthropological elements of the real situation and consequently misjudges the behaviour-pattern of social groups and political elites in these countries.

The Russians are presumably slowly learning to be more subtle. By now they have had their share of experience, in Guinea and elsewhere, of the perils of the policy of subversion-cum-economic aid. Moreover, the Soviet programmes of African, Oriental, and Latin American studies are getting into their stride and a greater degree of political sophistication is only to be expected in the future. Even so, Soviet policies are on the whole unlikely to lose their schematic flavour.

IT has been pointed out in these columns that the Soviet image of the national bourgeoisie has been vague, contradictory, and subject to constant modification.[1] Paradoxically, the Soviet attitude to it was hostile when, according to the more recent interpretation, the national bourgeoisie was ' progressive ', leading the struggle for national liberation, and became more friendly more recently, when it is ceasing to be ' progressive ', or at least is becoming less so.

Political realities and the need to support, for reasons of state, the leaders of the national movements of the new countries, do not, however, preclude allusions to their pernicious or at least contradictory role. In particular, it is categorically stated that their socialist pretensions must not be accepted as the real thing; they can be genuine only if they have the communist stamp. The local brands of socialism are rejected as fraudulent deceptions of the masses. Thus Yuri Popov, writing in *Asia and Africa Today* (December 1961), explained that ' pro-imperialist circles hiding behind talk about " real African socialism ", are attempting to castrate the class content of the proletarian struggle and to force the African working class to betray the principles of proletarian internationalism, as well as to drag into the African working-class movement the narrow nationalist slogan that " all Africans are brothers ". However, this false bourgeois thesis will become less and less popular on the African continent . . . The day is not far off when the all-conquering teachings of scientific socialism will triumph on the African continent '. No less emphatic is the Director of the Soviet African Institute, I. I. Potekhin, who declared in the *World Marxist Review* (November 1961), that ' there is a lot of talk about socialism in Africa, and the ideas of socialism are fairly widespread, but these ideas are not those of scientific socialism ', and elsewhere explained that ' the theory of " African Socialism " is being used to deceive the toiling masses in the interest of the capitalist development ' (*Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1, 1962). This, according to him, is the more easy, not only because of their ' petty-bourgeois mentality ', but also because of their persistent tribalism, which, as he now admits, cannot be entirely blamed on the pernicious influence of the imperialists (*Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 2, 1962).

[1] W. Z. Laqueur, ' Soviet Doctrine and the New Countries ', *Survey*, No. 37.

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There are other statements of this kind. In the November 1961 issue of *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniya* G. Mirsky and V. Tyagunenko criticised the concept of 'Arab, Indian, or African socialism', and the May 1962 issue of the same magazine declared:

> The situation is changing. . . . The movement of national liberation is acquiring a new character. . . . Life is putting in first place in the independent countries the task of internal social transformation. . . . These demands inevitably create sharp social conflicts, since they affect the interests of the ruling groups.

The latest of such pronouncements was made by Khrushchev himself.

Speaking in Sofia on 18 May, he said that many Asian and African countries announce that socialism is being built there, and that one could only rejoice that the liberated peoples were tying their future to socialism. 'But what kind of socialism do they mean?' he asked. 'How do they interpret it? On what forces do they intend to rely in building socialism?' And he pointedly added that the present nationalist leaders would have to understand that 'it was only by relying on the working class that victory could be achieved and correct solutions found to vital social problems, or else other people would come after them who would better understand the demands of life' (*Pravda,* 20 May 1962).

But the Soviet leaders speak a different language when they are dealing directly with the African leaders. Thus Mikoyan declared during his visit to Accra that Ghana 'had made great progress in building socialism in the country' and enlarged further on the point:

> Our parties operate under different conditions; they have a different history and different tasks. What brings us nearer to each other, however, is your effort to build socialism. In the foreword to the Russian edition of his autobiography, your outstanding leader Dr Nkrumah wrote: 'The creed of our party is socialism.' Your party has assumed the task of stirring all people to attain and build socialism under African conditions (*Pravda,* 13 January 1962).

However, when Modibo Keita of Mali, and later Mamadou Dia of Senegal, visiting Moscow, proclaimed that the building of socialism is the official goal of their countries, their hosts carefully refrained from speaking on the subject, and limited themselves to diplomatic flattery and general references to the economic progress of these African countries. This probably reflects their frustration at not being more successful in inducing the African leaders to sever their economic and technical relations with the West, and particularly the association of some of them with the European Common Market. As Khrushchev put it with acerbity, instead of turning to their 'true friends', some 'honest leaders get themselves involved in bargains with imperialism'.

In praising his hosts, Modibo Keita went very far in exalting their ideology and even declared—rather like Fidel Castro—that the activists of his Sudanese Union Party 'had been guided since 1946 by the invaluable teachings of Marxism-Leninism' (*Pravda,* 22 May 1962). But he

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also discreetly added that 'the conditions in our country are somewhat different from yours, and so are our methods' (*Pravda,* 23 May 1962), and stressed its unchanging attachment to non-alignment:

> We have chosen the road of co-operation with all countries without exception. We are for non-alignment with the blocs and this is in our view the best way to maintain our independence by assuring our country a harmonious development (*Le Monde,* 1 June 1962).

Mamadou Dia was even more explicit:

> Our choice is to build socialism in our country, to build it not in the abstract, but concretely, not according to theoretical schemes, but in line with our own social and economic conditions. And we also say that we do not want to be dogmatists. I must tell you, as I should be frank here, that we do not pretend to be Marxists-Leninists (*Pravda,* 6 June 1962).

While not giving up its long term ideas, the Soviet attitude to the nationalist movements and to the national bourgeoisie in the developing countries depends for the moment on purely opportunist considerations, more particularly on the degree of political benefit it can derive from using them against the West. This explains both the vehemence against the countries 'governed by reactionary pact-makers' and the indulgence and continuous aid for neutralist countries where the communists have been suffering local reverses. It is precisely in the latter category that the economic aid given by the Soviet Union is proportionately the greatest.

This does not however preclude the pursuit of the strategic line aiming at the formation of states of 'national democracy'. Among the countries considered to be in the transitional stage towards the 'road of non-capitalist development' are Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, while Cuba has already reached that stage. Although Moscow must have realised by now that its possibilities of control are limited, and many surprises may be in store even within the ideologically kindred movements, its overall strategy has hardly changed. In Asia it gives diplomatic and military help to Soekarno, while the Indonesian communists who are represented in various organs of his 'guided democracy', are trying, as *Kommunist* (No. 6, 1962) points out, to transform it into a 'national democracy', a prospect considered realistic in view of the fact that 'the strong Indonesian Communist party, with its almost two million members and great authority over the masses, undoubtedly influences the policy of the government' (*Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniya,* No. 4, 1962, p. 78). In Latin America, it relies on the alliance with *fidelismo* and is ready to sacrifice for it the interests of the 'old cadre' communists. As the Escalante affair has shown, for the Soviet leaders 'Havana vaut une messe'. In Africa they probably reckon that the real chances of a communist challenge will arise only in a decade or so, and that by then the Moscow-trained cadres will be cured of their pan-African or Afro-communist leanings, and the influence of Western

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education will play a lesser role. It is precisely because of this that present prospects are limited, as is recognised in the case of Nigeria. It is emphasised that, at the moment, of the 'Nigerians in the governmental machine, holding high positions, 80 per cent. received their education in Britain. This has undoubtedly impressed its stamp on their way of thinking and behaving' (*Asia and Africa Today*, No. 4, 1962).

THESE calculations almost certainly underestimate the centrifugal pull of national sentiment, as well as of local interests, ambitions, and conditions; but the spectre of polycentrism does not prevent the Soviet Union from going vigorously ahead with its effort to train the pro-Soviet cadres and to use the ruble offensive to strengthen its positions in the developing countries, even though so far neither has been an unqualified success.

The training of cadres receives particularly great attention. The Lumumba University (formerly People's Friendship University) received a good deal of publicity, but there are many other institutions, less well-known, in which future political elites are being prepared from among the present semi-intelligentsia. Of particular importance are the schools for trade unionists (such as 'The Trade Union School of the World Federation of Trade Unions' in Budapest, or the Fritz Heckert trade union school in East Germany).[2] This is especially relevant for Africa, where the trade unions will play a crucial part in the political development of the continent.

The role of the intelligentsia is recognised, although in theoretical analyses it is still the spectre of the 'national bourgeoisie' that dominates the scene. The intelligentsia (or semi-intelligentsia) does not fit smoothly into the class scheme, although it can easily be coupled with the adjective 'progressive'. To apply it to the elements of the 'national bourgeoisie', the old theoretical game of distinguishing between its different strata is being played.[3] Thus the 'national bourgeoisie' is said to consist of three layers, the big, the middle, and the small bourgeoisie, and the differences in their political attitudes becomes more marked with the achievement of independence. Before then, the whole bourgeoisie is progressive, because it suffers under the imperialist yoke of foreign capital; afterwards it is only 'certain groups of the national entrepreneurs who are capable of undertaking resolute anti-imperialist action', while it is only the small bourgeoisie which shows progressive leanings. But, as Khrushchev reiterated in his speech in Sofia, the national bourgeoisie 'under contemporary conditions has not yet exhausted its progressive

[2] For this and other information on the subject cf. 'Der Ostblock und die Entwicklungsländer', Quarterly reports, published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Bonn.

[3] Cf. N. Savelyov, 'On the role of the national bourgeoisie in the national liberation movement', *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniya*, No. 5, 1962. Various other schemes, basically similar, were put forward at a conference on 'the problems of national liberation movements and social and economic development in the newly liberated countries', held under the auspices of the same journal. Cf. Ibid., Nos. 3, 4, and 5, 1962, and a series of articles on the subject by Jerzy Kleer in *Politika* (Warsaw) 28 April, 12 and 26 May, 1962.

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role'. In practice, the three-tier analysis of the 'national bourgeoisie' resembles a similar analysis of the Soviet peasantry during the time of collectivisation. While there can be no doubt that there were rich, middle, and poor peasants in Russia at the time, the label *kulak* was attached to all of them, whatever their actual station, if they refused to join the kolkhozes. Similarly the 'national bourgeoisie' is branded 'reactionary' when it refuses to follow Soviet injunctions and becomes 'progressive' when it joins the 'anti-imperialist front', whatever the actual social position it occupies within its own country. There are no attacks on the Imam of Yemen as a feudal reactionary, but it is said that 'in the Philippines, for instance, the destinies of the country are in the hands of the reactionary bourgeoisie, linked by common interest with the big landowning aristocracy and the foreign imperialists'. Nasser's 'Charter of National Action' indicating 'the Egyptian way to socialism' has not yet been commented upon, but no doubt it will present a rather involved problem for the Soviet theoreticians, who find it difficult enough to explain how 'the internal class contradictions can sometimes find their expression in action which seriously limits the rights of landlords, and even result in such governmental measures as the nationalisation of big capitalist property which has recently taken place in the United Arab Republic'.[4] The Indian 'national bourgeoisie' is commended for 'solving such national tasks as the liberation of Goa'. In Africa, Potekhin stated authoritatively, 'The antagonistic character of the contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and the working class is overshadowed by the unity of interests in the fight against imperialism.'[5] In Latin America, too, the attitude towards the 'national bourgeoisie' is a function of its position vis-a-vis 'Yankee imperialism'.[6]

But, on the whole, despite the doctrinal schematism, the Soviet Union is gradually coming to realise in practice the politically relevant distinctions of the local scene, even though it cannot always exploit them.[7] It would be paradoxical if the Western political analysis, unencumbered by doctrinal blinkers, failed to recognise them at a time when the new political elites in the developing countries are becoming more sophisticated about Soviet policies and purposes.

(*continued on page* 78)

[4] Ibid., pp. 100, 102. Cf. also R. Abakov and G. Mirsky, O klassovoi strukture v slaborazvitykh stranakh', ibid., No. 4, 1962: 'It is difficult to imagine that the bourgeoisie would exclude itself from such a profitable sphere of activity as banking and insurance' (p. 79).

[5] I. I. Potekhin in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1, 1962.

[6] Cf. Trinidad Martillo, 'Polityka SShA v Latinskoi Amerike', *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniya*, Nos. 3 and 4, 1962. Following the establishment of the Soviet African Institute, an Institute for Latin America has now been established within the Soviet Academy of Sciences (*Novaya i Noveyshaya Istoriya*, No. 2 1962).

[7] The anxiety about Western policies associated with reform in the newly emergent countries is reflected in such recent books as *Sotsial-reformizm i kolonialny vopros* (Moscow, 1961); E. D. Mordzhinskaya, *Ideologiya sovremennovo kolonializma* (Moscow, 1961); K. Brutents, *Protiv ideologii sovremennovo kolonializma* (Moscow, 1961).

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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE *TIERS MONDE*

Curt Gasteyger

IN no other field has the Soviet Union's political strategy undergone such far-reaching changes during the past decade as in its attitude to the non-committed newly developing nations. The prominent part they play today in Soviet political thinking and in Soviet propaganda for a 'broad zone of peace' makes it easy to forget that only ten years ago the very existence of such an intermediate group of countries, outside the two great world camps, was still firmly denied by the Soviet leadership.[1]

This is not the place to discuss in any detail the reasons for this striking change in Soviet policy. Suffice it to say that it was brought about largely as the result of two interdependent post-war developments —the unexpectedly rapid process of de-colonisation and the growing importance of the newly independent nations for the outcome of the overall East-West conflict—two new factors which compelled the Soviet Union, for the first time in its history, to enter the arena of world politics in the literal sense of the word. The actual (as distinct from the merely ideological) engagement of the Soviet Union in the non-committed regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America is a phenomenon of the utmost significance for the future course of world affairs. Stalin's successors were almost as unprepared for it as the politicians of the West. During Stalin's lifetime the East-West conflict had been almost wholly confined to the geographically adjacent zones of influence of the two rival camps. Soon after his death it began to reach every corner of the globe, and competitive coexistence became world-wide. This first emerged for all the world to see in 1956, with the Soviet intervention in the Suez conflict, i.e., in a region which, only a short time before, had still been regarded as the exclusive sphere of influence of the Western Powers. By 1957, when the first sputnik was launched, the world in general, and the non-committed countries in particular, regarded the event, as a matter of course, as a symptom of the Soviet Union's ubiquitous presence.

This novel concern with the developing nations brought the USSR face to face with a series of difficult problems of adaptation. It saddled the Soviet Union with additional economic burdens, and it presented its leaders with the formidable task of co-ordinating the many divergent views and objectives of the international communist movement. In fact, from the Soviet point of view, the non-committed world was nearly as much of a liability as a potential asset. While it presented the USSR with opportunities to extend its influence and conquer fresh political fields, it also involved it in reverses and all sorts of obligations. True,

[1] cf. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (Moscow, 1952).

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the Soviet Union enjoyed certain important advantages. It has been victorious over its own native feudalism, and it could point to a communist theory which had been consistently anti-colonial and anti-imperialist. Moreover, its persistent propagandist use of such seductive, if essentially hollow, slogans as 'peace', democracy', 'independence', 'self-determination', etc. gave it a distinct advantage over the more sober and more varied but also less impressive terminology of the West. Finally, there is the fact that the Soviet economic system can be presented as a ready-made model for the speedy solution of the main economic problems in most of the underdeveloped countries—an asset which may seem all the more attractive because of the wide-spread ignorance about the relatively high level from which these advances were made and the cost of communist advances in terms of human lives and human wretchedness.

EVEN so, the underdeveloped countries brought the Soviet Union up against problems which were not easy to solve in either theory or practice. It is not surprising therefore that the actual policy of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis these countries during the past eight years has been marked by some striking inconsistencies and twists and turns which, in some cases at least, made it plain to what extent Moscow had remained the prisoner of its own ideological prejudice and rigidity. As it happens, the colonial question is one of the few on which the communist classics, Marx and Engels, left their successors without guidance. True, Marx and Engels condemned colonial exploitation and prophesied the liberation of the colonies with the aid of the European proletariat. But for them this was merely a subsidiary issue. Their revolutionary theory was almost exclusively concerned with the conquest of power by the proletariat in the industrial countries of the West. One need only recall the difficulties under which Lenin laboured when he felt obliged to devise an ideological justification for the communist revolution in Russia, 'the weakest link in the chain of capitalist states'.

True, Lenin recognised, and on various occasions wrote about, the importance of the national liberation movements in China under Sun Yat-sen and in such Middle Eastern countries as Persia, Turkey, and Egypt. But the communists did not appreciate the full significance of these movements until after the disappointment of their hopes for a European revolution. It was only then that they seriously began to look beyond Europe and to think of the liberation of the colonial countries as a possible second front in the hope that, once imperialism had lost these countries with their vital markets, it would split up and eventually be overwhelmed by its own internal crises.

The strategy of this colonial revolution was first outlined in a series of theses adopted by the second congress of the Communist International in 1920. *Mutatis mutandis*, these theses were reaffirmed by the sixth congress of the Comintern in 1928. Thereafter, however—not least, presumably, because of the serious reverses which the communists had

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suffered in China—the communist liberation movement remained a dead letter for more than twenty years. Under Stalin's rule Soviet policy concentrated on the construction of socialism in one country.

In view of their similarity with the current strategy of communism, it seems appropriate to recall the more important communist theses on colonialism of those earlier days. They stated among other things:

1. In view of the absence of communist successes in the industrial countries of the West, the opportunity for revolutionary expansion has shifted to the colonial areas of the world. National liberation movements weaken the position of imperialism even where the conditions are not yet ripe for a communist conquest of power.

2. As the proletarian forces in the colonial countries are not yet sufficiently developed for independent action, they must conclude temporary alliances with the nationalist, bourgeois-democratic movements of their countries for the joint struggle against imperialism and for national liberation.

3. The achievement of national independence in the colonial countries is merely a first step which creates the essential prerequisites of a revolutionary transformation. It creates the conditions in which it will be possible to complete the transition from a national and colonial to a socialist revolution.

4. Within the nationalist, bourgeois-democratic alliance the progressive forces (i.e. the communists) must maintain their complete ideological independence and must concentrate on the systematic education of the future cadres of the proletarian parties in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. In the last analysis it is always up to the communist parties to lead the revolutionary movements in the colonial countries.

THIS was a programme which the Soviet communists could easily have revived after the second world war and which might have given them the chance of considerable successes in the newly developing countries. That they did not in fact do so seems to have been mainly due to the fact that Stalin thought exclusively in terms of the 'two world camps', in which there was no room for a third force—a fact which indicates how singularly he failed to appreciate the political significance of the colonial liberation movement. Only after Stalin's death, and after many reverses, did the Soviet Union find its way back to the position from which it had started out in 1920. But this was no easy task. In fact, despite repeated attempts to adapt its policies to the actual conditions of today, the Soviet Union has even now not yet succeeded in developing a long-term and generally valid theory for the relationship between communists and the newly developing nations. In view of the complex situation in these areas this would in any case be a pretty hopeless undertaking; but that of course is something that the Soviet ideologists cannot admit. The declaration of the 81 communist parties of December 1960 and the new programme of the CPSU both demonstrate that the communists continue to try

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to translate their ideological dogma into a universally binding general line which would help them to advance towards their dual goal of weakening the West and further expanding communist rule. In its practical application this general line is expressed in certain fixed programmatic aims which are identical for all the developing regions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They include everywhere the promotion of the 'national liberation struggle'; the foundation of, and support for, 'progressive' (i.e. communist or pro-communist) parties and groups; the formation of anti-imperialist or anti-feudalist alliances or popular fronts; the economic and cultural penetration of individual countries; the training of scientific and technical cadres; and, on the international plane, the creation of a 'zone of peace' embracing the countries which are committed to 'positive neutralism' and who can be induced to support the foreign policy of the communist states, whether exemplified by the 'five principles of coexistence', the demand for general and complete disarmament, or the call for the banning of nuclear weapons and tests. The shrinking support for the Western powers in the United Nations General Assembly on certain important questions shows that these Soviet efforts have had some success.

In its approach to individual continents and even more to individual countries the USSR has experienced rather greater difficulties. So far at least communist doctrine and Soviet policy have failed to take sufficient account of the very great variations between the economic, political, and cultural structures of the different developing regions and countries. Some instances of this will be discussed later. They illustrate the chief problems which face the Soviet Union in its practical relations with the underdeveloped countries and which can be defined in the form of the following questions: To what extent do the social structures of the developing countries correspond to the conditions which, according to Marxist-Leninist theory, are the prerequisites of a revolutionary transformation? Do they contain even the rudimentary elements for the development of a socialist state or a socialist economy? Is it possible, within the cultural and intellectual atmosphere of these countries, to train cadres in strict proletarian-communist discipline, or are the prevailing anti-Western and neutralist trends in these countries based on altogether different motives and sentiments, such as nationalism, racialism, pan-Africanism, etc? A glance at certain specific aspects of Soviet policy vis-à-vis the developing countries shows that Moscow has still a long way to go before it can hope to find adequate answers to these questions.

WHEN the Soviet leaders, after Stalin's death, began to review their policy, they had to proceed from the (to them) disagreeable fact that the former colonies had achieved their independence without the liquidation of capitalism, without a communist revolution, and even without any conspicuous help from the communist parties. All this compelled some fresh thinking about the colonial liberation movement,

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and as a result the Soviet Union began to attach greater importance than in the past to the role of the national bourgeoisie in the developing countries and to be rather more cautious in its estimate of the so-called revolutionary forces, i.e. the influence of the communist parties. It began also to think anew about the objectives of the liberation movements, especially about the different stages which are to lead from the national to the social revolution culminating in the communist conquest of power.

In theory it was of course easy to distinguish between (pro-communist) genuinely revolutionary and (bourgeois national) pseudo-revolutionary forces. In practice, however, it often proved exceedingly difficult to differentiate precisely between those 'genuinely' progressive and socialist forces of a particular country which are communist or pro-communist, and other movements which, though they may call themselves socialist, are not so in fact in the Marxist-Leninist sense of the term. As a result, the Soviet leaders have frequently been deceived by the socialist labels of nationalist movements, especially in Africa. It is not surprising, in the light of these experiences, that they should now lay particular emphasis on the need for careful discrimination. 'In Africa', wrote Ivan Potekhin, the Soviet specialist on African affairs, 'they talk a great deal about socialism; in fact socialist ideas are very popular there; but, in most cases, these are ideas which have nothing in common with scientific socialism'.[2] Khrushchev, too, laid stress on the need for such distinctions: 'Communists support the general democratic measures of national governments. At the same time, communists explain to the masses that these measures are in no sense socialist measures.'[3] In other words, the Soviet spokesmen now go out of their way to emphasise that they are prepared to give their full support to the anti-imperialist struggle of the new left-wing regimes in the developing countries but that they are not prepared to recognise these countries as socialist states. In making this distinction they guard themselves against accepting responsibility for the actual or potential failures of these new regimes and, at the same time, they provide their potential critics within their own camp with a plausible explanation for the many disappointments which the new regimes have caused them despite all declarations of friendship and despite extensive economic aid.

Another serious difficulty which they have to face is connected with the role of the communist parties in Africa.[4] They have exercised great restraint in founding new communist parties there or in supporting existing ones. No doubt they have done so partly for tactical reasons, i.e. because of their overriding desire to establish friendly relations with the ruling non-communist regimes even if that could be achieved only at the cost of refraining from assisting the frequently illegal communist

[2] I. Potekhin, in *Aziya i Afrika sevodnia* (Moscow), No. 10, 1961.
[3] Speech of 6 January 1961.
[4] cf. Walter Z. Laqueur, 'Communism and Nationalism in Tropical Africa', *Foreign Affairs* (New York), No. 4, 1961; David L. Morison, 'Communism in Africa', *Problems of Communism*, No. 6, 1961; N. Numade, 'The decision for a New Africa', *The African Communist* (London), No. 5, 1961.

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parties. But this has not been the only reason for their restraint. It stemmed also from their obvious scepticism about the peculiar facets of Afro-communism, which remains ideologically ill-defined and which differs profoundly from both European and Asian communism. In the long run, in any case, Moscow will hardly be able to tolerate the many political variations and ideological peculiarities of the African Left without being driven to insist on a clear distinction between 'genuine' communists and quasi-communist nationalists. There remains the difficult problem of how such distinction is to be made in practice. What kind of criteria must be applied in order to discover which groups are truly progressive and revolutionary and which, notwithstanding their leftist phraseology, are merely nationalists imbued with anti-Western resentments? Communist literature does not answer this question for the simple reason that it cannot be answered in general terms. For the time being, at any rate, the communists accept the nationalist regimes as auxiliaries in the struggle against imperialism. Of course, this involves them in the risk of underestimating the independent strength of the nationalist forces, as they did in fact in the case of Egypt and Iraq and, more recently, Guinea. The Soviet Union is clearly in danger of repeating in Africa the mistakes which it had made earlier in the Middle East, where the anti-colonialist nationalists freed themselves from communist tutelage as soon as their country had become independent and they themselves had come to power.

IT is presumably because of these experiences that the communists now once again tend to take a somewhat more critical view of the role of the national bourgeoisie in the developing countries. From about 1955 onwards they began to acknowledge its importance for the national liberation struggle and to plead for a time, almost without criticism, for an alliance between their own very weak supporters in these countries and the anti-Western sections of the national bourgeoisie. They still regard the national bourgeoisie as a valuable ally in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, but they now once more put greater emphasis on its dual role as a currently progressive but potentially reactionary force. This emerges from both the Moscow declaration of 1960 and the new CPSU programme, which has this to say on the subject: 'In the colonial, ex-colonial, and dependent countries the national bourgeoisie which is not connected with imperialist circles is, in contemporary conditions, objectively concerned with the realisation of the fundamental tasks of the anti-imperialist and the anti-feudalist revolution. Consequently its progressive role and its ability to participate in the solution of essential all-national tasks are not yet exhausted. However, with the growth of the contradictions between the working and the propertied classes and with the aggravation of the class struggle within each country, the national bourgeoisie shows an ever-increasing inclination towards collaboration with imperialism and reaction at home.'

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There is a special need, from the Soviet point of view, for a clear distinction between the various revolutionary and political forces in Africa. A national bourgeoisie in the communist sense of the term hardly exists there. It is true that even Soviet specialists have realised that any future analysis of the national bourgeoisie will have to be based not only (and perhaps not mainly) on economic factors; nevertheless, Soviet spokesmen specially stress also in the case of Africa the leading role of the working class in the struggle for liberation, although, according to the admission of an African communist, 'a developed proletariat exists there only in a few small areas'.[5]

Neither this nor the fact that communist parties exist only in a very few African countries prevents the Soviet leaders from proclaiming that in Africa, too, the liberation movement must sooner or later come under the leadership of the communist party. So long as this cannot be achieved, Soviet efforts are concentrated on the trade unions. In contrast to Asia where some countries, such as Indonesia and India, have strong communist parties, the only effective organisations in Africa (apart from the armies) are the trade unions. Sekou Touré probably did not exaggerate when he declared that 'the future course of Africa depends not least on the African trade unions. Their decisions will be of decisive importance for the whole continent'.[6] The communists seem to have understood this and to have acted accordingly, as the following summary of Potekhin's argument indicates.[7] He maintains:

1. In Africa south of the Sahara the national bourgeoisie is still weak or has hardly come into being. It lacks all traditions comparable to those of the national bourgeoisie in Asia or, one might add, Latin America, and it lacks traditional bourgeois parties such as for instance the Indian National Congress. Class relations, generally speaking, are hardly or not at all developed.

2. The social structure in Africa south of the Sahara is based on patriarchal-feudal relations, with a strong survival of tribal organisation. Private land ownership hardly exists.

3. Trade unions, by contrast, even though they may still be weak, developed in nearly all countries of Africa during the period of colonialism in connection with the foreign-owned mining and similar industries. In some of the countries the trade unions are now closely tied to the state and government or to the ruling party. Some of the important new African leaders come from the trade union movement and some of them are still today trade union leaders.

[5] F. Kumalo in *The African Communist*, No. 4, 1961. Potekhin, on the other hand, stresses the importance of the numerical strength of the working class in many African countries. His estimate is a total of 15 million (op. cit.). The *World Marxist Review* (No. 2, 1961) estimates their number outside the Union of South Africa at about 5,320,000, and in Africa as a whole at 10–11 million, out of a total population of approximately 230 million. Cf. also 'Podem rabochevo dvizheniya v stranakh Azii i Afriki', *Kommunist*, 1962, No. 6, pp. 103–111.

[6] Quoted from the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 4 February 1961.

[7] *Problemy Vostokovedeniya* (Moscow), No. 1, 1960.

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For all these reasons the communists have made a special effort to gain a foothold in the African trade unions, with the inevitable result of dividing and splitting them. Even the Nigerian Trade Union Congress, which once seemed to be immune to left-wing influences, is now split into various rival wings. The All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF), founded in May 1961, is under strong communist influence, and most of the more liberal-minded unions, many of which belong to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, refuse to co-operate with it. Even so, the Soviet Union is by no means satisfied with the AATUF. The *World Marxist Review* has criticised its pan-African programme, first, because it has allegedly failed to state clearly that it aimed, politically, at national liberation, and, economically, at both a complete break with the foreign capitalist monopolies and at the nationalisation of the basic industries; and, second, because it advocated a wrong kind of neutralism which treated the socialist camp on a par with the capitalist camp.[8] All this seems to indicate that Moscow cannot rely even on the left-wing African trade unions as a secure basis for its future policy in Africa.

ANOTHER problem of increasing importance for communist policy in the developing countries is that of agrarian reform and, closely connected with this, that of drawing the peasant populations of these countries into alliance with the 'progressive forces'. Of special significance in this context has been the example of Cuba which, together with other Latin American developments, provided a fresh stimulus for discussion. At one such discussion, which took place in September 1960, the Soviet representative Ulianovsky outlined what must be regarded as the authoritative communist view on the matter.[9] According to Ulianovsky, it was mainly the support of the peasantry which enabled the national bourgeoisie after the second world war to seize power in a number of countries in Asia and certain parts of Africa. The national bourgeoisie—he explained—managed to retain this peasant support largely because it succeeded in separating the anti-imperialist from the anti-feudal struggle, with the result that the revolutionary energies of the peasantry were diverted from the struggle for agrarian reform, however overdue, and concentrated solely on the task of national liberation. Subsequent agrarian reforms which the national bourgeoisie was impelled to carry out in nearly all Asian countries benefited, according to Ulianovsky, only the wealthy and the middle peasants but not the smallholders. In this way the national bourgeoisie was able to evade or postpone a radical agrarian revolution. As the peasantry in the developing countries was still very weak and had not yet come under the leadership of the working class, it was unable to overthrow the

[8] Ali Yata, 'New Weapon for Embattled Africa', *World Marxist Review*, No. 12, 1961.
[9] 'The Agrarian Problem and the National Liberation Movement', *World Marxist Review*, Nos. 1 and 2, 1961.

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landowner; but conditions in most of these countries remain very unstable and they are becoming increasingly ripe for revolutionary action.

The conclusions drawn from this discussion stress that only a radical solution of the agrarian question can create the conditions in which the developing countries can attain true economic independence from the foreign colonialists. The peasantry, according to this doctrine, plays a progressive-revolutionary role in all the developing countries, irrespective of the fact whether such a peasant class actually exists or not. At least so far as Africa is concerned, this must be regarded as very much open to doubt.

There is no comparable analysis to be found in communist literature of the role of the intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia and their decisive significance for the liberation movements. This omission is all the more striking as the intelligentsia, which in most of the developing countries now belongs to the ruling stratum, provided the vital inspiration for all the nationalist and anti-colonial movements. The Soviet theoreticians admit of course that it has its limited significance. But as they deny that the intelligentsia possesses the attributes of a genuine class, they insist that it can play a truly progressive role only after it has subordinated itself to the leadership of the communist party. This systematic belittling of the role of the intelligentsia prevented the Soviet politicians in many cases from gaining access to politically decisive groups in the developing countries. It also illustrates how hard it is for them to free themselves from dogmatic ideologies and to see things as they really are.

THE speed with which the process of emancipation was completed in most of the former colonies made it urgent for the Soviet Union to decide how it would treat the newly independent states of Africa and Asia if it wanted to continue to play the role of their champion. Or, as the textbook *Foundations of Marxism-Leninism* put it: 'Wise statesmanship consists precisely in the ability to devise, after the achievement of national independence, the right methods for the solution of those burning questions of social advance which every country must solve'. Moscow's approach was that of seeking to draw a clear dividing line between the stage of political emancipation, which the new states had already achieved, and economic independence, which for most of them was said to be still a distant goal. As Ponomarev, for instance, explained in the Soviet journal *Kommunist* (1961, No. 8): 'Political emancipation is the first step on the road to the achievement of true freedom. The second no less important step is the attainment of economic emancipation, the creation of an independent, developed economy. Until this second stage is reached, independence cannot be regarded as secure'. The developing countries, it is alleged, are still living under the capitalist dictates of neo-colonialism from which they have still to liberate themselves with the aid of the 'socialist camp'.

It was in connection with these ideas that Moscow developed the

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theory of the national democracies as new types of independent states. It was first publicised in the Moscow declaration of 1960 and was later incorporated into the new programme of the CPSU. By now it belongs to the basic tenets of communist policy vis-à-vis the developing countries. The term national democracy is used to describe a higher stage in the struggle for liberation which, according to Moscow, must aim at the complete elimination of all Western influence from the world of the non-committed developing countries. A national democracy in this sense is a state *sui generis*—a country which has completed the first stage of national revolution and which, in its internal social order, stands approximately halfway between the capitalist West and the communist people's democracies. The formation of such a state—as Ponomarev explained in *Kommunist*—corresponds to the vital task of uniting all progressive forces in a broad national front against imperialism; its programme must include both economic and political independence from imperialism within the framework of ' positive neutrality '; opposition to military blocs and foreign bases; and, internally, a broad form of democracy which leaves the way open for large-scale agrarian and social reforms.

Ponomarev made it clear that the Soviet Union regards a state of this type as no more than a transitional stage to a higher form of organisation. ' There is no doubt ', he wrote, ' that a national-democratic state makes it possible to open up prospects—as the objective and subjective pre-conditions ripen, depending on the struggle of the peoples of these countries—for a transition to a higher form of social structure '. The national democracies, in other words, are one way to socialism. This view evidently rests on the assumption that the strength of the bourgeois leadership will sooner or later be exhausted in the struggle for power; that the communist party will have a chance of increasing its influence; and that economic and social conditions will be favourable to revolutionary action. Once all this happens, the national democracies will be ripe for the transition from the national to the social (communist) revolution.

Of special importance in this context are of course the economic prospects of the developing countries. The Soviet Union, and the rest of the Soviet bloc, have increased their economic aid to these countries in recent years, but they have done so with discrimination. They have concentrated their aid on certain particular projects, primarily heavy industry plants and spectacular buildings such as sports stadiums, hotels, congress halls, etc., and they have given rather more aid to some of the developing countries than to others. In Asia they have given preference to India, Indonesia, Iraq, and, to a lesser extent, Burma; in Africa to Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and Ethiopia; and in Latin America, of course, principally to Cuba. Most of these are countries which have already made some progress on the way to economic independence, a fact which would seem to indicate that Moscow's hope for the separation of these countries from the West rests largely on their economic

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development. For this reason it has welcomed and supported all economic measures which tended to create difficulties between the developing countries and the West, such as the expropriation of foreign-owned industrial and agrarian enterprises, the state control of imports and exports, etc.[10] Generally speaking, what the Soviet Union advocates for these countries at this juncture is a form of state capitalism.

FINALLY, there is the Soviet bid for cultural influence in the developing countries. Since the 20th CPSU congress in 1956 the Soviet Union itself has done a great deal to broaden and intensify its Oriental and African studies. Soviet scientific studies in these fields are nowadays far more concrete and realistic than they used to be. In 1959 the Soviet Academy of Sciences set up a new centre for African studies, the African Institute in Moscow, which supplemented the already existing Institutes for Oriental Studies (especially the Orientalist faculty of the Leningrad University), the Moscow and Tashkent Institutes for Oriental Studies, and the Moscow Institute of International Relations. The work of these Institutes, which is to provide the Soviet politicians with suitable material, covers language courses, the publication of dictionaries and historical monographs as well as the training of Soviet specialists. Among the projects of the Africa Institute is that of rewriting the history of Africa, which, according to Potekhin, will be the first 'real' history of the African peoples, as all bourgeois histories of the African peoples suffer from the grossest kind of distortions. It is to be the task of this 'real' history to throw light on the great past of the African peoples and to review critically the harmful policy of their former colonial masters who, among other damage, had injured the Africans through the arbitrary drawing of frontiers and the artificial division of peoples with a common language. It appears to be the main purpose of this approach to make the Africans conscious of the difference between ethnical frontiers and the current state frontiers in Africa so as to promote the pan-African movement for the unification of the many different national states. Moscow evidently hopes that by exploiting pan-Africanism the communists can gain greater influence and undermine to its own advantage the present political order in Africa.

In addition to its propaganda along these lines the Soviet Union makes use of numerous specialist organisations which all serve the purpose of direct cultural infiltration into the developing countries. Among them are the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the Afro-Asian Writers' Union, as well as countless bi-lateral Friendship Societies and women's and youth organisations. There are furthermore the various cultural agreements as well as the increasing number of students, trade unionists, technicians, teachers, etc. who get much or the whole of their training in communist countries. The greatest project of this kind is the Peoples Friendship University 'Patrice Lumumba' in Moscow which is to serve 4,500

[10] *Aziya i Afrika Sevodnia*, No. 10, 1961.

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students from Asia, Africa, and Latin America and which, in addition to a Russian language course, has six regular faculties for engineering, agriculture, medicine, natural sciences, history and literature, and economics and international law. The Soviet government deliberately refrained from stressing the dependence of this international university on the state or the communist party of the USSR. Its official sponsors were all nominally independent bodies such as the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with the Nations of Asia and Africa, the Union of the Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. It remains to be seen to what extent Moscow will succeed in winning the foreign students for its own purposes. The reports of some African students who attended these courses indicate that the results achieved so far are not always encouraging.

EVEN this sketchy survey of some of the more important aspects of Soviet policy vis-à-vis the developing countries indicates, not only the breadth and the many-sidedness of the Soviet engagement in the non-committed world, but also its manifold problems. No doubt the very complexity of the task has often been too intricate for communist ideology and has compelled it to make more and more concessions to regional, national, and even local realities. The simplified juxtaposition of communism and capitalism and the categorical denial of a possible third way for the developing countries hardly correspond either to the existing social and political conditions or to the prevailing public opinion in these countries. It is worth noting in this context that the Soviet definition of the kind of neutrality which it is willing to tolerate or promote is becoming steadily narrower. This emerges from both the foreign policy programme which the Soviet Union tries to prescribe for the national democracies and the particular stress which it now lays on the need for the ' positive ' character of neutrality. No doubt this represents the first stage of Moscow's attempt to transform the non-committed into a committed world in which neutralism no longer has a place. It is a policy which, in the last analysis, is based on Moscow's continuing confidence in the historical inevitability of the eventual world-wide victory of communism, but which, for a number of reasons over which Soviet policy has no direct control, may well suffer failure. The continuing shrinkage of the remaining colonial territories is bound to deprive Soviet policy of much of its impetus; and there is no reason to believe that the ' national democracies ' will actually develop as the Soviet Union hopes they will. The tension between the Soviet Union and Guinea which last December came into the open may well be a first indication of a rather different kind of development. And although Moscow asserts that the existence of the ' world camp of socialism ' is the main condition for the non-capitalist development of the Asian, African, and Latin American states, it does not follow by any means that this non-capitalist way must necessarily be a communist one.

There is the further fact that the polycentric tendencies within the

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international communist movement, especially the Soviet-Chinese conflict over the correct attitude to the non-committed nations, may well lead to openly divergent communist policies within these areas. The struggle for communist unity, which is so difficult to achieve even within the bloc, is hardly made easier by the frequent deviations outside the bloc, especially in Africa. In this respect at least time is not likely to be on Moscow's side. The difference between the Soviet and the Chinese approach to the developing nations is among other things closely connected with the different internal situation in the two countries. No doubt, the more cautious Soviet approach reflects the profound transformation which has already taken place in Soviet society. In contrast to the more activist and more revolutionary Chinese approach, the Soviet Union looks among the developing countries first of all for allies and relies on gradual methods rather than on revolutionary action. Moscow appreciates that, in present conditions, revolutionary action could only end in failure, and it deems it wiser therefore, at least for the time being, to cooperate with the present rulers of the developing countries.

All this may be in sharp contrast to the revolutionary fervour of the 1920s; on the other hand, there is no doubt that, especially among the developing countries, the communist economic and social programme serves as a substitute, or support, for a unified political dogma. The continuing social-revolutionary process in this area is the real motor of the communist movement. It may be true, as George Kennan said, that the East-West rivalry for the non-committed world has resulted in a de-polarisation of the East-West conflict, but it is doubtful whether this has decreased international tension. In fact, the opposite seems to have happened; Soviet engagement in the developing regions of the world has merely multiplied the areas of conflict with the West. While Stalin was clearly reluctant and unable to produce a series of simultaneous crises, Khrushchev's strategy, to use Philip Mosely's term, appears to be that of the rolling crisis. It is by no means certain that Moscow will always be able to keep this strategy under its control, and if one looks upon its policy vis-à-vis the developing countries with this aspect in mind, it is not easy to feel particularly optimistic about its future course; or quite certain about the outcome of the present one.

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THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA

Hugh Seton-Watson

INTELLIGENTSIA is a famous Russian word, and the social groups to which it has been applied have played, and perhaps still play, an important part in the life of the Russian people. We are here concerned with the difference between its roles before and after the revolution. Before the revolution, it was on the whole a factor of disruption: the alienation of the educated elite from the social and political system of Imperial Russia provided the soil in which the seeds of revolution were planted, and it was from the intelligentsia that the small but active minority of professional revolutionaries was recruited. After the revolution, on the other hand, a new intellectual elite was systematically developed, and its role has been—especially since the destruction of the survivors of the old elite in the Great Purge of 1936–1939—to provide the brains and the organising ability required by the Soviet regime. From a factor of disruption, the intelligentsia has been changed into a factor of conservation, a beneficiary of the new order. Such at least is the impression received from a first glance at the two periods.

The pattern is not of course entirely surprising. There have been many cases in history of revolutionary groups turning into reactionary holders of power, of oppressed classes becoming oppressor classes. But the issue is complicated both by the peculiar experience of Russia and by the peculiar use of words by the exponents of the Soviet regime.

First of all, what is the intelligentsia? It is not simply an intellectual elite, which in some form or another exists in every society. The intelligentsia, as a distinct social group with a distinct political role of its own, is found only in ' underdeveloped societies '—that is, in societies subjected to an artificially accelerated process of modernisation. Intellectuals in Western Europe or North America are a part of the bourgeoisie. In underdeveloped societies, where it can hardly be said that a bourgeoisie exists, the intellectual elite form a separate category. In Western Europe the secular intellectual elite grew up with society as a whole, evolving slowly from the medieval intellectual elite grouped around the Catholic church, in the centuries following the Reformation. This process was more rapid, and more obvious, in Protestant than in Catholic countries, but it took place also in Catholic France, Northern Italy, and Western Germany. It was greatly accelerated by the industrial revolution of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, which created a demand for new and old skills on a hitherto unprecedented scale. In North America the processes which had started under European colonial rule continued after independence. But in Russia, and in the other societies which later embarked on the process of modernisation, the process was neither slow nor spontaneous. Modernisation was adopted, in various degrees and at

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various pace, by the governments, for reasons of state, and in all cases required the artificial creation of a modern secular intellectual elite.

The intelligentsia, as it arose in Russia and elsewhere, was a part of the modern elite, but was not identical with the whole of it. No one can be regarded as a member of the intelligentsia in an ' underdeveloped society ' who does not possess a substantial modern education, but not all who possess such an education are members of the intelligentsia. A modernising government's first aim in the artificial creation of a modern elite is to create competent bureaucrats, generals, admirals, diplomats and the like, as well as a certain number of learned practitioners of those sciences most likely to contribute to the strength of the state. Peter the Great, Sultan Mahmud II, Mohammed Ali, and the Japanese reformers of the Meiji Era are examples. Those who, after acquiring the necessary skills, obtained leading posts in the state service, or made outstanding academic careers, can hardly be regarded as belonging to the intelligentsia.

A MEMBER of the intelligentsia is someone with a modern education who lives for and by political and social ideas. He is distinguished from other well-educated people in his society not by the quality of his education or his intellectual distinction, but by his preoccupation with ideas. A brilliant physicist who is absorbed in his scientific work is not a member of the intelligentsia: a clerk with a secondary school education for whom the most important things in life are general political and social ideas, and their application to his society, is a member of the intelligentsia. The late Patrice Lumumba, for example, was undoubtedly of the intelligentsia. It is obvious that the greater part of the intelligentsia is to be found in what in the West are called the ' free professions ', among people who have no official status in the machinery of government. This does not mean that they need earn their living from unofficial sources. There is a distinction between government employees and government officials. In Imperial Russia a very large number of doctors and junior medical personnel were on the government pay-roll (Ministry of Interior or its provincial or district authorities). But they were not considered to be officials (*chinovniki*). Many engineers, statisticians, agricultural experts or economists were employed by *zemstvos*. The great majority of school-teachers were employed by the Ministry of Education or its lower authorities. But all these people were regarded as professional people, quite different from the bureaucrats who did the business of governing Russia. However, it would be wrong to imagine that there were not also individual bureaucrats, and individual army officers who, being preoccupied with political and social ideas, belonged to the intelligentsia. Probably there were not many of these in Russia after the failure of the Decembrists (who were of course a classical example of ' intelligentsia-in-uniform '). But in later underdeveloped societies there have been, and no doubt still are, many such. Colonel Nasser is a striking example.

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The frustrations of the intelligentsia—the politically conscious unofficial section of the modern intellectual elite—in the early stages of the process of modernisation are fairly well known by now. Imperial Russia was of course the most striking example of them. There are four principal sources of frustration.

The first is their isolation from the mass of their compatriots. This 'cultural gap' is quite inevitable at the beginning of the process. But a great deal depends on the speed with which the modernising government becomes aware of the nature of the gap, and sets itself to narrow it. Here Russia is the extreme example of what not to do. The class bias introduced into education by Uvarov, and perpetuated by his successors right up to 1905, and with only slight modification up to 1917, artificially kept the gap wide for far longer than was necessary. The opposite example was Japan, where within some thirty years of the revolution almost all boys and girls had a minimum compulsory schooling of four years, soon increased to six.

The second source of frustration is the contrast between the ideas which the intelligentsia learned during their education and the political system under which their people lived. Here again Russia is an extreme example, since the dogma of autocracy, with its complete denial of representative government, freedom of political opinion, and freedom of association, was maintained right up to 1905. Those educated Russians who wished to make government careers were forced to abandon their beliefs or to live a double life of conspiracy. Those who were determined to preserve their ideas—and in Russia these formed an exceptionally high proportion—were obliged to remain outside government. Being thus excluded by their own choice from any experience of the practice of government, they preserved their ideas in their pristine revolutionary purity in a manner that was inconceivable in countries of free institutions, where government became to some extent invigorated by the infusion of ideas, and ideas were modified by knowledge of the political facts of life.

The third source of frustration is awareness of the contrast between their country's economic backwardness and the possibilities of an advanced economy shown by contemporary industrialised and urbanised societies. This was a less important factor in the case of the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia than were the first two. Indeed it may be argued that this aspect of Russia's condition was of greater interest to Russia's tsars and ministers, from Nicholas I to Witte, than to the populists or even the marxists, obsessed with moral and social problems. Even the marxists in Russia were not very much interested in economics. Those Russian marxists whose interests were economic, such as Struve or Prokopovich, ceased to be marxists. It was that section of Russian marxism which put moral and political issues first which triumphed. Lenin of course studied economic problems, but he was a politician and a moralist rather than an economist. However, in the underdeveloped societies of the mid-twentieth century this economic aspect of the frustration of the intelligentsia has become more important. Indeed the

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attraction of communism to the Asian and African intelligentsias is due as much to the economic myth of the Soviet Union as to the populist myth—as much to the belief that communism has produced some magic recipe for rapid industrialisation as to admiration for the 'service to the people' by communist heroes and martyrs.

The fourth source of frustration is rule by a foreign race claiming superiority over the subject people. In Russia this factor played its part among the intelligentsia of the non-Russian peoples, but did not of course affect the great majority of the intelligentsia who were Russians. In colonial territories of Asia and Africa however it has played a decisive role, and in a sense replaces the second factor listed above (denial of political freedom) since most European colonial empires allowed their subjects far greater liberty than the Russian tsar would give to the Russian citizen.

THE quasi-constitutional system established in Russia after 1907 did not satisfy the aspirations even of the moderate section of the intelligentsia in Russia. Nevertheless conditions were much less intolerable, and the need for revolution appeared less urgent. During the last ten years of Imperial Russia intellectuals were becoming less obsessed with political and social ideas, and the new generations of students at the universities were becoming more interested in their studies for their inherent value, less concerned with their utility to the revolutionary cause. The three middle classes were drawing closer to each other, were in fact tending to merge in a single bourgeoisie. The intellectuals were becoming part of this bourgeoisie. The intelligentsia in fact, as a separate social and political category, was tending to disappear. But these trends were arrested by war, defeat, and revolution, ending in the seizure of power by a political party whose leaders represented the intelligentsia tradition in its most extreme form.

In other underdeveloped societies intelligentsias achieved power more quickly and less painfully. In the Balkan states which emerged from Turkish rule the intelligentsias played a part of some importance. It was least in Rumania, where a landowning class retained great power, and greatest in Bulgaria, where neither landowners nor rich capitalists existed. In Bulgaria the heroes of independence soon turned into reactionary rulers, not averse from using the methods of the Ottoman Empire. Stambulov is the outstanding example. The new generation of the educated youth led the radical or revolutionary opposition to the new regimes. Similar trends were to be seen in Serbia and Rumania. In the 1930s movements with an essentially 'populist' outlook (though not professing the particular social doctrines of the earlier Russian *narodniki*) were to be seen in all three countries. The radical party in Yugoslavia, founded in the late nineteenth century by extremely radical intellectuals, whose leader Nikola Pasic had at one time been Bakunin's secretary, had become the party of reactionary capitalists and bureaucrats, and the older generation of radical intellectuals of 1900 in Rumania and Bulgaria

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had also become respectable and conservative. Young Serbs and Bulgarians in the 1930s were attracted by communism, as the heroic movement of their day directed against social injustice and fascism, promising liberty, equality, and fraternity in modern dress. The corresponding people in Rumania, in a different geographical situation and with different traditions of political ideas and of international friendships and enmities, were attracted by anti-semitic fascism in the form of the Iron Guard. The fact that the doctrines of the Iron Guard were intellectually pitiful, and that its leaders were criminals, is here irrelevant. The point is that in all three cases the frustrations of the intelligentsia, and their desire for revolutionary action, were essentially similar to those which had prevailed in Russia in the late nineteenth century. But the enemies against whom they fought were not an Ottoman sultan or an autocratic tsar but political parties which had been founded by earlier generations of radical intelligentsia. The victory of a radical nationalist intelligentsia, which led to the foundation of the independent Balkan states, was only the beginning of a sad story. This is a point which the victorious intelligentsias of more recent Asian or African states might ponder with advantage.

IN the Middle East the intelligentsia-in-uniform has played a very important part. This is probably due to the peculiar prestige of the profession of arms in the Ottoman Empire, and the extent to which army officers predominated among the first generations of the modern elite. A comparison of Ottoman history in this respect with the history of other modernising societies would be of great historical value, and one may hope that some day some Western scholar will perform this task. It is perhaps not fanciful to argue that Nuri es-Said in his youth was an example of intelligentsia-in-uniform. Later in life, like Stambulov of Bulgaria, he became a conservative dictator, and came to a rather similar end, though at rather different hands. Colonel Nasser and his team are clear cases of intelligentsia-in-uniform, and their victory marked the end both of the Egyptian old regime and of foreign rule. Whether their laurels, like those of the Balkan liberators, will fade, whether the intellectual youth is turning against them, and has ' more revolutionary ' aims of its own, is yet to be seen.

In India, Nehru is a very special example of radical intelligentsia, a combination of Russian *narodnichestvo* with English new-statesmanship, and owes his great success not only to his gifts and his popularity, but also to the efficiency of a bureaucracy derived from the imperialists and to the preservation by American military power of a world-wide balance of power within which he can afford to make his edifying moral gestures as a virtuous neutral. Whether the attitude of Indian youth to the congress leadership has points in common with that of Bulgarian youth to Stambulov (and of Chinese youth in the 1930s to the Kuomintang) is also yet to be seen. In ex-French West Africa, too, a conflict of generations can be observed between such men as Léopold Senghor and Félix

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Houphouet-Boigny on the one hand and the young marxists of the *Parti africain de l'indépendance* on the other. For President Sekou Touré, a younger but not very young man who has adopted at least some of the trappings of totalitarianism, this situation does not arise, at least for the time being. But whether he will escape the fate of the Lady of Riga is also yet to be seen.

IT might be thought that these examples would throw some light on the future of the Soviet Union. But it is doubtful whether they do.

The victorious Bolsheviks had an ambivalent attitude to the intelligentsia. They were aware of the contribution it had made to the revolutionary movement, but they disliked its naturally unruly spirit. Perhaps because so many Bolshevik leaders were ashamed of their own non-proletarian origin, they over-compensated by their policy of pin-pricks and insults to the intelligentsia. But though they insulted them, they employed them, for they needed their skills. They denounced them as a bourgeois intelligentsia, and announced their intention of replacing them in due course by a new proletarian intelligentsia. But one may suggest that the real distinction between the survivors of the old intelligentsia and the new intelligentsia which the Bolsheviks set out to create lay not so much in the social origin of its members as in its attitude of mind. It was not so much that the Party was to replace bourgeois by proletarians as that it was to substitute docile for rebellious subordinates. When, by the late 1930s, the new intelligentsia had been trained, a very large proportion of its members were children not of workers or peasants but of middle-class parents. However, all had been brought up in Soviet schools and subjected to marxist-leninist indoctrination, and when they took over the places vacated by the victims of Yezhov they showed themselves both eager and docile.

But meanwhile something else had also happened. Stalin had carried out his artificial, accelerated, and regimented industrial revolution. Like the private-initiated industrialisations in Europe and America a hundred years or more earlier, the state-initiated industrialisation of Russia under Stalin created whole new social groups of people fulfilling managerial, technical, and administrative tasks which had previously not existed. These people were not workers or peasants, whatever their parents might have been. They were the equivalent of the middle classes of 'capitalist societies'. Their existence could not be indefinitely denied. A name had to be found for them. They could hardly be called 'state capitalists', 'state bourgeois', or 'bureaucrats'—words loaded with odium. The solution adopted by Stalin and Zhdanov (who at the 18th CPSU congress in 1939 made himself to some extent the patron of this new class) was to apply to them the only word whose historical associations were respectable. They were entitled 'toiling intelligentsia'. Worthier proletarian successors of the defunct, misguided but not wholly dishonoured bourgeois intelligentsia, the new class would raise the banner high and march on to an ever more glorious future.

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But of course the 'toiling intelligentsia' are not an intelligentsia at all. They are simply the whole upper stratum of Soviet society. To a greater extent than before in Russian history these various social groups are welded together by a common ethos, inculcated in the school system and spread by the mass media. This ethos is compounded in varying proportions of potted marxist-leninist theology, neo-Victorian moral and aesthetic values, and Great Russian or *gross-sowjetisch* chauvinism. The fact that this upper stratum is tending to form an increasingly homogeneous social and cultural category, in contrast to the vertically separated middle classes of Imperial Russian society, tempts one to describe it as a 'state bourgeoisie'. But whatever terminology one may adopt one thing is clear—this is not an intelligentsia. And, indeed, the reason for this is obvious. The Soviet Union is not, like Imperial Russia or contemporary Egypt, an 'underdeveloped society'. It is an advanced industrial society with an agrarian sector which has not yet been culturally absorbed. The cultural gap between elite and masses has, however, been enormously narrowed with the vast expansion of the educational system. The intelligentsia as a separate political and social group has ceased to exist and it has been incorporated in the state bourgeoisie, to which its name has been arbitrarily given.

AND yet a doubt remains. The traditions of the Russian intelligentsia are exceptionally strong. They are reinforced by the heritage of Russian classical literature, which is familiar to all educated Russians. Do Russian intellectuals, and especially the members of those professions which formed the irreducible core of the old Russian intelligentsia—teachers, creative writers, and scientists—still consider themselves a category apart—a true intelligentsia in contrast to the vast philistine army of managers, bureaucrats, and technicians?

On the attitude of these two categories—the intelligentsia in the wider Soviet official sense and the narrower traditional sense—to the Soviet regime, one can only speculate. The regime of Stalin, with its security police state-within-the-state, its interference with scientific thought and rational business management and its periodic bouts of paranoiac terror, was clearly intolerable to the whole state bourgeoisie. But the more rational system of Khrushchev is another matter. It is true that Khrushchev's decentralisation plan appeared directed against the interests of the managers, and that the apparent representatives of their interests at the highest level, such as Pervukhin and even Mikoyan, have lost status. But life for these men, on balance *stala luchshe, stala veselee.* And the Soviet Union is getting more and more powerful in the world, and their chauvinism is flattered. Why should they oppose the regime, if it works, and if it brings them material success? They are no more likely to go in for political ideas than were the Russian business men of the 1890s, who fattened on the profitable state contracts offered by Witte.

The intellectuals in the narrower sense are another matter. Many of them are privileged. Many calm their restless consciences by the

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thought that freedom has increased since Stalin died, and that perhaps they individually have made some small contribution to this process. They too may be excited by Soviet successes, in outer space or in Cuba. Yet at the time of the Hungarian revolution there were undoubted indications that there were people among the intellectual youth of Russia who questioned not just this or that feature of the regime, but the regime itself. A warning must here be uttered against drawing the wrong conclusions from the case of Hungary. The fact that the intellectual youth of Hungary, largely composed of children of workers and peasants who had been privileged by the regime, led the revolt against the regime is immensely important and encouraging. Yet it should not be forgotten that all Hungarians were aware that the Rakosi regime was the creation of a foreign occupying power. This 'anti-colonial' factor cannot affect the attitude of Russian intellectuals. Among the non-Russian nationalities, on the other hand, it may be of great importance. It is true that, for example, Uzbek intellectuals have benefited from the economic and educational progress of their country during the forty years of Soviet rule. But it is also true that the intelligentsias of all colonies have been created by the colonial power, yet this has not made them supporters of colonial rule. Are the Uzbeks and Azerbaidjanis impervious to the 'ingratitude' which infected Indians, Vietnamese, and Senegalese? Or is the acquiescence of the non-Russians in their fate due to the efforts of the Soviet security police? It would be astonishing, in the light of the historical experience of modern multi-national empires—Habsburg, Ottoman, British, and French—if the desire for independence did not grow apace with the educated class of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. But it would be no less astonishing if this desire were allowed any expression within the predictable future.

The rulers of the Soviet Union, then, have avoided the fate of the makers of the Balkan states by a combination of systematic industrialisation and totalitarian power. They well understand the problems of the 'intelligentsia before' in the underdeveloped societies of Asia and Africa, and have had considerable success in manipulating them for the purposes of their own foreign policy. At the same time they have been able to merge their own 'intelligentsia after' into a wider upper stratum, or state bourgeoisie, which has obtained material advantages from their regime. The outside observer may have some doubts as to the real extent of their success, and possibly the Soviet rulers themselves have their doubts. But hitherto on balance they have done pretty well.

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'THE AGRARIAN QUESTION'

W.K.

THE newly emerging countries are almost without exception agrarian in character. Although they invariably wish to become industrialised as quickly as possible, they will in fact remain predominantly agricultural communities for some considerable time to come. Being anxious to industrialise rapidly, they tend to be impressed by the example of Soviet Russia, reputed to have developed its economy by its own efforts, within less than five decades, from most primitive beginnings to a state of great complexity and sophistication. The communist experiment, previously limited to the Soviet Union, China, and their post-war imperial acquisitions in Eastern Europe and in Asia, is thus presented more and more frequently as the model of economic progress for backward countries.

In spite of its apparent success in industrial development communism has not gained control anywhere in economically developed countries. Ironically enough, only agrarian countries have so far fallen victim to the political philosophy of the dictatorship of the industrial proletariat. This is as true of China as of Russia itself. On the other hand, even semi-agrarian societies such as Italy and Spain have rejected communism as a solution for their economic and social ills. In view of this historical record, any study of communist doctrine must take into account that part of the dogma which is directed at 'the agrarian question', to assess in particular the processes by which industrially retarded countries are made ripe for communist seizure of power and to measure agricultural progress where communist regimes are in control.

The columns of communist periodicals have been filled with contributions on the international aspects of the agrarian question ever since this subject was first discussed by the Communist International in 1921. Before the last war this question, considered all-important by the Comintern, filled the pages of a special journal, and a pale copy was issued in Prague in the post-war era of the Cominform. The historian will have to search through the pages of these journals if he wishes to record the vacillations of communist thought throughout the four and a half decades since Lenin, as a temporary expedient, usurped the agrarian programme of the narodniki, his chief opponents, in order to snatch political power from their hands.

To assess current communist attitudes towards the agrarian question it may suffice to consult the record which has been available since an 'exchange of views' was organised in September 1960 in Havana and Bucharest under the auspices of the editorial board of the *World Marxist Review*, the editors of *Fundamentos*, the organ of the Central Committee of the Popular Socialist party in Cuba, and the Institute of Economics of the Rumanian Academy of Sciences.[1] The significance of these

[1] *World Marxist Review* (Prague), 1961, Nos. 1, 2, 3.

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conferences was revealed by the presence there of such important figures of international communism as Bagdash, who has had a hand in several political upheavals in the Middle East, and of Namboodiripad, the chief minister of the short-lived communist government of Kerala in India.

The importance attached to the agrarian question was emphasised by yet another conference held under the auspices of the *World Marxist Review* in the autumn of 1961, when the problem of the economic development of ex-colonial nations was discussed and the subject of agrarian reform figured prominently on the agenda. This forum was attended inter alia by Ajoy Ghosh, the then General Secretary of the Indian Communist party, and by Jack Woddis of the Communist Party of Great Britain, who speaks with some authority on communist activities in former and remaining British colonial territories. Although no resolutions were passed at this conference, it was agreed that ' radical agrarian reform is indispensable for rapid development of the productive forces and consequently for social and economic progress.' [2]

Although, on occasions of this kind, some of the weapons of the past are taken from the arsenal of the Communist International, it would be a dangerous error of judgment to regard them as outmoded and blunt. In fact, many of them have been sharpened to meet a new challenge. When, immediately after the last war, some five hundred million colonial people in South and South-East Asia were given independence, communists, hamstrung by the conditions of Stalinist isolationism, were unprepared to meet this act of British statesmanship. Much has happened since those days. The conferences held under the auspices of the *World Marxist Review* should be seen as an attempt to prepare in advance for further opportunities of communist penetration and action. The concept is thus of immediate concern to developed and developing countries alike.

FLEXIBILITY of approach has taken the place of doctrinal sterility in so far as the gospel of the agrarian dogma permits this. The summary records of twenty-four of the contributions made during the conferences of Havana and Bucharest are revealing in this respect. Apart from the statements of some East European delegates—each one a rather flat recording of his master's voice—and some unimaginative pronouncements by representatives of South European communist states, the conferences were focussed on agrarian problems in the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America. (No doubt others will follow which will deal with the territories south of the Sahara.) There is no need to emphasise that the various communist statements contained a great deal of the conventional communist jargon, based on a not altogether unrealistic assessment of the polarisation of village society and the excessive rates charged by landlords and moneylenders. Rural exploitation was described in familiar fashion as feudal or semi-feudal, even in cases where the characteristic elements of feudalism are absent. The alliance of workers and peasants was taken for granted, although experienced communists

[2] V. Bochkaryov, ' New Paths for New States,' *New Times*, No. 41, October 1961.

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know by now that rural and urban interests are not necessarily identical and are often in sharp conflict with each other. Outworn platitudes on the leading role of the industrial proletariat, allegedly the most revolutionary class and thus the motive power of national-democratic movements, were repeated ad nauseam even with regard to countries where there is no trace yet of an industrial working-class as an economic or political force with which to reckon in the foreseeable future.

Within this setting there were signs of originality of approach where this promised political reward. The concept of co-operation with the national bourgeoisie was accepted by nearly all the delegates present, at least as a temporary expedient during the period of transition from 'feudalism' through 'capitalism' to 'socialism', i.e. to communist rule. The agrarian bourgeoisie was believed to be capable of being neutralised if not won over to the cause of agrarian reform. The national bourgeoisie was of course not to be entrusted with tasks regarded as the prerogatives of the communist party, the spearhead of the industrial proletariat. In fact, some speakers held that the bourgeoisie, because of its dual and contradictory nature, was not even capable of solving the agrarian question. No doubt was thus left at the various conferences about the transitory nature of the national fronts, which are in any event directed against such bourgeois phenomena as foreign oppression and exploitation, e.g. United States capitalism in Latin America, French colonialism in North Africa, and oil imperialism in the Middle East.

Although communist China apparently had no place on the invitation list of the editors of the *World Marxist Review*, a Chinese touch was discernible at times in the classification of rural society. Some delegates amended, in the light of Mao's experience, Lenin's advice 'to come to an agreement with the middle peasant, while not for a moment renouncing the struggle against the kulak and at the same time firmly relying solely on the poor peasant' (as cited by the Rumanian delegate at the Bucharest conference). In the words of Bondiaf of Algeria, his party 'relies for support on the agricultural labourers, on the poor and middle peasants—the lower strata of the peasantry; it will pursue the policy of alliance with the upper strata of the middle peasants, with those of the rich peasants and landlords who are loyal to the national cause; and it will seek to isolate the big landowners, many of whom have joined with the colonialists'.[3] Aziz al Hajj of Iraq expressed somewhat more crudely the same sentiments when he said: 'Our line with the different strata in the countryside is to win over the small landowners, to neutralise the middle landholders, and deliver the main blow to the big landholders'.[4] Other delegates expressed similar views.

In spite of these deviations along Chinese lines, the Soviet concept of world domination by 'peaceful' means prevailed. Agrarian reform was of course to be seen not as an end in itself, but as part of the struggle for national independence. This applies in particular to colonial territories

[3] *World Marxist Review*, January 1961, p. 68.
[4] Ibid., March 1961, pp. 64–65.

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in Africa. Jack Woddis of the British Communist party expressed the view at the Prague conference that ' the chief usurper of land in Africa is not the feudal landlord, but the big foreign monopolies with their huge export-producing plantations, and the white settlers who have seized the best land and are conducting their farms along capitalist lines '.[5]

In the interest of communist participation in the process of national liberation, substantial concessions are regarded as justifiable by communist leaders in the present phase of peaceful co-existence. The most significant evidence may be found in the readiness to accept expropriation with compensation of landed property above a certain ceiling and its distribution, against a certain charge, to landless farm labourers and tenants. These deviations from conventional communist doctrine are now considered permissible where a more radical programme would antagonise ' progressive bourgeois forces ' and thus weaken communist influence in political circumstances otherwise favourable. Thus in Iraq the communists, who have for the time being accepted the agrarian reform law as promulgated by General Kassem's government, have specifically stated that they are not against compensation in certain circumstances. In neighbouring Iran the Tudeh party insists on the ' abolition of the landlord system and the transfer of landlord property to the peasants through confiscation without compensation in the case of feudal estates and landlords who have acted as enemies of the people, but with compensation in the case of big landowners upholding the national interest '.[6]

Similarly in Chile, where the Communist party is joined by left-wing non-communist groups in the Popular Action Front, it has conceded that ' compensation should be paid for expropriated land in the form of bonds payable over a certain period of time in keeping with the means at the disposal of the state '.[7] The Communist party of Venezuela entertains similar views. The most outspoken programme in this respect is that of the Communist party (in exile) of Spain, which obviously sees no chance of a return to power without substantial concessions at this stage to left-wing non-communist views. The programme adopted at its sixth congress proceeded from the principle that the owners of latifundia should be indemnified and calls for expropriation, with compensation, even of latifundia of absentee landlords—a most staggering departure from the party's position on this issue at the time of the Spanish Republic. Similarly odd statements on the question of distribution against payment have been made on behalf of the Communist parties of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.

No mention is made in current communist party statements of the ultimate aim of collectivisation where such a programme could upset the precarious alliance with non-communist political groups. This is of course in line with communist tradition. It was the practice throughout Eastern Europe as well as in China, where collectivisation was explicitly rejected

[5] *New Times*, October 1961, p. 14.
[6] *World Marxist Review*, January 1961, p. 76.
[7] Ibid., February 1961, p. 79.

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as the ultimate aim as long as the communist parties were preoccupied with gaining the mass support of the rural population in the early phases of their seizure of power. The delegates to the agrarian conferences in Havana and Bucharest followed this recipe, except for occasional vague references to the formation of voluntary 'co-operatives' which only the initiated could recognise as the forerunners of collectives. Where political developments are far enough advanced, however, the institutional pattern of the future is revealed. In Cuba the Agrarian Reform Law of 1959 encouraged peasants and farm labourers to form 'cooperatives for joint cultivation', and the Cuban communist delegate to the Havana conference was able to report that in fact poor peasants were being organised for the purpose of joint farming operations. Even here, however, no reference was made to collectives of the Soviet type. The delegates of some of the more radical Latin American communist parties found the experience of Cuba most helpful. In particular, the representative of Colombia saw in the Cuban model an 'inspiring example to the agrarian movement and to the revolutionary forces' [8] of his country.

IN view of the momentous importance of these revelations and the persuasiveness of communist arguments at congresses concerned with the future of backward areas, it may seem surprising that these meetings have hardly been mentioned in the columns of the Western press or in the programmes of Western broadcasting stations. Yet the political leaders of newly emerging countries have every right to expect statements of the Western position on such an important issue. Before dealing with the *locus standi* of the West in this matter, however, it would seem appropriate to scrutinise communism's own achievements in this sphere. Western sources need hardly be consulted any longer on this subject, since the most authentic criticism is contained in the speeches of Mr Khrushchev, who knows the weaknesses of Soviet agriculture better than any other man alive. Even the most damning of Western accounts have been dwarfed by his own assessment of the farming industry, one of his chief concerns for the last twenty years or so. After more than four decades of communist rule, the agrarian question and the agricultural situation still require the constant attention of the political leadership and hardly a session of the Party Presidium, Central Committee or Congress passes without reassessment of the state of farming. Khrushchev's latest series of visits to farming districts are a measure of the seriousness of the situation in this sector of the national economy.

When Khrushchev reached first place in the Party and the state, some twenty million farming families had served for thirty years as the chief source of primitive accumulation in the initial period of state capitalism. They had been held in a state of almost permanent destitution, reminiscent of the conditions described by Marx in his analysis of early private capitalism. The only notable achievement in agriculture was the replacement of horses by tractors, thus releasing land under grass or oats for

[8] Ibid., January 1961, p. 79.

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sowing rye or wheat for human consumption. As a result crop production more or less kept pace with the growing number of consumers. There was no improvement in food consumption however; rather the reverse. This was due in particular to the poor state of the livestock industry, on which Khrushchev was most vocal in his first major agricultural speech after Stalin's death. While the human population had increased by one-fifth in thirty years of Soviet planning, the number of productive farm animals had declined by one-tenth. Later on Khrushchev was even more outspoken when criticising agricultural productivity and the cost of farm production. He estimated Soviet labour requirements as five to seven times those in the United States for the chief arable crops, and as anything up to sixteen times as much in the case of livestock farming. The performance was equally poor when it came to farm requisites, such as fertilisers, where the supply per unit of cropland was some five per cent of that used in Western Europe.

Although almost a decade has passed since the death of the tyrant who was primarily responsible for agriculture's state of almost permanent depression, few lasting improvements can be recorded. It is true that Khrushchev has by his virgin land campaign mobilised a substantial untapped reserve of grain, but he is the first to recognise that this area is beginning to yield rapidly diminishing returns. It is equally true that Khrushchev's maize campaign has provided a badly needed source of fodder for milk cattle, but here too a limit has been reached much sooner than he expected. Even these improvements seem small when measured against the long list of concessions to the farming community, ranging from reductions in taxes and delivery quotas to increases in farm prices and agricultural wages, and the equally long list of administrative changes, from the abolition of machine tractor stations and Republican Ministries of Agriculture as controlling agencies to the amalgamation of collectives and the strengthening of State farms.

The latest proof of Soviet agriculture's failures was provided at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU held last March, when agriculture was the only item on the agenda. The meeting adopted unanimously a resolution which embodied the views and recommendations contained in Khrushchev's six-hour opening speech. This in turn had included many points drawn from the six major speeches he made at regional agricultural conferences between mid-November 1961 and mid-January 1962. The proceedings of the plenum revealed the continuing crisis in Soviet agriculture in spite of various measures to remedy it. Reductions had been made in the prices of farm machinery, spare parts, and fuel; tax concessions had been granted and loans for the purchase of equipment extended. Furthermore, several administrative measures had been taken: the All-Union and Republican Ministries of Agriculture had been reorganised; a State Procurement Committee, a Farm Supplies Corporation, and a Trading Organisation had been founded. Yet none of these measures seems to have yielded satisfactory results. Agriculture continues to require Khrushchev's constant attention

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as the gap between the rates of growth of industry and agriculture steadily widens.

When Khrushchev initiated the virgin lands campaign, he was apparently reconciled to the prospects of two good harvests, one medium result, and two crop failures every five years. He seems to realise now that he made a number of miscalculations. He over-estimated the possibilities of long-term improvements from ploughing up virgin lands and from feeding maize silage to milk cows. He also misjudged the prospects of surpassing United States per capita consumption levels. At current rates of performance there is no prospect of reaching the ambitious targets for food output in 1965, let alone those for 1970 and 1980.

In the face of these predicaments, Khrushchev put in hand three measures: the ploughing-up of over 100 million acres of grassland, fallow and oats to be sown with fodder crops of higher yield and fodder content; a larger allocation of mineral fertilisers and agricultural machinery; and the setting-up of an All-Union Committee for Agriculture under a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers with committees under party control at Republic, region and district levels, to check, through inspectorates, on performance and management of both collectives and state farms. These steps have come as the anticlimax to a campaign in which some major ills of the farming industry had been astutely and courageously diagnosed. In the absence of incentives to members of collectives, price changes are unlikely to be fully effective, even though the inspectors may expect payment by result. The fate of the private plot, the creation of agro-towns, the provision of fixed minimum wages for members of collectives, and the adjustment of net incomes of collectives by a land tax have been left in the air.

The new measures are unlikely to lead to the break-through which the party needs to reach its ambitious targets. There are four principal reasons for believing that the agricultural targets are unattainable: the unrealistic assessment of grassland and fallow as alternative sources of supply; the insufficient provision of farm requisites, e.g. mineral fertilisers and farm machines; the lack of incentives to managers of state farms, and to chairmen and members of collectives; and, lastly, the likely resistance of members of collectives to ploughing-up areas largely used for grazing the more than 20 million head of privately-owned cattle which are dependent in part on public grassland. In these circumstances it is difficult to see how agricultural output can improve within the framework of the seven-year plan. The increases in the retail price of meat and dairy products will shorten the queues, but the new farm prices, though more favourable than at any time since 1953, are unlikely to provide the incentives required to bring supplies into line with demand.

A TRAVELLER in countries of the Soviet bloc who has an eye for processes of development will be staggered by the gap between industrial advance and agricultural stagnation. Of the problems with which these countries are faced, none is so acute as that of agriculture.

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It has always been communism's child of sorrow and this it will remain. Certain improvements in farming methods and food supplies in recent years can unquestionably be observed, but the progress made must be regarded as modest indeed. The use of commercial fertilisers is still patchy and unscientific. The application of insecticides is conspicuous by its almost uniform absence. The allocation of fodder rations is for the most part unrelated to the performance of the animals fed. Dairy herds are still largely of the dual purpose type and thus poor milk producers. Farm machinery, though there is far more of it than before the last war, is often badly assorted, insufficiently utilised, and kept in poor repair. These are shortcomings which might be overcome in time in any normal farming community. There are others, more serious, which are inherent in the communist way of dealing with agriculture.

The two most conspicuous failures of communist farm policy are rooted in the absence of the market mechanism and the lack of sufficient rewards for individual initiative; in other words, in the denial of choice throughout the life of the cultivator. Where private initiative and market forces operate, as on the private plot and in the kolkhoz market, this happens in spite of the communist regime and not because of it. Prices and price ratios do not operate as forces regulating production. Performance is measured almost exclusively in physical terms. It is thus hardly possible, anywhere in the communist countries, to have a satisfactory meeting of minds when the economics of farming are discussed. The most obvious economic conclusions from distorted prices and price ratios are rarely drawn. The fulfilment of the plan in physical terms overrides all other considerations. State managers and chairmen of collectives are at best good agronomists—often enough they are not even that. They are all too frequently ignorant of such economic problems as increased productivity per man or reduced cost per unit. It is not surprising in these circumstances to find much waste of men and materials throughout the farming industry. A corollary of this is the lack of initiative on the part of farm labourers and members of collectives. The people working on the land have reduced their level of activities to the lowest common denominator. Over wide areas the sheaves of grain may remain exposed to the hazards of a capricious summer without being turned to sun and wind during a weekend crucial for the quality of the final product. The only subject discussed at meetings of members of collectives is the payment of labour days; no interest is shown in such vital questions as the crop rotation or the utilisation and marketing of the farm product.

Success or failure of farming and farm policy is revealed in densely populated industrial countries most of all by the state of affairs in the livestock sector. Here communist agrarian policy has failed even more demonstratively than in arable farming. Any traveller with an eye for farming performance cannot fail to find evidence of gross exaggeration of livestock yields in the statistical records drawn up at the farm level. This is most probably why farms selected for the benefit of visitors often prove on inspection to be poor examples of what the authorities are

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clearly anxious to show. One may well ask how communist regimes that have been highly successful in the industrial sphere have failed so blatantly in agriculture. Visits to farming areas of the Soviet bloc reveal beyond a shadow of doubt that men unfamiliar with the affairs of the farming industry control this important operation. Lack of understanding of basic agriculture problems is not, however, restricted to the governmental and political bureaucracy; it is found also among farm managers and technicians. The limitations dictated by weather and distance are ignored time and again. The acreage mania of the amalgamated collectives and mammoth state farms is the most extreme expression of this misunderstanding about the role of farming in modern society. Low intensity of farming is more and more coming to be recognised as a mistake to be corrected, but most of the measures taken to this end fail to provide for the fact that higher intensity depends on higher capital input per man and acre, and not on the increased acreage of operational units or their administrative reorganisation. Nor are the chief differences between farming and industry recognised and understood.

In industry, operations take place irrespective of the hazards of the weather and are supervised within a strictly circumscribed space. Farming, by contrast, has to take into account weather and space as its chief limitations. It thus depends to a much greater extent than industry on flexibility in the direction of labour and on the initiative of the individual. These are systematically disregarded throughout the farming industry, and in these circumstances it is not surprising that the Soviet Union, which leads the world in certain highly selected spheres of technical development and industrial performance, is at best the most developed of the underdeveloped countries when it comes to agriculture. Significant differences exist, of course, between the farm economies of the various European communist countries. Leaving climatic variations aside, the chief distinction lies in the degree of private decision which the peasantry is allowed. Here Poland and Yugoslavia clearly stand out as the two countries that have abandoned collective for private farming after recognising the impossibility of success in conditions of enforced collectivisation. The effect of this change of policy is most noticeable at the farm level. It has been defined, however, more than once as a merely temporary retreat, and party functionaries, government officials, and agronomists claim to be convinced of the overwhelming advantages of collective farming. Improvements in private farming are treated as legacies of the past rather than challenges of the future.

IT might be thought that Chinese agriculture would serve as a model for non-aligned nations where the Soviet model has failed. It would of course be an over-simplification to treat the Chinese solution merely as a variant of its Soviet forerunner.[9] There are substantial differences,

[9] *Chinese Agriculture as a Model for Asian Countries.* Golden Jubilee Congress, Hong Kong, 1961.

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which the similarities between the Chinese and Soviet treatment of the agarian problem make all the more startling. In all essentials the Chinese way of dealing with the rural communities and with the farming industry is remarkably reminiscent of the Soviet pattern. This applies even to matters of detail. However, the important benchmarks are the distribution of land to cultivators and landless tenants in the early phase of the revolution, followed by the concentration of individual plots into mutual aid teams that soon assume the form of collectives. Unless this basic identity with the Soviet model is understood, the Chinese pattern may well be accepted where the Soviet variant is regarded as inapplicable.

The communes represent a specific Chinese feature which can be fully understood only in the wider context of the Chinese Communist party's history. Its agrarian programme was conceived when the Russian countryside was in the throes of collectivisation and the famine that followed it. These events are bound to have left their mark on Chinese communist thought. The land reform after the revolution was a passing phase, and the experiment of collectivisation that followed was equally short-lived. Between July and December 1958 more than one hundred thousand peasant households were reported to have abandoned their individual way of living for life in the communes. The vastness of the experiment cannot be described better than in the words of Chao Kuo-chün who, when writing of China's land reform, said: 'Seldom were so many people so deeply affected by any movement within so short a period. Institutions and values that had prevailed in China for centuries were swept away or transformed during this stupendous political-social-economic revolution'.[10]

Much has been written about the multi-purpose, multi-functional nature of the communes as operational work units, and of their specific task in the wider setting of the Chinese second five-year plan and the 'Great Leap Forward'; but the overriding consideration must have been the remoulding of the mind of the people at long last to the will of the party. The communes were assigned the task of effecting fundamental changes in social structure, personal relations, values, and loyalties. They were thus, first and foremost, an experiment, perhaps the greatest in history, in social engineering. As an attempt at improving food and farming they failed as badly as the Soviet collectives. Not unnaturally, the exuberance of the Great Leap Forward has since given way to the gloom of the austerity programme and the emergency measures announced at the end of the secret session of the National People's Congress held in April 1962. Whilst agriculture has been given pride of place in the revised programme of development, there is to be retrenchment in capital construction and heavy industry. Even so, the prospects of growth remain bleak. The number of consumers has increased in the last five years by as much as the population of Britain, but food supplies

[10] Chao Kuo-chün, *Agrarian Policy of the Chinese Comunist Party 1921–59* (New Delhi, 1960).

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today hardly exceed the modest level reached in 1957; they may well be less.

THIS is not the place to deal in detail with the doctrinal errors that underlie communist agrarian policy and that are ultimately responsible for its continuous failure for over four decades.[11] Basically, the erroneous concept of early Marxism persists: small-scale farming is still regarded as economically backward, and the peasant-cultivator is thus thought to be tied to the reactionary forces hostile to the industrial working class. The peasants are therefore considered politically expendable, to be treated as enemies of the state rather than as vital partners of modern industrial society. While there are genuine conflicts of interest between producers and consumers, this concept shows an utter misunderstanding of the economic and political role of the individual food producer in densely populated industrial countries, i.e. under conditions of intensive farming where the optimum size of an operational unit tends to be small rather than large. In spite of all communist criticism of Western capitalist society, the Soviet type of industrialisation is structurally not altogether at variance with its non-communist counterpart, although there are vital differences in the interpretation of industrial policy and in the role of state, industrialist, and industrial worker. Against this, Soviet agrarian policy is an attempt not merely to break with the past, but to act against all previous agricultural experience and to operate in the face of diametrically opposed developments in Western countries. Western and Soviet farming have nothing in common.

Extensive forms of farming in large operational units might be justified in thinly populated areas and under extreme climatic conditions, but they have in fact become the standard pattern of agriculture throughout the Soviet Union. Intensive farming was eliminated when Stalin enforced collectivisation against the bitter opposition of Russia's village population, and it has not reappeared in spite of recent concessions of considerable magnitude. Were it not for the fact that private initiative is punished time and again instead of being rewarded, Soviet agriculture could by now have reached a state of intensity and prosperity not dissimilar to that of farming communities in Western Europe. In fact, farming, though improved in certain respects, remains the most backward sector of the economy throughout the Soviet bloc.

The theoretical misunderstanding about the role of agriculture in industrial society, and the doctrinal inflexibility in the face of a never ending series of failures, have created a dilemma that will be resolved only when the political leadership has ceased to adhere to communism as the answer to the agrarian question. It would hardly be prudent to make long-term forecasts, but it seems certain that the communist regimes of the Soviet bloc will one day have to face the consequences

11 Cf. 'Soviet Agriculture as a Model for Asian Countries,' *The China Quarterly*, January–March 1961.

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of an agrarian misconception which has sometimes proved to be an almost unbearable burden. When that day comes, the undoing of communist agrarian policy may well lead to bloodshed and loss of life on the scale of the communist agrarian revolutions of 1917 and 1949. Had the economic role of small-scale intensive farming in modern society been understood by the revolutionaries of Russia—and of China for that matter—a political relationship between workers and peasants might have developed that could have facilitated government by consent instead of tyranny on a massive scale. The only conclusion possible is that as long as communism reigns, the Soviet pattern will remain that of extensive farming unsuited to countries that wish to provide for the requirements of a growing urban industrial working class.

If this is so, it may seem strange that the Soviet concept has any appeal at all in countries that are seeking to ease their agrarian malaise. This can only be explained by the fact that communist criticism of conditions in backward agrarian communities has a foundation real enough to make acceptable an otherwise totally unsuitable solution. It does not require a communist critic to see that the agrarian conditions that prevail in most backward countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America represent a serious handicap to industrial development. The cultivation practices of subsistence farmers are mostly medieval in character. They remain unchanged as long as reforms long overdue are inhibited by forces interested in maintaining the status quo, such as landowners, moneylenders, millers, and merchants.

These men are not more wicked than their fellow citizens, nor have they failed entirely to fulfil a function in the society in which they grew to become an important sector. Industrial society, however, breeds requirements of an entrepreneurial type which the frozen societies of backward countries cannot provide. Unless entrenched vested interests are weakened by agrarian and other reforms, revolutions are bound to sweep aside the medieval institutions of society. The landowning interests usually argue their case by pointing to the likely loss of supplies to urban areas in case of expropriation and redistribution of landed property. In this respect they find themselves in the company of Lenin, who justified his stern measures in the countryside by citing the requirements of starving industrial workers. However, even if the decline of market supplies were unavoidable—and this need not be so if early measures are taken for an exchange of goods between town and country—the beneficial effects of agrarian reforms, such as the elimination of excessive polarisation of land ownership, of exorbitant rents and interest rates, cannot easily be exaggerated. In this sense the communist contention that agrarian reform is a prerequisite of industrialisation is not without foundation. In the absence of such reforms no middle class can develop, and without a middle class industrialisation is impossible except under conditions of dictatorship. Soviet Russia offers proof of this.

If the interdependence of agrarian reform and industrialisation is understood, it is possible to forecast where economic development is

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likely to fail and where communist agitation will therefore succeed. Far too little attention is paid to this aspect of things by indigenous authorities, who tend to centralise all manner of planning but to leave agrarian reforms to chance or to local initiative. Similarly, well-meaning Western governments finance industrialisation at heavy expense to their taxpayers as if economic aid could operate as a short-cut to reforms long overdue. Unless the interdependence of these processes is recognised, there will be serious economic upsets and political disappointments.

Conversely, too little attention is paid to the nature of agrarian reforms where they occur in the course of political change. However disagreeable to Western interests the revolutions in Egypt and Iraq may have been, an analysis of Nasser's and Kassem's agrarian reforms reveals beyond doubt that the one was as little fascist in character as the other was communist in design. Both aimed in their own imperfect way at creating a new vested interest without which a class of entrepreneurs, civil servants, industrial managers cannot grow. Against this, the declared aim of Castro's agrarian revolution was collectivisation. His revolution could thus be recognised at an early stage as communist in character.

Although the Soviet pattern of land reform followed by collectivisation provides no genuine solution of the agrarian problems of developing countries, it would be folly to reject the need of drastic reforms of land tenure conditions before industrialisation can begin in earnest. Whilst they provide no solution in themselves, they are an essential pre-condition of any change from the Middle Ages to the Twentieth Century. Communists fully understand this; hence their hostility to any programme of agrarian reform that is likely to become effective without their active participation. The communist attack in Korea in June 1950 was probably dictated in part by the desire to wreck the chances of the land reform which was due to come into force in the South. More recently, the demonstrations against agrarian reform measures introduced in Iran seem to have been supported, if not initiated, by members of the clandestine Tudeh party and their agents abroad. Both Radio Moscow and the so-called National Voice of Iran, broadcasting from across the Soviet border, have displayed a degree of aggressiveness which suggests a good deal of annoyance at the thought of the Persian reform succeeding and the communist cause losing ground in the Middle East as a result.

Where the need for non-communist agrarian reforms is not understood, the well-trained disciples of the conferences of Havana, Bucharest, and Prague may succeed in making a decisive impact on public opinion, although they have no solution to offer. Where, on the other hand, agrarian reforms that are long overdue are not allowed to be inhibited by the forces of a static society, but are carried out effectively in anticipation of the development of individual initiative and to encourage the growth of a responsible governing class, there will be no need to fear the attraction of the Soviet model. The agrarian question can be solved in ways other than those prescribed by the editors of the *World Marxist Review.*

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TRADE AND AID

Milton Kovner

DURING the last years of Stalin's rule Western Europe had proved invulnerable to Soviet frontal attack. Impelled to make a significant revision in both the means and immediate objectives of foreign policy, Khrushchev has proffered the prospect of a prolonged contest of economic strength with the West as an alternative to the 'series of frightful collisions' which both Lenin and Stalin had envisaged for the period of transition to world communism. 'We are attacking capitalism from the flanks, from economic positions, from the positions of the advantages of our system', asserts the Soviet Premier: 'this will make certain the triumph of the working class, the triumph of communism'.[1] Nowhere has the spectre of Soviet economic warfare suggested by Khrushchev's unilateral declaration of 'war through trade' seemed more immediate than in the proliferation of Soviet trade and aid activities in underdeveloped countries. It has even led many observers to suggest that the prevailing picture seems discouraging for the West when viewed against the advantages to the Soviet Union of a state monopoly of foreign trade and an economy whose potential demand for a wide range of foodstuffs and consumer goods makes it able to absorb the agricultural and raw material surpluses of primary producing countries.

But there is no need to accept, without qualification, the prospect of unimpeded Soviet success in subverting newly independent states through a reversal of the classical concept of 'trade follows the flag'. The structural advantages of the Soviet economy which ostensibly enable it to absorb the primary products of underdeveloped countries with little cost, and often considerable economic gain, are more apparent than real. And Khrushchev's choice of essentially economic for more traditional forms of the international class struggle does not seem to have won unanimous support either within his own party or the world communist movement. In carrying out their trade and aid programme the Soviet leaders will be confronted with many economic and political problems which will make their impact on the future evolution of Soviet economic strategy in underdeveloped countries.

TO deal first with the argument which attempts to apply the doctrine of comparative advantage to Soviet trade with less developed economies: briefly, the proponents of this thesis argue—and not without some validity—that years of Soviet emphasis on the capital goods industries at the expense of its agricultural sector has resulted in a significant shift in its cost structure, so that the Soviet Union now enjoys

[1] N. Khrushchev, *For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism* (New York, 1960), p. 312.

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a comparative advantage in the production of a varied line of capital goods and a comparative disadvantage in the production of agricultural commodities and raw materials. Thus they maintain (a) that for physical and institutional reasons the USSR has, and probably will continue to have in the foreseeable future, difficulty in expanding agricultural output in relation to growing domestic requirements; (b) that the USSR has a well developed capital goods industry which, in certain sectors, is beginning to show a capacity to produce in excess of current requirements and that the Soviet Union is in a position to export a varied line of machinery and equipment items; and (c) that a policy of exporting capital goods to underdeveloped countries in exchange for raw materials, foodstuffs, and consumer goods would result in important net gains to the USSR. Hence purely economic criteria, i.e., a desire to maximise real income, would suggest an expanding and mutually profitable exchange of goods with underdeveloped countries, quite apart from the wider aims of Soviet policies.

This conclusion, however, while perhaps theoretically sound, suffers from several practical limitations. First, even if the real cost advantages of a particular kind of international exchange could be conclusively demonstrated (and the paucity of accurate Soviet cost data makes any such definitive judgment difficult), it would still be necessary for Soviet foreign trade to be reshaped in the light of this and other considerations. The changes in Soviet commodity trade with the non-communist world suggested by this picture of declining costs of capital goods relative to the costs of raw materials and agricultural products are not yet evident. Soviet exports are still dominated by the fuel and crude materials which have been the traditional staple exports, and its imports remain predominantly machinery and equipment and manufactured goods. Given the Soviet requirements for industrial equipment both for its own projected economic growth and for the equipment needs of other bloc countries, this order of Soviet priorities is not likely to be altered in the immediate future.

It would be gratifying to believe that Soviet economic and political planners had at last become enlightened enough to permit Soviet foreign trade to be conducted largely on the basis of an international division of labour or in the interest of improving domestic productivity; but there is little evidence that any such fundamental change in thinking has taken place. The Kremlin may be more concerned than in the past with increasing consumer satisfaction in the USSR, but it will not permit itself to be dominated by consumer demand. Western machinery and equipment to produce consumer durables are still more likely imports from the West than are large quantities of consumer goods; and grain will continue to be grown at high cost in the virgin lands of Kazakhstan and Western Siberia, where poor soil and climate conditions make them marginal growing areas, while the possible advantages of increasing imports of foodstuffs are rarely acknowledged. Apparently, the sacrifice of productivity and the loss of efficiency which departure from a trade pattern more nearly reflecting comparative advantage entails, are, in Soviet eyes, compensated

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by the long-term advantages of political control over economically dependent bloc partners and economic independence of the West.[2]

MOREOVER, the consistent Soviet import surplus with most underdeveloped countries (despite substantial credit outlays) suggests that the USSR represents to these countries primarily a market for their foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials, and only secondarily a source of supply. Thus, any evaluation of future prospects for sustained Soviet imports from the area must necessarily take into account the relation between potential Soviet requirements and the resources and export capabilities of underdeveloped countries. Priority Soviet import requirements from non-bloc countries will for several years consist largely of equipment and technology for the chemical, transportation, metallurgical, and electronics industries—items for which underdeveloped countries have little immediate export potential. Published Soviet plans through 1965 do not appear to provide for any rapid growth in the import of those raw materials and foodstuffs which would be of most interest to underdeveloped countries. Soviet imports of cotton and wool, for example, have averaged more than 25 per cent of total Soviet imports from this area; but the planned quadrupling of synthetic fibre production during the period 1959–65 is in marked contrast to the scheduled increases in output of about one-third for cotton fabrics and of two-thirds for woollen fabrics. Thus, rising domestic production of cotton and wool coupled with the increasing ultilisation of synthetic materials should enable production to keep pace with consumption.

With respect to natural rubber, imports of which represent about a quarter of total Soviet imports from underdeveloped countries, the USSR is making a determined drive to modernise and expand its chemical industry, with particular stress on plans for developing new synthetic rubber substitutes; if these were successful they could have a marked effect on future Soviet requirements for natural rubber. The prediction of Fedorov, chairman of the State Committee for Chemistry, in 1959, that the USSR would cease to need imports of natural rubber in the course of the seven-year plan is unquestionably over-optimistic, but the autarkic drive in this area is unmistakeable. Imports of natural rubber from

2 In spite of occasional expressions of concern with the economic efficiency of foreign trade, e.g. the Soviet Minister of Finance's reference to the change in the ruble exchange rate in January 1961 as providing the 'possibility of comparing world market prices with the wholesale prices in the Soviet Union . . . thus making it possible to evaluate more correctly than before the relative profitability of exports and imports' (*Pravda*, 15 November 1960), and Mikoyan's admonition at the 22nd CPSU congress that 'the world market and world market prices are not a fiction. To ignore them may lead in practice to serious material loss' (*Pravda*, 22 October 1961), the concept of comparative costs remains anathema to communist economists. The doctrine is regarded as an attempt by western economists to 'justify the suppression and stifling of small and medium-size enterprises in the interests of concentrating production in the hands of the biggest imperialist monopolies', and 'to concentrate industrial production in a few developed countries while dozens of colonial and dependent countries are converted into their agrarian and raw material appendages'. See A. Frumkin, 'The insolvency of bourgeois foreign trade theory', *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, April 1960.

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underdeveloped countries may remain at their current high levels for the immediate future, but the USSR will become increasingly independent of the need for such large purchases in the years after 1965.

Prospects for any great expansion of foodstuff imports, which in 1960 accounted for almost one-third of Soviet imports from the area, must also be regarded as generally unfavourable in view of the apparent disinclination of Soviet planners substantially to increase the prevailing low level of dependence on non-bloc sources of food.[3] According to the plans for tea production, for example, it is estimated that by 1965 the margin between output and consumption will be reduced to less than half the current level of imports. Similarly, state procurement of rice in the USSR is to be raised to one million tons 'in the next few years' so as to satisfy all domestic requirements and eliminate the need to import.[4] Oil seeds, vegetable oils, and tobacco are also commodities for which the Soviet Union seems to offer only a limited future market in view of increasing competition from local production and from other bloc suppliers.

Of course, if Khrushchev succeeds in diminishing the disparity in growth rates between heavy and light industry, and if the Soviet leaders become more responsive to the long suppressed desires of the people for a substantially higher standard of living, the USSR may be more inclined to export industrial equipment in exchange for such staples of underdeveloped countries as coffee, cocoa, and tropical fruits and vegetables. But there seems little question that in order to provide an expanding market for the exports of underdeveloped countries, the Soviet Union must be willing to absorb a range of goods from these countries considerably wider than their traditional primary products. It must be prepared, for example, to shift a part of its imports of machinery and equipment and semi-manufactured goods from preferred Western suppliers to underdeveloped countries, and to increase its imports of textiles, electrical equipment, and other products of light industry which these countries are beginning to produce.

It is more likely, however, that the extent to which the USSR will be willing to continue to absorb a substantial share of the traditional products of primary producing countries and make the internal planning adjustments required by such an exchange, will reflect political demands

[3] Soviet leaders have more than once made clear their unwillingness substantially to expand their imports from the West of the foodstuffs and consumer goods which are of relatively low priority on a Soviet economic planners' preference scale. These are regarded as luxuries acceptable only in exchange for similar Soviet exports, less desirable in exchange for capital equipment, and unthinkable in exchange for foreign exchange or gold. In 1955 Khrushchev inveighed against the United States' alleged reluctance to sell capital equipment to the USSR: 'You want to buy our manganese', he asserted, 'but you want to sell us toys' (*New York Herald Tribune*, 13 September 1955). In a similar vein he declared to the Press Club in Washington in September 1959: 'If the United States contemplates selling us sausages or shoes there will be, of course, no sale; you must look for such a buyer elsewhere. We want to purchase goods in which we are interested. . . . This does not include such types of consumer goods' (U.S. Department of State, *Notes on Soviet Affairs*, 19 May 1960, p. 55).

[4] United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, *Annual Survey of Europe in 1959* (Geneva, 1960), III, 39; *Annual Survey of Europe in 1960* (Geneva, 1961), V. 16.

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rather than predictable economic imperatives; and this introduces a host of additional variables whose potential impact on the course of Soviet economic activities in underdeveloped areas may be provisionally assessed.

THAT Khrushchev's policy of expanded economic ties with non-bloc countries has not gone uncontested at home is perhaps best seen in the frequency with which both he and Mikoyan, the foremost architects of the so-called Soviet economic offensive, have been obliged to seek the public forum to defend it. Mikoyan, the most influential of Soviet foreign economic policy-makers, has repeatedly sought to modify the restrictive implications for foreign trade to be found in the 'two parallel world markets' thesis of Stalin's last work, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*. In a speech on 11 March 1958 he addressed himself specifically to certain nameless 'comrade economists' who, apparently still guided by that concept, had 'dogmatically' and erroneously concluded that there was no possibility of significant trade and other economic ties between the two world markets. 'If one looks more deeply', he said, 'such reasoning essentially contradicts the Leninist principle of the coexistence of two systems. . . . In this connection, we must not overlook such an important factor in international life as the role of countries liberated from colonial dependence which have gained political independence and are proceeding on the path of establishing economic independence.' [5]

Khrushchev, too, in his report to the central committee of 6 May 1958, alluded to some dispute over the question of Soviet trade with non-bloc countries when he acknowledged that 'some comrades may allege that we cannot profit from increased orders from the United States, West Germany, Britain and other capitalist countries. By so doing we, as it were, support capitalism. These comrades are wrong'.[6] Recently the international communist journal *World Marxist Review* (October 1961), sought to grapple with this question:

> In connection with the extension of trade relations between the two world systems the question arises: will not the increased trade help to stabilise the shaky capitalist economy and thus bolster up the world capitalist system? Of course, this factor may in some cases alleviate capitalism's economic difficulties and influence the degree of employment of its productive forces. But no amount of trade between the two systems, however extensive, can alter the fundamental laws of capitalist society or . . . end the periodic depressions and crises of production. Hence the trade relations between the two systems cannot stabilise capitalism.[7]

5 *Pravda*, 12 March 1958.
6 Ibid., 10 May 1958.
7 Khrushchev himself may have inadvertently contributed to such apprehensions by his repeated suggestions that it is to the West's own economic advantage to trade with the USSR. In a letter to President Eisenhower urging an expansion of Soviet-American trade, he maintained that through such trade 'the U.S. would have the opportunity to expand the volume of orders placed with its industrial enterprises and

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Perhaps the clearest intimation of differences about Soviet foreign economic policy was provided by what seems to have been a calculated effort to suppress Saburov's speech of 4 February 1959 at the 21st CPSU congress. *Pravda's* failure to print the speech, indeed its elimination of any reference to Saburov's statement in its publication of the full texts of every other speech delivered at the congress, was perhaps indicative of Khrushchev's reluctance to give any publicity to any opposition to the regime's programme of economic assistance to underdeveloped countries when he himself had declared that 'the Soviet Union and other socialist countries . . . are extending and will continue to extend economic assistance to them'. Saburov's speech appeared in full for the first time some months later in the stenographic report of the congress. In it, he charged the 'anti-party' group, of which he was an admitted participant, with

> having opposed or tried in every way to obstruct the adoption of decisions on important problems of foreign policy. In particular, it opposed the central committee's policy in such important problems as the necessity of developing our economic ties with the People's Democracies and extending aid to these countries, to say nothing of our aiding the poorly developed and dependent countries of Asia and the Near East. The participants in the group behaved like people blinded by narrow-minded national insularity, evincing failure to understand the party's policy in problems of the utmost importance.[8]

At the 22nd congress in October 1961, Mikoyan once again felt obliged to restate the position that 'general worldwide economic relations continue to exist now that two world systems . . . have come into being. Each of these markets . . . is developing according to its own laws. But at the same time the two world markets are not shut off from one another by an impenetrable wall'. Significantly, he added that Molotov's 'rejection' of the policy of peaceful coexistence was 'at odds with the Leninist understanding of relations between the two systems and would have led to repudiating the broad development of economic relations between them'.[9]

Although the specific sources of contention are still matters for speculation, it seems unlikely that even the most insular of Soviet economists and planners would be objecting to the traditional pattern of trade with the more industrialised nations of the West, i.e. the exchange of Soviet raw materials and semi-manufactures for advanced Western technology and equipment. Reliance on the industrialised West to provide a reservoir of goods to supplement domestic sources, stimulate industrial technology, and compensate for the failures and miscalculations of the

increase the employment of its population' (U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, 4 August 1958, p. 201). In a similar vein, Khrushchev remarked at the Leipzig Fair in March 1959: 'It is surely clear to everybody that the development of the trade of the USSR with the United States, let us say, would lead to an increase in the level of employment of the U.S. population' (*Pravda*, 7 March 1959).

8 *Vneocherednoy XXI s'ezd KPSS* (Moscow, 1959), Part II, p. 290.

9 *Pravda*, 22 October 1961.

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planning mechanism, is as integral a part of Soviet trade policy today as it was thirty years ago when the USSR, in the midst of a similar ambitious plan period, purchased one-half of the world's exports of machinery and equipment.

One reasonable assumption would be that opposition is directed at what is 'new' in Soviet foreign economic policy, i.e. the dramatic entry of the USSR into the foreign lending field, which since 1954 has led to the conclusion of economic cooperation agreements with 22 underdeveloped countries on four continents providing for credits totalling almost $3 milliard. The veiled allusions to 'comrade economists' who disagree about the question of increased East-West trade, and the explicit connection by Saburov of the 'anti-party' group with such opposition, suggest that the trade and aid programme has caused some concern among more conservative elements who question the economic profitability of a rapid expansion of Soviet capital goods exports to underdeveloped countries in exchange for what they consider to be relatively low priority raw materials and consumer goods.

Apparently in reply to such charges, *Pravda* on 9 May 1958 explained that Soviet aid was not *designed* to be very 'profitable' from the commercial point of view. 'If one approaches the matter from this commercial side only, it would be profitable for the USSR to build new factories in its own country with these funds and then export the finished products.' In a similar vein Khrushchev explained that while 'the Soviet Union and other socialist countries consider it their duty to help underdeveloped countries and to extend trade and all other forms of economic relations with them in every way, naturally, in their case, we cannot say that our economic relations are based on mutual advantage. Generally speaking, from the commercial standpoint, our economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries is even unprofitable for us.' [10] These and similar explanations of the Soviet Union's 'internationalist duty' were apparently not enough to satisfy one Gosplan official who, in a report to the central committee in June 1959, betrayed undisguised resentment when he asserted that while he had been 'happy and proud' to see in India the finest of Soviet electrical equipment, when he returned to the USSR he asked: 'Is such equipment common in our own factories? Apparently not. Why is this so?' [11]

CHINESE and Albanian objections to Moscow's programme of trade and aid are, on the other hand, inextricably linked to the wider issue, dating back to at least 1957, of the correct strategy to be pursued in the world communist struggle, particularly in the national liberation movement in underdeveloped areas. The Albanians, and particularly the Chinese, have objected to large-scale economic aid to, and cooperation with, bourgeois governments whose 'janus-faced' character makes them unreliable allies in the struggle against imperialism. The ultimate effect

10 *Pravda*, 13 July 1958.
11 *Plenum tsentralnovo komiteta KPSS*, 24–29 June 1959 (Moscow, 1959), p. 232.

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of such support, they maintain, would be to hinder rather than assist revolutionary prospects in these countries.[12] With equal vehemence they object to Soviet encouragement and material support to the state sector of underdeveloped countries on the 'erroneous' premise that the development of state capitalism provides the 'prerequisites for the transition to higher economic forms . . . to the development of the national liberation movement into the socialist revolution.'[13] It is merely a 'deception' of the peoples in the colonial areas to suggest that under the leadership of the bourgeoisie they can not only achieve complete victory in the national democratic revolution but even 'march into the period of socialism by way of state capitalism.'[14]

In reply to such views, Moscow propagandists refer to Lenin's belief that at the beginning of any national movement it is the national bourgeoisie, not the communists, which 'plays the leading part'. Selfless help to such groups, it is contended, enables them to fight against medieval survivals, to maintain and consolidate economic and political independence from former colonial masters, and to support the struggle of the USSR and its allies to ease international tension and to unmask and isolate the warmongers. Such support for bloc foreign policy objectives must not be underestimated; nor should the economic and strategic effects on imperialism of the loss of such colonies. Hence there is an 'historically useful role' for the national bourgeoisie and the basis for 'lengthy cooperation' between it and the countries of socialism. The dogmatic view, Moscow asserts, that the national bourgeoisie of the colonial and dependent countries has always and everywhere turned into a reactionary force, unable to participate in or play a leading role in the anti-imperialist struggle, has been discarded.[15]

The new CPSU programme adopted at its 22nd congress emphasises that 'although the national bourgeoisie shows an increasing inclination to compromise with imperialism and domestic reaction', its 'progressive' role in 'accomplishing the basic tasks of an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution . . . in the solution of pressing national problems . . . is, therefore, not yet spent.' To such forces, the programme adds, the CPSU regards it as its 'internationalist duty' to render 'all-round support'.[16] It was thus implied that the cause of world communism stands to gain more by collaborating with national-bourgeois elements

12 Stepanov, writing in the Soviet journal *International Affairs* (June 1960), rebutted the argument—attributed by him to Western sources but equally applicable to the Chinese position—that 'if Soviet assistance to former colonies and semi-colonies promotes the progress of these countries and helps raise the living standard of their population . . . this means that "Moscow" is robbing itself of the chance to "export revolution"'. This argument, maintained Stepanov, is false because it is 'based on the perverted bourgeois conception of communism as an ideology which spreads only where there is extreme poverty of the masses'.

13 *Vestnik leningradskovo universiteta*, Seriya ekonomiki, filosofii i prava, No. 5, 1961.

14 *International Studies* (in Chinese, Peking), 3 May 1960.

15 *Pravda*, 26 August 1960.

16 Curiously, the programme omits the specific pledge to render *economic aid* to newly liberated countries contained in the Moscow statement and in Khrushchev's report of 6 January 1961. Such a commitment is, at best, only implied in its promise to render 'all-round support' to 'peoples fighting for their liberation'.

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on the international scene than by actively opposing them—through more aggressive local communist party agitation—on the domestic scene.

Even earlier, the calculated vagueness with which the Moscow statement of 1960 dealt with the transitional period between national liberation and eventual socialist revolution in underdeveloped countries, and the lack of emphasis given to the doctrine of national democracy in subsequent Chinese comments on the Moscow meeting—a concept which the Russians had hailed as a 'thesis of great importance'—had made it clear that a formula which both China and the USSR could find acceptable had not been found.

The Moscow-Peking dispute has been somewhat obscured by the Chinese government's own aid programme in underdeveloped countries. Chinese objections to Soviet aid policies appear to centre more on the question of which specific bourgeois-nationalist regimes are to be aided and to what degree, rather than on the issue of whether or not to extend any aid at all. Peking itself has obviously been influenced by what it believes to be its own needs in giving economic assistance to countries with a strong anti-Western bias, or to those around its perimeter where the maintenance of amicable relations serves China's immediate interests. On the other hand, it vehemently opposes large-scale Soviet aid to India, a direct antagonist of the Chinese.

Unquestionably, too, Chinese and Albanian criticisms of the Soviet aid programme are based partly on the argument that the Soviet Union has treated non-bloc nations more generously than it has its own more deserving allies. China, particularly, has alternated its assertions of the necessity to 'go it alone' in its industrialisation programme, with very pointed suggestions for a greater share of Soviet largesse. When, in the spring of 1957, there were indications that the Russians might be unwilling to continue to sink large amounts of capital into what seemed the bottomless pit of Chinese needs, Peking Radio (29 March 1957) asserted that although China was indeed grateful for Soviet assistance, it was only a fraction of what it needed. In January 1961, Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi pointed out, in an obvious attempt to diminish any exaggerated Soviet claims of assistance to China, that 'Soviet aid thus far extended to China is roughly equivalent to China's aid extended to South-East Asian nations,'[17] and in February of that year, the Chinese *People's Daily* made the unprecedented statement that Soviet aid to China was merely the fulfilment of its 'proletarian internationalist duty', implying that China did not have to be particularly grateful for Soviet aid.[18]

THE development of Albania's dispute with the Soviet Union following the 22nd congress has provided additional insight into similar Albanian objections and motivations. Scarcely had the congress concluded its sessions, when Prague Radio, on 30 October 1961, accused the Tirana

17 *New York Times*, 17 January 1961.
18 Quoted in *Peking Review*, 19 February 1961, p. 5.

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regime of accepting 'as a matter of course' the economic aid which was offered by other bloc nations 'in the spirit of socialist brotherhood.' The Albanians, it was said, 'constantly asked for more' and now they think they can decide whom the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and other socialist countries should assist and whom they should not. Predicating their opposition on a 'basically incorrect' view of the international situation, 'they strongly opposed assistance to young Asian and African countries . . . regarding the assistance given to countries which are not members of the socialist camp as strengthening a potential enemy'. One week later, the Czech publication *Prace* (5 November 1961) reporting a meeting between economists and trade unionists, reproduced the following comment:

> The Albanian leaders have strange ideas about socialist internationalism. Among other things they want us, for instance, primarily and first of all to assist only the needy countries of the socialist camp and then some time in the future—when these countries no longer need assistance—to help the other underdeveloped countries. Assistance to underdeveloped countries, however, is an integral part of our concept of internationalism.

A similar theme was expounded in a major article on Soviet-Albanian relations by Konstantinov in *Kommunist* (1961, No. 17), in which, for the first time, Moscow made explicit Albanian (and by the clearest implication, Chinese) objections to large-scale bloc aid to underdeveloped countries. The author reminded his readers that Albania 'received from the USSR and other socialist countries aid and credits worth hundreds of millions of rubles', and that 'more than once Albania's considerable indebtedness on Soviet loans was written off by the Soviet Union'. But, expressing the most 'narrow-minded nationalism', the Albanian leaders began to make 'inordinate demands' on the USSR and other socialist countries, 'rather peculiarly interpreting the internationalist principle of brotherly co-operation and mutual aid as a one-sided responsibility of other socialist countries to satisfy all their economic demands'. Indeed, Konstantinov continues, this 'nationalist narrow-mindedness and egotism of Hoxha and Shehu also found expression in their resentment of the aid rendered by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa.' Obviously the Albanian leaders 'do not understand the role of the neutral countries in the struggle for peace', do not understand that aid to such countries extends the 'anti-imperialist front'.

Thus there is cumulative evidence to suggest that Khrushchev's more flexible approach to foreign economic policy has been criticised both within his own party hierarchy and by the Chinese and Albanian leaders, and on economic as well as political grounds. This opposition is, more fundamentally, linked to wider political issues of world communist strategy generally, and to more specific controversies over domestic economic priorities and defence policies; the effects on the future Soviet economic programme will be determined in large part by Khrushchev's success in resolving these other differences within the party leadership.

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THERE is clearly a strong bond between those in the Soviet Union who advocate slower rates of growth for basic industry, a more rapid improvement of domestic living standards, sizeable reductions in military expenditures, and a strategy of coexistence vis-à-vis the West, just as there is among the more conservative communists inclined towards austerity at home, traditional priority development of heavy industry, no diminution in conventional military forces, a more aggressive posture towards the West, and the avoidance of any further strain in the Sino-Soviet alliance.

These ostensibly disparate lines of controversy have undoubtedly compelled the Soviet leaders to make more explicit the true 'militancy' of the doctrine of 'peaceful coexistence', and the connection between Soviet foreign economic policy and the wider political objectives of world communism, particularly with reference to the national liberation movement in underdeveloped areas. Soviet propagandists have hastened to explain that far from 'a renunciation of the class struggle in the world arena', it was merely a 'choice of such *places d'armes* for this struggle', as seemed best suited to the changing correlation of world forces in socialism's favour.[19] 'Only those who have lost their political acumen and international perspective can regard the economic competition between states belonging to different systems as mere commercial rivalry. Only the non-Leninist can fail to see that economic competition between the two diametrically opposed systems is the cardinal political factor of our day, a form of class struggle on an international scale'.[20] Khrushchev himself has vigorously rejected the 'distorted' charges of 'left-wing critics' that Soviet policies of coexistence and disarmament would impede the national liberation movement, and reaffirmed his belief 'that the peoples which have not yet got rid of the fetters of colonialism can achieve their liberation only in struggle, including armed struggle'.[21]

In general, there has been a perceptible hardening of the Soviet propaganda line towards the national-bourgeois leaders of the new states since the Moscow conference of communist parties in November 1960. In the pages of Soviet journals there has been evident a growing impatience with the progress of 'social reform' in these countries and a greater stress on the divergence of interests—particularly on domestic issues—between these governments and the local communist parties. The strong emphasis on domestic 'reforms' among the criteria established for the 'national democratic' state by the 1960 Moscow statement suggests a greater selectivity in the future choice of recipients of Soviet economic assistance, a proportionately greater emphasis on trade rather than aid, and perhaps some insistence on getting more tangible political returns, commensurate in the Soviet view with the economic resources expended.

19 *Pravda*, 17 January 1962.
20 A. Rumyantsev, 'Our Common Ideological Weapon', *World Marxist Review*, January 1962, p. 5.
21 *Pravda*, 17 March 1962.

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MARXISM AND ASIAN CULTURAL TRADITIONS

Emanuel Sarkisyanz

IN both the United States and Western Europe, the present power conflicts over Asia have stimulated new interest in the Eastern peoples. As the fashionable term 'underdeveloped countries' indicates, this interest has been concentrated upon industrial plants, population explosions, educational planning, problems of credit availability and so on. However, these constitute only one of the dimensions in the relationship of Asian peoples to the West and to communism. This essay deals with only one factor in the relationship between oriental traditions and communism, but it is one which is rarely discussed. It is designed to supplement the more customary writings about the politics of Asian societies, from the angle of the history of ideas.

It is true that Marx and Engels occasionally commented upon Asian political and economic problems, particularly those of India and China. Yet the idea of appealing to the dependent colonial peoples of the East to rise against the capitalist West was originally quite alien to Marxism, as can be seen from the attitude of the Second International. The social-democratic parties of the metropolitan countries held an extremely moderate if not ambiguous position about independence movements in their colonies or protectorates. Marxism was originally anti-nationalist but definitely occidental. Not before it developed in its radical Russian variety did it become nationalist and anti-occidental.

Russia was the first among the underdeveloped countries; that is, Russia was the first agrarian state of non-occidental culture that found itself confronted by the overwhelming technological superiority of western neighbours, the earliest non-industrial country whose rulers therefore, most notably Peter I in the early eighteenth century, engaged in forced modernisation and compulsory westernisation from above. Thereby they broke with their established cultural traditions for the sake of the military power and competitive strength of their state. The Eastern version of enlightened absolutism began by forced rationalisation and the enforced secularisation of the idea of the state. With this compulsory creation of a ruling elite, a social abyss opened between the traditionalist, medievally-orientated peasant majority and the relatively enlightened ruling minority, a situation characteristic of underdeveloped countries to this day. It was a contributory factor in the Russian Revolution of 1917. The revolutionary sentiments of Russia's westernisers evolved out of the rationalist heritage of Peter I, but with the victory of the Bolshevik minority, Russia turned away from the western homelands of Marxism. Nevertheless, for a long time communism preserved an outwardly westernising appearance.

Russia's turn towards the East out of antagonism to the West had

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been anticipated by Russian nineteenth-century thinkers, both radical and conservative. Alexander Herzen became disappointed in both the European middle-class and the proletariat, and rested his hopes for the future on the agrarian peoples of the East. Herzen believed in the liberating mission of the oriental peoples of the Russian Empire, who possessed those social institutions in which he saw assurances of Russia's start over Western Europe on the road to democracy: agrarian collectivism, which was to protect the individual against proletarianisation and depersonalisation. The anti-revolutionary Dostoevsky urged Russia to free itself from the fear of being considered Asiatic. He claimed that Russia's erroneous estimate of itself as purely Western and not Asian (or rather Eurasion) had to be paid for by the futility of her policies in Western Europe. By contrast, Russia's greatest philosopher of religion, Vladimir Soloviev, saw in Eastern Asia an apocalyptic danger, if Christendom were to abandon its ecumenical mission; if the West were to betray its mission of Christianity, it would have to succumb to the Asiatics. And before his death in 1900 Soloviev came to believe that Europe, including Russia, had failed in that mission, a failure from which he expected the end of history.[1]

Unlike Soloviev, the revolutionary poets Andrei Bely and Alexander Blok infused this apocalyptic vision of Eastern Asia as executor of Europe's destinies with a millennarian hope of a utopian future. They welcomed the rising of Eastern Asia as a prelude to world revolution; it was to end the class struggle and thereby history would find its chiliastic fulfilment. This faith in a political millennium derived from primitive Christianity and entered into the spirit of the Russian intelligentsia from the peasant masses who had carried their semi-medieval attitudes into the twentieth century. Both the German sociologist Karl Noetzel and the Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev saw in the ideologies of the Russian revolution the impact of late Muscovite religious utopian (Old Believers) thought.[2] This ' Old Belief ' became associated with almost all Russian peasant revolts up to the end of the eighteenth century. In secularised form, the fervent expectation of an approaching millennium provided the dynamite for that spark which came from Western-imported Marxist materialism.

THESE aspects of continuity between traditional Russian ideas about a perfect society and the communist utopia present a problem of intellectual history, but its elucidation has, unfortunately, been hampered by their political implications, and similar tendencies can be observed in the case of China. The conventional refutations of attempts to investigate elements of ideological continuity emphasise aspects in which

[1] Cf. Herzen, *Sobranie Sochinenii* (ed. Lemke), vol. 8, p. 47; Dostoevsky, *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii* (Petersburg, 1891–92), vol. 11, p. 515; S. N. Trubetskoy, ' Smert Solovieva ', in *Vestnik Evropy*, 1900, p. 414.

[2] Karl Noetzel, *Die soziale Bewegung in Russland* (Stuttgart, 1923), p. 106 ff.; N. Berdiaev, *The Origin of Russian Communism* (London, 1937); ' O Kharaktere russkoi religioznoi mysli XIXvo veka ', in *Sovremenniya Zapiski*, 1930, p. 310.

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communism differs from Confucianism, and the strange conclusion is sometimes reached that because not *all* aspects of the Confucian and the communist utopian goals are similar, there cannot possibly be parallels in *any* aspect. Yet mere common sense suggests that all revolutions known to history both destroyed some aspects of the previous tradition and preserved some others; no revolution has ever eliminated or preserved *all* aspects of the system which it overthrew. That the content of Chinese Confucian concepts of a perfect society did differ greatly from the blueprints of Marxist communism, with its modern western origins, has too often obscured the fact that the latter could and did find structural points of departure in the very existence of the former. That the communist sphere in Asia almost coincides with the Confucian cultural sphere in China, Korea, and Vietnam can hardly be merely an accident of political circumstance. The intellectual starting positions of Li Ta-chao, the founder of the Chinese Communist party, were decidedly Confucian. The Confucian dual principle of a political authority (which was ideally to be derived from universal, cosmic Reason) and the concept of Utopia as the social application of universal Reason (derived from the cosmic harmony) provided an intellectual point of departure in China for what was Hegelian in Marxist communism.[3]

A perfect social order was the main goal of the Confucian intellectual tradition. The decisive currents of Chinese thought were concerned with social ethics in a rationalistically utopian sense. Indeed, the belief in the possibility of perfection in the social order is typical of the Confucian tradition in Chinese thought. Among the great world-religions, Confucianism (if it can be called a religion) alone postulated a perfect society, not as a means to any other-worldly goal—as did medieval Christianity and Buddhism—but as an end in itself. What the Confucian tradition sought in religion was not spiritual salvation but a principle of reason which could be superimposed upon a harmonious world order as the Reason of the State.

> The forces of civilisation, of humanisation of the world, were conceived of as that Reason which allows Humanity to be discovered in Man. They are the reason of the celestial laws, to which everything earthly is to subordinate itself, the reason behind the world order, its volition. It endows with the mandate of Heaven; upon those most strongly penetrated by it it bestows authority over men.[4]

French domination over Confucian Vietnam was not legitimised by reference to a Heavenly Mandate, as had been the rule of its Chinese-inspired dynasties, but the collapse of French domination in 1945 had consequences which seemed to obey the signs of the Heavenly Mandate when the Confucian Bao Dai proclaimed the independence of Vietnam and then turned power over to a nationalist-communist coalition under

[3] Cf. E. Sarkisyanz, 'Über den Modernismus der Hochreligionen Asiens', in: *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, pp. 487, 489; 'Communism and the Asian Mind', *Yale Review*, Spring 1950; *Südostasien seit 1945* (Munich, 1961), p. 25 ff.

[4] Paul Mus, *Sociologie d'une Guerre* (Paris, 1952), p. 255.

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Ho Chi Minh. According to Paul Mus, Ho Chi Minh appeared to Vietnam's rural masses as ' executor of the Law of Heaven ' (Thien Min). In the ' Xâ Hoi Hoa ' slogan of communist Vietnam the word ' Hoa ' means that radical renovation of the universal order which follows upon a catastrophe in the Confucian concept of history. Semantically, the slogan derived from the agrarian collectivist institution of Xâ—village communities of northern Vietnam. These communities were also the ideological units of traditional Vietnam: they were guardians of the ancestor cult which under a Confucian rationalisation remained the core of the rural Vietnamese outlook. The affiliation of the north Vietnamese peasantry to the Xâ village communities was ideologically founded upon the cult of the Earth Spirits whose Chinese ideographic sign is ' Xâ '. And the communist Vietnamese village Soviets likewise claimed to continue the function of the Xâ communities.[5] Thus their revolutionary programme was not understood as a break with the past but as a resumption of traditional values threatened by Western domination.

Paul Mus, French Indochina's eminent historian of ideas, thought that the parallels between animistic and Confucian cosmology and Hegelian and Marxist dialectics, with its ' scientifically ' conceived Reason immanent in predetermined history, were basic factors in the communist success in Vietnam. He emphasised that it was precisely the philosophic totalitarianism of Marxist communism which embodied that dual principle familiar from the Chinese Confucian tradition but lacking in Western secularism: Authority emanating from universal Reason and dominating the principle which moves the world, an authority which enforces this cosmic rationality in society.

> Under Heaven (T'ien-hia) it appears as the Way (Tao), as the Cosmic Principle . . . The strictness with which Marxism subordinates to itself all spheres of life proves in this [Confucian] perspective that it is destined for power. The Confucian state provided in this background a precedent.

MUCH more radically than the Confucian state did the communist Chinese state suppress independent Buddhism and Lamaist Tibet. The Chinese communist suppression of Tibet was greatly facilitated by the (at least initial) collaboration of a considerable section of the Lamaist hierarchy. Thus the Tashi (Panchen) Lamas, incarnation of the Amitabha-Buddha and politically second only to the Dalai Lamas, have traditionally collaborated with China, and the present Panchen Lama passed over to the communist side as early as 1951, even before the Chinese occupation of Lhasa. Since the flight of the Dalai Lama, he has become the main Tibetan instrument of communist control. According to a belief apparently widely held in Tibet, in the Panchen Lama shall be reborn—at the time of the decline and impotence of Lamaism—the

[5] Bernard Fall, *Le Viet-Minh: La République Démocratique du Viet-Nam 1945–1960* (Paris, 1960), p. 76 ff.; P. Mus, ' The Role of the Village in Vietnamese Politics ', in: *Pacific Affairs*, September 1949.

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'King of Shambhala'. This Shambhala is a mythical land, its imaginary location somewhere to the north of Tibet. The legendary twenty-fifth and last monarch of Shambhala is the subject of prophecies about a coming millennium. He is expected to lead the Lamaist peoples into a decisive, final combat against the foes of Righteousness.[6] The faithful pray to be reborn as fighters of Shambhala against the enemies of Truth; with the triumph of Shambhala's hosts, Buddhism is to win the entire earth. They are to crush the forces of evil and to prepare the coming of the future Buddha Maitreya, whom Lamaism also expects from somewhere north of Tibet. This is to bring about a social utopia in the spirit of a chiliastic millennium: 'Grain shall then flourish on the fields without the necessity of ploughing.'

Such expectations also refer to the rebirth in Northern Shambhala of Kesar (Gesar), the hero of Tibetan and Mongolian epics, who also is to usher in Utopia. Before his departure from this world, Kesar is said to have declared 'That among the mountains, there shall not be some that are mighty and others low. That among men, there shall not be some that are mighty and others deprived of power; nor some that abound in riches whilst others lack them: may happiness prevail in Tibet!' When he received the answer that, with universal equality, social relations would be out of their proper order, Kesar is said to have replied: 'My words have been uttered too soon. I shall come back to repeat them.' A Tibetan Lama said in the 1920s of his advent:

> It is from Mongolia that he will come again with his army to exterminate all those who oppose the Reign of Justice. We have slept long, while he, the Invincible, was resting; but we shall awaken for his return. To the conquest of the world he will lead the millions of Asiatics who, today, are drowsing. He will be reborn among us. The power of our united thoughts will construct him. He will be the Thought Product of the minds of all of us whom the Europeans wish to make their slaves. The true faith will be preached, and those who refuse to act justly, the masters who insist on remaining masters, the slaves who persist in remaining slaves, shall be exterminated.

Alexandra David-Neel reported that after the first world war it was widely believed in Tibet that Kesar has already been reborn and that his advent was to take place within fifteen years.

For over a century these expectations had been associated in Lamaist thought with notions of social revolution. This is shown by a letter of the first Russian-educated Buriat-Mongol, Dordji Banzarov. Under the

[6] Ekai Kawaguchi, *Three Years in Tibet* (Benares, 1909), p. 499; E. Sarkisyanz, *Russland und der Messianismus des Orients* (Tuebingen, 1955), p. 371 ff. On Shambhala see: A. Grünwedel, 'Der Weg nach Shambhala' in *Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse*, vol. XXIV, iii (Munich, 1915), pp. 78–9; R. Bleichsteiner, *Die gelbe Kirche* (Vienna, 1937), pp. 228–29; E. Sarkisyanz, 'Communism and Lamaist Utopianism in Central Asia' in: *The Review of Politics*, 1958, p. 624 ff.; A David-Neel, *The Superhuman Life of Gesar of Ling* (London, 1932).

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immediate impression of the 1848 revolutions, Banzarov put their Lamaist interpretation into the following words:

> The inhabitants of the Occident are now undergoing a period of turmoil. They have expelled their lords and khans and have become hostile to one another. It seems such also were the times in which Kesar was born into this world. Judging by the character of the present epoch, will not Kesar appear again? Then we will have the chance to be among his thirty-three companions.[7]

To the Lamaist peoples of the Russian Empire, the Buriats and Kalmuks, the Tsars were potential Buddhas. At the beginning of the twentieth century a rumour spread in Tibet that Shambhala of the North was to be identified with Russia. The Buriat Lama Agvan Dordji(ev) is reported to have presented Russia as champion of the Buddhist universalist imperial ideal. Such notions were connected with the identification of Northern Shambhala with Russia and they were to play a considerable political role in the early years of Outer Mongolia's People's Democracy. The Roerich expedition to Outer Mongolia in 1926 and 1927 observed that the Mongol soldiers of Sukhe Bator, whose role in Mongolia had been compared to that of Lenin, composed songs about Shambhala. They were sung in the Mongolian Revolution: 'The song begins with the words "Jang Shambal-in dayin" or "The War of Northern Shambhala", and calls upon the warriors of Mongolia to rise for the Holy War to liberate the country from oppressing enemies. "Let us all die in this war and be reborn as warriors of Shambal-in Khan" goes the song.'[8] Even in Tibet—and after the communist revolution in Russia—Alexandra David-Neel observed an identification of Shambhala with Russia and a belief that Kesar's warrior companions had already been reborn, mainly in Russian territory. And in 1953 she wrote: 'Would the idea of taking advantage of those remarkable messianic dreams that haunt the Tibetans not occur to the leaders of Red China, now that they have installed themselves among them? Perhaps it has already occurred to them.'[9] Such a communist utilisation of certain Lamaist notions was particularly natural before the Chinese atrocities in Tibet following the 1958 rising. In Russia Stalin's purge of the Buriat champions of a Lamaist-Marxist synthesis, and his policy of killing off the leading survivors of the Buriat intelligentsia, was designed to strengthen Great Russian domination over such nationalities as the Buriats. This north Mongolian people were to be isolated from the attractions of Japanese-sponsored Pan-Mongolism, which might have drawn them away from the Soviet Union.[10]

In 1924 the Darnata Pandita Hutukhtu, a Lamaist incarnated hierarch of Outer Mongolia, declared that Buddhist morality was equalitarian and

7 D. Banzarov's letter to Bobrovnikov, dated 12 April 1848, in D. Banzarov, *Chernaya vera i drugiya stati* (Petersburg, 1891), p. 111.

8 George Roerich, *Trails to Inmost Asia* (New Haven, 1931), p. 157, quotation abridged.

9 A. David-Neel, 'Prophéties et Légendes thibetaines', in *La Vie des Peuples*, May 1925, p. 160; *Le vieux Tibet face à la Chine nouvelle* (Paris, 1953), p. 24.

10 Cf. Sarkisyanz, *Geschichte der orientalischen Völker Russlands* (Munich, 1961), p. 387; 'Kommunismus und die Geisteskrise Asiens', in G. K. Kindermann, *Probleme der Entwicklungsforschung* (Freiburg i.B., 1962), p. 345 ff.

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endorsed the Soviet system. In 1925 the People's Commissar of Agriculture of the Buryat Autonomous Soviet Republic spoke of the 'socialist transformation of Lamaism', and some Lamaist Marxists in Buryatia even joined the League of the Militant Godless. They stressed that Buddhism, being atheistic, could not be considered a religion. On this basis, Tsybikov, a well-known Lamaist scholar and author of a Russian description of a pilgrimage to Tibet's sanctuaries, participated in the anti-religious work of the Buryat branch of the Militant Godless. In 1927 the chairman of the All-Union Congress of Buddhists, the Lama Agvan Dordji(ev), declared that Western civilisation had developed the illusory principles of the Ego (whose reality Buddhism denies), deriving from it the primacy of property which produced capitalism and imperialism. Dordjiev produced at that time a Lamaist endorsement of the remedies expounded by Lenin. That Buddha himself was a predecessor of Lenin was a claim frequently made by Soviet Buryat Lamas and even by some Buryat communists in the Leninist period. The outstanding Buryat historian and revolutionary theorist Zhamtsarano stressed that 'Gautama Buddha had given the world an accomplished system of communism', and wanted to see Buddhism developed according to 'Lenin's testament'. And an official Soviet obituary of 1924 quoted with satisfaction comparisons of Lenin and Buddha made in the Orient.[11]

Actually, socialist if not Marxist interpretations of Buddhist ethics antedate the Bolshevik Revolution; they were first advanced in British India, appearing in the context of Buddhist modernism, that is, of trends endeavouring to reinterpret religious tradition under the impact of Western rule. As British domination over India and Ceylon was largely rationalised by 'educating its natives for the responsibilities of democracy', India's cultural revival, and the movement for national emancipation, produced the counterclaim that democracy and even socialism were part of the indigenous tradition, in this anticipating the 'progressive' Occident. Thus at the beginning of this century Dhammapala, a prominent figure in the modern Buddhist revival, described Buddhist ethics as socialistic and another Buddhist modernist declared in 1907: 'The spirit of Buddhism is essentially socialistic . . . the accumulation of capital in the hands of a few can have no ethical justification . . . How does this differ from theft? . . . Buddhism prohibits theft of every form, whatever may be the euphemistic name by which it may be known'. It was this political Buddhism with its anti-Occidental orientation which helped to decide the Ceylon elections of 1956 in favour of neutralism.[12]

11 M. Pavlovich, 'Lenin i narody Vostoka', in *Novy Vostok*, 1924, p. 13; *People's Law* (in Mongolian) (Ulan Bator, 1924), cited in *Ateist*, 1927, pp. 68–9; Mandjigine, 'Protiv propagandy natsionalisticheskoi ideologii v Buriat Mongolii', in *Revoliutsionny Vostok*, 1932, pp. 243–5; A. Oshirov, 'O buriatskom lamaizme i borbe s nim', in *Antireligioznik*, June 1930, pp. 67–8; March 1927, p. 48; Zhamtsarano, *Osnovy buddizma*, cited in B. Toglitov, 'Lamaizm i buriatski natsional-demokratizm', in *Antirelitioznik*, July 1930, p. 22.

12 P. Lakshmi Narasu, *The Essence of Buddhism* (Madras, 1907), pp. 45–6; cf. Sarkisyanz, *Südostasien seit 1945* (Munich, 1961); W. H. Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation* (Princeton, 1960).

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But the most effective socialist interpretation of Buddhist ethics was developed in Burma, contributing to the communist failure in that country.

IN Burma communism encountered, in the person of U Nu, a rival socialism that is not a purely Western importation but has deep roots in the Buddhist tradition. If such political implications of Buddhism seem contrived, it is largely because Indology has made only the abstract, monastic Buddhism of the Canon, and not the historical lay Buddhism of the medieval epigraphy of Burmese kings, familiar in the West. It is this latter Buddhist tradition of *social* ethos going back to India's ideal Buddhist ruler Asoka, of the third century B.C., that was expressed, for example, by Burma's king Kyanzittha in his inscription of 1098-99:

> Tribhuwanadityadhammaraja, with his right hand he shall give boiled rice and bread to all the people, with his left hand he shall give ornaments and wearing apparel to all men. Men who are not equal in body, speech, or in spirit, the king shall make them equal. . . . Even all the poor old women . . . they shall become rich. . . . Those who lack cattle shall have plenty of cattle. . . . The pious gifts the king made in . . . digging tanks or planting groves . . . *only in order that all beings might escape out of Samsara* [earthly existence] . . . might obtain happiness in the worlds beyond until they arrive in Nirvana. The bar of the gate of Heaven . . . by wisdom shall the king draw open . . . and shall bring all mankind into heaven. He shall empty the four painful states of existence. When the King of the Law shall preach the Law, the sounds of applause of all men shall be like the sounds of rainstorm at the end of the ear . . . that all beings may obtain . . . plenty and be free from famine in every place that lacks water and land, our lord the king digs water tanks, creates cultivation . . . the exalted mighty universal monarch, the omniscient one, the Bodhisattva, who shall verily become the Buddha that saves and redeems all beings, who is great in compassion for all beings, who is exalted above all other kings that dwell in the four quarters of the earth.[13]

In Theraveda (Hinayana) Buddhism, liberation from suffering caused by attachment to the world of impermanence can only be achieved by individual contemplation and meditation. It was precisely for this reason that, when it expressed political ideals, as in the above inscription, these were designed to create such social conditions as would permit the meditation that alone liberates. Therefore the state was to ensure that economic relationships would allow the leisure necessary for meditation on which the achievement of Nirvana depended. This inspired the Buddhist ethos of Burmese kingship, with its ideal of a social order permitting each being to save itself. Even after the monarchy disappeared, with the British conquest of Upper Burma (1886), these traditional ideals of a perfect Buddhist state were preserved by Burmese folklore, still alive

[13] Kyanzittha's inscription, transl. from the Mon language in *Epigraphia Birmanica*, vol. I, part ii. Edited by Ch. Duroiselle (Rangoon, 1920), pp. 117, 123, 142, 146, 166.

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even in the cities. A perfect Buddhist ruler, closely associated with the future Buddha, is the subject of some of Burma's most popular prophecies, still being republished. Although the 'Buddha Raja Marvel Prince' is apparently not mentioned specifically in the English literature about Burma, the belief in him is almost universal among the Burmese people outside the English-educated minority, and in many cases it is found even among them. He is expected to establish a perfect society, without rich or poor, but with inexhaustible wealth for all, in a world united by peace and harmony by the Buddhist ethics of non-attachment. This utopia is to come at the end of the present cycle of decline, a cycle of degeneration which began, according to the Dighanikaya of the Pali Canon and the Burmese Manu-Dhammathat, when the Illusion of the Self caused men to appropriate the freely growing nourishment, originally held in common by all, as private property. As a result the means of livelihood ceased to grow without labour; this made it necessary to elect the first ruler, a future Buddha.

IN the mind of the rural Burmese, British rule had undermined the economic basis of the Buddhist monastic institutions and therewith the basis for the meditation which alone could for ever free them from the realm of Impermanence and Suffering. To this traditionalist majority, the Buddhist goals constituted a primary aim of the struggle against colonial rule (though for most politicians religion was a means of exerting mass pressure for political goals). The 'Naga-Ni' party song of the Thakin nationalist revolutionaries, from which Burma's present governing party emerged, postulated prosperity as one aim of the struggle 'so that the poor will be enabled to build monasteries'[14]; that is, economic reforms were regarded as means in the pursuit of Nirvana as the goal. U Nu declared that socialism is the teaching which can bring humanity back to the blissful past when nature satisfied all human needs, before greed had moved men to appropriate more than their necessities, before private property had caused want and misery.[15] This was an application to politics of the Agganna-Sutta of the Buddhist Canon. In 1948 he had described property as a purely functional means for the pursuit of Nirvana (through meditation), maintaining that it is the illusion about the inherent value of property that has produced the class struggle and bloodshed throughout history; its elimination would usher in a perfect society.

In his November 1959 election platform U Nu (whose Buddhist charisma produced folkloric identifications of his personality with the expected Burmese ideal Buddhist ruler of the future and bearer of a perfect society),[16] referred to the ideal of the perfect Buddhist ruler

14 The text of the Naga-ni Song was kindly supplied to the writer by the Burmese Broadcasting Corporation, in Rangoon.

15 Thakin Nu, *Mein gun: mya* (Rangoon, 1949), pp. 69–70; the typescript of the Burmese text was supplied by the courtesy of the Union of Burma Information Department.

16 U Po U, *Bodayaza Min Sedja*, p. 142, as interpreted, for instance by U Maung Gyi Daw Thein, the publisher of the corresponding prophecies, in an interview with the writer on 15 August 1959.

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(which inspired the inscription of A.D. 1090 quoted above). In describing his Buddhist socialism he said that the acquisitive economy had developed out of the Illusion of the Self, which Buddhism aims to overcome, and that it obstructs a social order which would make meditation economically possible for all, thereby permitting universal liberation from impermanence.

The Buddhist doctrine of redemption was, and has remained, primary in U Nu's thought, socialist economics secondary. For U Nu's ideology, as for the social ethos of traditionalist rural Burma, a welfare state (providing the economic prerequisities for meditation) is only a means; the final aim is the overcoming of the Illusion of the Self and release from the bonds of attachment to transitory existence.

Socialism and the welfare state have remained for him, throughout every shift in terminology and emphasis, economic means for Buddhist eschatological goals. In this sense his former minister Ba Swe had called Marxism a lower truth, facilitating the achievement of the Buddhist higher truth, since 'reflections about Ageing, Disease, and the fact of Death cannot be clearly answered by the Marxist Abhidhamma [philosophy]'; it can give 'material satisfaction, while at the present time men, being lost in concerns about food, concerns about clothing, and concerns about shelter, cannot meditate about the phenomena of impermanence . . . they cannot free themselves from the fact of Death. But having obtained satisfaction for the corporeal frame through material well-being, they shall be able to meditate over Ageing, Disease, and the fact of Death. The Buddhist Abhidhamma would give them clear answers, Release and Liberation.' [17]

Although the Burmese communists borrowed Buddhist philosophical terminology for translating Marxist dialectics into Burmese (for example, the communist theorist Thakin Soe),[18] they were not content to have their Marxism accepted merely as a particular methodology of liberation from economic suffering within the far more universal Buddhist methodology of liberation from all suffering. They refused to be content with the acceptance of Marxism as a limited economic truth within U Nu's Buddhist socialism. The Burmese communists were not content with Buddhist-Marxist ideological partnership, just as they refused to be satisfied with a coalition partnership in Burma's Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League government. In vain U Nu tried to convince them (by quotations from Marx and Lenin) that Burma provides no reason for the use of force to achieve a revolution, that among the Burmese people there are few economic contradictions, and that therefore Burma provides few sociological presuppositions for the class struggle. This did not deter them from starting civil war in 1949; their victory would have

(*continued on page* 129)

[17] U Ba Swei, *Bama to hlan yei: hnin bama lou-tha: lu-du* (Rangoon, 1955), pp. 44-5.
[18] Thakin Soe, *Bama to hlan hmu* (Rangoon, 1934). This is examined further in my forthcoming book, *Buddhist backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution*.

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MARXISM AND AFRICAN CULTURAL TRADITIONS

Pierre Alexandre

TO anyone wishing to study the influence of marxism in Africa, the former French colonies are a fertile field. Marxist influence in colonial territories was generally in direct proportion to its importance in the home country of the colonisers themselves. And marxian thought, in its philosophical as well as its political and economic aspects, plays a more important part in contemporary France than in any other European power with African colonial responsibilities, past or present.

An obvious example is the attitude of the French Communist party during the crucial years after the Second World War—1945 to 1948—and to a lesser degree in the following decade. Through its *Groupes d'Etudes Communistes* (GEC), created and animated by European officials, mostly from the Education service,[1] it succeeded in shaping both the structure and the methods of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA), which became the pioneering force in the emancipation of French African colonies. When the RDA broke away from the Communist party in 1951, marxist influence (chiefly communist) continued to be relayed in French Africa through the left-wing trade unions organised by the communist-dominated trade union federation (CGT), and also through propaganda aimed at the African students in France.

This kind of influence is primarily of a political nature and likely to be far less in evidence in countries where the communist party had either no influence (Britain, Belgium) or is clandestine (Spain, Portugal). However, communism and marxism are not absolute synonyms: there are heretical communists, as well as non-communist or anti-communist marxists. On this count France is in a special position. First, marxism permeates the thought and doctrine of almost all the non-communist left, including part of the socialist party, which held prominent posts in most of the Cabinets up to 1958. Then, a knowledge of marxism is a necessity for all French intellectuals. Anybody in France who wants to study law, economics, history, or philosophy, just cannot afford to ignore Marx and the marxist thinkers. Even the curriculum of secondary education includes an introduction to philosophy which would not be complete without a section on historical materialism.

Finally, it must be remembered that, up to 1958, the political leaders of the Overseas Territories (the Territoires d'Outre Mer of the 1946 Constitution) were quite intimately mixed up with French politics, where marxism is an important and living factor. This, of course, had no parallel in British colonies and even less in Belgian, Portuguese, and

[1] Up to 1948 communist infiltration went far higher up in the administrative hierarchy: at least one governor and one governor-general were communists or fellow-travellers.

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Spanish territories. One result is that French-speaking African politicians tend to consider marxism, and especially communism, more in terms of internal politics than in terms of foreign relations. Marxism is thus more integrated (hostilely or sympathetically) in the political life of the French-speaking than in that of the English-speaking states.

The direct influence of the socialist countries—the USSR and satellites, China, Yugoslavia, and even non-marxist Israel—is felt all over Africa through scholarships, technical assistance, etc. It seems strongest in Guinea and Mali, especially in the former, where an Africanisation of marxism appears to be in progress.

In religious attitudes and behaviour, the influence of the colonial powers is somewhat harder to define and describe precisely. There probably are distinctions to be made between colonisers according to the religious tradition dominant in their culture, and to the nature of the relationship between church and state in their constitution and public law, as well as in home and colonial politics, all these factors being apt to react in different ways upon the attitude of the colonial and later on the national administration in such matters as its policy towards Christian missions, Islam, etc.

On the whole Britain, with her indirect rule theory, seems to have followed a policy of *laissez faire* in religious matters. However, the educational system gave the religious missions a somewhat privileged position, but less so than in Belgian and Portuguese colonies. In the latter the Roman Catholic church could almost be considered a branch of the administration. Conversely, the constitutional religious neutrality of the French territories, in conjunction with the political anti-clericalism of many officials, often resulted in tension between the colonial administration and the Catholic missions. As for the Protestant missions in French, Belgian, and Portuguese colonies, they were frequently considered to be so many nests of suspicious foreign agents.[2]

Islam, rather favoured by British colonial authorities, was held in suspicion by the Belgians and the Portuguese. In French territories it was seen sometimes as a Trojan horse of foreign propaganda, and sometimes as an ally against the political interference of Catholic clericalism.

To sum up, it seems that the colonisers with a Roman Catholic culture, including the French, were more apt to endow religious phenomena with a political significance, according to their own political tradition. However, the expression of political and social frustration through syncretistic cults, sects, and heresies (*kitawala*, ethiopism, Congolese kimbangism, Gabonese *bwiti*, etc.) was the outcome of local conditions rather than of the relationship between politics and religion in the colonisers' home country.

WHEN speaking of marxist influence it may be useful to define what exactly is meant by 'marxism.' In the strict sense, the word ought to relate to dialectical materialism as expounded by Karl Marx a hundred

[2] Including the French Protestant mission, because of the high proportion of Swiss citizens in its personnel and of the position of Protestants as a minority in France.

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years ago, with or without the later developments and interpretations of his more or less faithful disciples: essentially a philosophy, an explanation of the world from which derive a number of theories, political as well as ethical or economic. This is the meaning retained throughout this paper.

Nevertheless it must be stated that in its current usage this is only one of many accepted meanings. 'Marxism' has become the nucleus of a kind of semantic constellation whose extreme points can be ranged approximately as follows:

(a) Dialectical materialism;
(b) communist orthodoxy;
(c) diplomatic sympathy with USSR or hostility towards Western bloc;
(d) non-conformism in politics and/or social revendications;
(e) single-party system with socialist trend in economics.

It is evident that c and d may well have no direct relationship with a, yet the mere fact of their being disparagingly embraced under the same names as a and b (considered as synonyms) is not without some psychological consequences.[3] The extensive and abusive use of these terms results, by a natural reaction, in a new kind of marxist, or communist, propaganda, if only because of the interest in marxism it generates among the people who are accused of drawing their inspiration from it. It is widespread enough to explain why, in several states, the opposition is already more or less overtly sporting a so-called 'marxist' label, even when knowing little or nothing of marxian ideology.

Marxist influence is spread chiefly through the channel of European languages. In their present state of evolution most Negro-African languages are not sufficiently developed to permit an accurate and efficient translation of *Das Kapital* or any other important doctrinal work. The social context in Africa today remains too different from that of nineteenth-century Europe to allow an exact transposition of terminology and notions, and even in those urbanised areas where the social contexts differ less, the poly-ethnical composition of the African population as well as European technical and economic ascendancy still give French and English a socially and intellectually dominant position vis-à-vis the vernacular.

It might then be expected that marxist influence would be small among the uneducated masses, deprived of the knowledge of any European language; more important among the traditional elite, who have had some sort of education in the use of French or English; and maximal in the new intelligentsia who have benefited from a full-scale European education.

The reality is somewhat different: the pattern referred to is more or less true as far as a theoretical knowledge of marxism is concerned,

[3] The communists themselves play up this confusion between 'marxism' and 'communism' just as some Roman Catholics do with the confusion between 'Christian' and 'Catholic'.

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but not as regards its practical influence on the general public. In the former French territories, at least, this practical influence is high among the traditional elite, to which a majority of the politicians and leaders belong. Most of them are either self-taught or have had elementary instruction in marxist theory in some 'school for cadres' on either side of the Iron Curtain. They understand the efficient use of agitation and propaganda, of mass organisation, parallel hierarchies and so forth. They may be scarcely aware of most of Marx's basic assumptions, and may even view some of them with hostility, but when it comes to action among, by, and for the masses, they do work efficiently along marxian lines.

The up-and-coming university-trained generation often seem rather out of touch with the masses and sometimes more or less divorced from the elite in power, which they criticise on theoretical and ideological grounds. While many of them can discuss competently the finest shades of marxian and post-marxian thought, it is doubtful whether they will succeed in adapting it to the actual problems of African development.

The lack of homogeneity in contemporary Africa is again underscored if one tries to place the new African states within the marxian model of history. Leaving aside the question of the validity of Sekou Touré's Guinean socialism, the situation might be described as the coexistence of bourgeois states, some of them reformist, with feudal,[4] slave-holding, and patriarchal [5] survivals. In the economic field the same heterogeneity is in evidence, ranging from predatory hunting economies to a few cases of state capitalism. The theoretical problems arising from this situation are not easy to solve in marxian terms, and this may be why the best trained African marxists are often the most reluctant in their approach to these questions. A possible answer would be to consider the colonial and post-colonial situation in Africa as an original, mixed one, in which none of the classical phases exists in its pure state because of the constant interplay between societies at different stages, still further complicated by the evolutionary short-cuts resulting from colonial intervention. This would of course completely upset the classical pattern of class relations and therefore the revolutionary process in Africa; which is exactly the conclusion reached by President Sekou Touré.

AS might be expected, there is heterogeneity also in the religious field. There, an ideal blueprint would show three levels with two critical transition points: one at the point of change from traditional ethnocentric to ecumenical religions (Islam, Christianity), the other at the point of change from these to agnosticism or atheism. Things are, of course, much more complicated and the transitions are not clear cut. Traces from the ethnocentric religions survive among Christianised and Islamised people and even among agnostics. Moreover there are the various syncretistic religions, which seem to constitute a category by themselves. Some of

[4] That is Potekhin's label for the Ashanti social system.
[5] Would the pygmies belong to the patriarchal or primitive communist stage?

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these are to be considered progressive and some regressive (the words, of course, imply no moral judgment), in relation to the theoretical scale of evolution drawn before. A progressive religious movement would be one tending to break the ethnical frame of a tribal cult (e.g. the inter-tribal West African 'fetishes,' such as *atigali-tigari*, the 'man of San,' etc.); a regressive one would tend to ethnicise an ecumenical religion (e.g. some of the tribal sects stemming from Islam or Christianity).

The African religious palette has fine distinctions of shade rather than clear cut contrasts. Africa's capacity for integration, cultural assimilation, one might even say for digestion, is especially developed where religious subjects are concerned. It is not surprising to see the philosophical aspects of marxism subjected to processes of this kind which might eventually produce unforeseeable syncretisms.

Traditional religions remain the most important in Africa by the number of their followers, and still wield a great deal of influence among the Christianised or Islamised populations. It is not easy to define them both accurately and briefly in general terms. However, most seem to have one interesting sociological trait in common: that of being ethnocentric, that is to say, each one of them is particular to one social entity, such as a tribe.

At first sight an ethnocentric religion appears as a more or less complex system of rites, these rites being the symbols for an underlying system of socially significant beliefs. Rites and beliefs form an indissoluble whole which can to some extent be compared to a language, their relationship being, in such an interpretation, akin to the relationship *signifie: signifiant* in Saussure's linguistic theory. If the analysis is pushed further, the religious system is found to be in its turn inseparable from the rest of the social structure, its own function being threefold, that is, to express the social structure, to explain it, and to keep it working, to perpetuate it, while, simultaneously, the other structural elements, the other partial systems explain, express, and perpetuate the religious system. The religious function is conditioned by the other social functions and conditions them.

The pervasiveness of rites in this closely integrated type of society makes it safe to replace the *sacred : profane* contrasts by an opposition of ritual to non-ritual. Innovations and foreign imports are likely to be very quickly ritualised, even in cases where a European observer would think them to be of a strictly technical nature. The religious system is a social integrator more than anything else.

Still, Africans are well aware that the world is not limited to their own society. Religion, ethnocentric as it may be, must also offer an explanation of the whole environment, of the global ecology, in other words a cosmology or *Weltanschauung*. Yet this *Weltanschauung* also remains ethno- or sociocentric[6]: the social structure, as symbolised in

[6] 'Ethnocentric' or 'sociocentric' to be taken in a fairly wide sense; the cosmologic system discovered by the late Professor Griaule in the Niger Valley covers a very large area inhabited by a number of tribes belonging to different linguistic stocks and quite distinct from one another in many other respects.

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religion, is both the image and the condition of the cosmic structure. Thus any breach of the social well-being may cause harmonic trouble in the natural order: murder or incest, for instance, resulting in drought or epidemic. Ethics, although socially determined, transcend in this way the limits of single societies to reach cosmic dimensions.

All this description is necessarily theoretical. It is doubtful whether any living society has ever actually conformed to it in all points, outside the monographs of ethnographers. At any rate, this state of affairs cannot continue after the social disruption caused by colonial interference. Nevertheless many elements of the traditional religions survive today, more or less integrated, more or less functional within the frame of the new systems. Marxist influence began to make itself felt with some degree of intensity only when the pre-colonial social structures were already in various stages of disintegration, and it has been and is particularly active in those areas where the disintegration of the former systems has gone farthest. Marxism in Africa has probably never been confronted with traditional systems in good working order; it has only met with their vestigial elements. The question is, how do these harmonise or contrast with dialectical materialism?

IN answering this question one must avoid the temptation to give too much importance to superficial resemblances between particular traits of African culture and individual traits of marxian philosophy. This confusion, or self-delusion, has for some years been rife among the African intelligentsia in France. It stems partly from fashion, and partly from an insufficient knowledge of both marxism and African ethnology. Starting from a correct assumption, i.e. the collective character of most pre-colonial modes of production, they end up with a so-called traditional African socialism which they try to link to a kind of proto-marxist philosophy founded on a more or less biased reconstruction of some aspects of traditional cosmologies.

All the same, there *are* some points of resemblance, not so much between classical marxism and traditional cosmologies as between the modern African interpretation of the remnants of such cosmologies and marxism as re-interpreted by Africans.

Marxism and Islam share a common advantage over other imported ideologies: they are all-embracing, as were the traditional systems. They are concerned both with understanding the world and with acting in and upon it. In other words, marxism can, up to a point, lead to a return of a tribal-type *Weltanschauung*, at a higher level of integration and on a scale far better adapted to the necessities of the modern world. A capital difference is, of course, that marxism as such is not in itself a ritual system. It is not impossible, however, that it could give birth some day to a ritual superstructure more or less rooted in African cultural tradition. The rationalist and atheistic character of marxism is not an insuperable obstacle to such an evolution if we accept the theories of some

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anthropologists according to whom the traditional religions are non-theistic ritual systems, rather like Confucianism.

There have also been attempts to trace a kind of dialectic and even of dialectic materialism in the traditional systems. This is again a confusion, in some cases intentional, between two different stages of intellectual evolution within two contextual frames which are very different, even if they sometimes show a few superficial similarities. Indeed, the total and constant interaction between the various fields of human activity and between cosmos and society, as more or less clearly postulated by traditional cosmologies, does often have a markedly dialectical character. Many of these cosmologies are dualistic, founded upon the necessity of conciliating and balancing opposites. This is indeed a brand of dialectics, though very far from the hegelian and marxian varieties, since it is static and not dynamic. If there is a dynamics it is a dynamics of stability; it tends to ensure social well-being, harmony between society and cosmos through the perpetuation of an equilibrium, and to ignore the notion of a progressive evolution from crisis to crisis.

The marxian notion of history would have been completely foreign to traditionally-minded Africans. The very notion of a traditional history is questionable. Many societies had, of course, records of their past, but in most cases these records, started as genealogies, quickly became mythical and were then integrated into the religious systems, their main function being juridical. This type of history can be said to merge with constitutional law; it often aims at explaining and justifying the present by the past, but seldom opens any definite eschatological perspective. In the societies whose systems of beliefs were eschatological, it was mostly of the ' back to the golden age ' type.

There is, finally, the question of materialism. The point has often been made that the deep religious feeling of the Africans is an insuperable obstacle in the path of marxist propaganda, because of the materialistic assumptions of the doctrine. It is true that most if not all of the African religions described by anthropologists are of a theistic nature, very often embodying belief in a High God or Supreme Creator, and are hardly reconcilable with marxian atheism. For all that, it does not necessarily follow that traditional religious systems are to be defined in terms of idealism or of spiritualism. It is questionable whether the contrast *materialism : idealism* is relevant at all stages of cultural evolution. Rites, especially magical rites, are a means of acting upon the material world. In many cases they are conceived and explained in strictly material terms (' forces,' ' energy,' etc.). Some African intellectuals even go so far as to find in traditional cosmologies a kind of prefiguration of modern physics. In all probability traditional societies did not oppose ' faith ' to ' reason ', or, if they did, the tension between them was resolved by the conciliatory dialectical process alluded to before.

It can be said in conclusion that, despite fundamental discrepancies, an efficient marxist propaganda can be, and actually has been, based upon the superficial resemblances between the remnants of the traditional

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religious systems and an oversimplified presentation of the essentials of marxism.

ISLAM was historically the first non-ethnocentric religion to acquire a large following in Africa. Its expansion may be divided into two phases, pre-colonial and post-colonial.

The first phase was marked by a periodic series of extensions and retractions corresponding to the growth and decline of poly-ethnical areas of rule. The late Professor Richard-Molard referred to these as 'the pulsating empires of the Western Sudan', and called Islam 'a cyclical political ferment'. But to the present writer it seems that Islam acted as a means of social and political integration for these empires rather than as the cause of their imperialist expansion. As much as, or more than, a mere corpus of supernatural beliefs, Islam is indeed a total, all-embracing social system. Superimposed upon the tribal total systems it gave the Sudanese empires a kind of common constitution which preserved in some degree the former tribal structures. When it receded, the pre-Islamic systems came back into pre-eminence, while some Moslem traits survived by becoming integrated into them with a new functional definition. Islam also persisted as a supra-tribal system closely linked with long-range trade; the Sudanese trader used it as a kind of passport, partly freeing himself in this way from tribal boundaries.

In the post-colonial phase the progress of Islam seems to be directly connected with the disintegration of the traditional social system under the impact of colonisation. Islam appears then as a mechanism of reintegration at a higher level.

In the first phase Islamic expansion was chiefly due to propaganda—persuasive or constraining—by some African conqueror whose technical culture was not wholly different from that of the conquered people. In the second phase it was rather due to an indirect reaction against the intrusion of a non-African invader with disproportionate technical superiority. While the process of Islamic acculturation occurred formerly at the tribal level, it now occurs on a pan-African scale, the tendency being towards one Negro-African Islam, rather than Fulani, Hausa, Swahili, and other varieties.

Islam has been considered by colonial authorities sometimes as a subversive factor just as dangerous as marxism, and sometimes, on the contrary, as a more effective obstacle than Christianity to marxist influence. In fact an important percentage of Moslems are to be found in states where marxist influence is strongest (Guinea, Mali) as well as in states where it is quite weak (Northern Nigeria).

In theory marxism and Islam ought to be absolutely incompatible, being in fundamental opposition in nearly all their respective essentials. In fact this incompatibility exists only where and when one of the two is to be found in a purely orthodox, puritanical form, that is, almost nowhere and never in Negro Africa. In most places, and especially

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where one or both are novelties, there are compromises and mutual contamination.

In many parts of Africa, Islam is to be considered as objectively progressive (even in the marxist sense), first because of its function as a social integrator in a context of de-tribalisation; second, because of the role it often plays in the anti-colonial fight for national emancipation. Certainly, there still exists a conservative Islam, led by customary chiefs, heirs to historical conquerors and for long the most faithful supporters of the colonial administration; but in recent years many of their pagan subjects have both become Moslems and acquired a new social (and national) consciousness.

A number of nationalist leaders of strong marxist tendencies are Moslems, or rather *islamisés*, without any serious Arabic culture but still members of the *'umma*, and, through this membership, more conscious of belonging to the Afro-Asian world than are some of their Christian or pagan colleagues. (And since their real knowledge of marxism is almost as scanty as their real knowledge of islamism, they see no contradiction between the two.) A young Senegalese nationalist once told me: ' We shall use marxism as a political and economic technique in our fight against you, and Islam as an ideology for the masses '. Which is in fact what is actually being done to some extent in Guinea and Mali, where it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between Islamised marxism and marxised Islam. Yet the mixture proves effective where a stricter orthodoxy in either would probably have failed.

There lies the problem for the future: if one of the orthodoxies prevails, a conflict will become unavoidable, all the more so because of the few apparent similarities between the two systems. The *'umma* is no more the International than predestination is economic determinism; the two eschatologies are absolutely opposed to each other. The exploitation for propaganda purposes of the superficial resemblances will aggravate the conflict if and when the oppositions become manifest. Meanwhile, and except in the areas where an orthodox Moslem oligarchy turns it into a conservative force, Negro-African Islam comes easily to terms with marxism in its present state.

THE present wave of Christianisation in Africa began at the same time as modern colonisation, in the second half of the nineteenth century, that is, at a time when European societies had become quite secularised, even in countries with a state religion or established church. Missionary action was often in the hands of non-conformist or disestablished churches, or of missions belonging to a nation other than that of the colonisers.

Nevertheless the missionaries, whatever their differences and conflicts with the administration and traders, did consider themselves for quite a long time as bearers of *the* Civilisation. On the other hand, the Africans, because they interpreted colonial society according to their own native sociology, quite naturally supposed Christianity to have exactly the

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same social function as their own religions. Hence, at first, the initial resistance to evangelisation, and, later on, its acceptance, when the Africans, convinced that Christianity was closely linked with European material superiority, accepted or sought conversion in the hope of sharing in this superiority.

Now the very nature of the colonial relationship, as well as the secular character of modern European society, could only result either in frustration of this hope, or in partial disappointment. Christianity in Europe is no longer a total system; it has become restricted to a field of its own, largely divorced from other domains of social activity; it is but one of several disconnected aspects of European culture. Conversion, while it tends to promote the dislocation of traditional African society, does not, in the present state of the relations between church and state, offer an instrument of social reconstruction adapted to the economic and political necessities of our time.

Because of its long historical tradition, the Roman Catholic church was the first to become conscious of this shortcoming. All Catholic political clericalism, from the ' Christian villages ' of the colonial era up to today's demo-Christian parties and trade-unions, is the result of an effort to re-structure society around the church. This attempt has met not only with political obstacles but with cultural ones as well; these the church has recently tried to remove by adapting its discipline and rites, going to the limit allowed under canon law.

As for the Protestant churches, they, also because of *their* historical tradition, have fallen into political or social clericalism much less often, even when they have been conscious of the problem posed by the secularisation of European society in an African context. The principle of free enquiry gives them more scope for the adaptation of dogma as well as of discipline and rites. One result is the proliferation of schismatic churches and syncretistic sects with a Protestant origin. These are very often marked with an obvious social clericalism, arising from the desire—conscious or not—to use religion as an instrument to re-structure the world and society.

The Roman Catholic church is as uncompromisingly anti-marxist in Africa as elsewhere. Lately the Roman hierarchy in many colonies have often followed a policy of encouraging and helping the nationalist movements, so as to beat marxism on its own anti-colonialist ground. Simultaneously they tried, successfully in a few cases, to identify Marx with Satan; but this strictly hostile and negative attitude has been resented by many educated Africans as an attempt to conceal a potentially useful truth and to treat them as irresponsible children. This reaction is reinforced by the fact that the Catholic church, despite some outstanding efforts in the fields of social welfare and trade unionism (and, for example, the work of Father LeBret's *Economie et Humanisme* group in Senegal), has got nothing as apparently clear and revolutionary as marxism to offer in the realm of economics. Antagonism is also aroused among the African intellectuals by the anti-scientific bias of the most conservative

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of the missionary clergy: a number of priests maintain a negative attitude towards science, believing that it endangers faith.

Protestant positions are less one-sided, and therefore more difficult to summarise. They depend partly on the nationality of the missionaries and partly on their theological trends. American missions, especially those which support Moral Re-Armament, are as strongly anti-marxist as the Roman Catholic church; some fundamentalists are also anti-scientific. German, Scandinavian, and Swiss missions are anti-communist rather than anti-marxist. On the other hand, the personnel of the French missions and of some of the nonconformist British ones often have left-wing opinions. In most cases Protestant missions of all nationalities have kept away from the colonial authorities, to whom some of them have become a nightmare because of the support they willingly gave to all native grievances. While they did not as a rule present their converts with any kind of clerical formula for reshaping society, they went farther than the Catholics in giving them freedom for individual personality development. Consequently there is every variety of attitude towards marxism among Africans with a Protestant education: orthodox communism as well as rabid anti-communism, and, what is seldom found among Catholics, a number of non-communist marxists who remain Christian all the same. On the other hand a Protestant education is not conducive to sympathy towards the mass parties, whose cadres, at least in West Africa, are rather of Catholic or Moslem origin.

On the whole Christianity continues to be widely identified with the Western world, and this is often a handicap nowadays. The care taken by many Christian missionaries to protect their flock from marxist temptation often gives it the attraction of a forbidden fruit. Many Africans think the prohibition is arbitrarily designed to deprive them of the panacea which could free them from the economic and intellectual domination of the imperialist West.

THE multiplication of syncretistic cults is an important aspect of the sociology of contemporary Africa. In most cases these cults seem to be instruments for the resolution of contradictions generated by the colonial situation, and for the re-integration of society at a higher level than that of the collapsing tribal system. Their doctrine is often quite elaborate, with a rich and complicated symbolism. They combine two types of elements: some from the traditional religions, lifted out of their former social context and re-interpreted in the light of European teaching; others imported from outside.

A cargo-cult aspect is frequently in evidence: the use of modern technical apparatus (telephone, submarine, etc.) as liturgical symbols, the announcement of a coming age of plenty with free access to all kinds of prestige gadgets, the quest for, and initiation into the 'White man's secret', the mysterious foundation of his material power; all adding up to the search for a magical short cut to technical and economic

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development.[7] It is materialism of a new kind, quite different from Europe's rationalistic materialsm and both a product and caricature of it. It is apt to play an important part, positive or negative, in the actual problems of development.

In the colonial era the syncretistic cults were generally organs of political opposition, either active (e.g. *kitawala*) or passive (*matsuanism*). Nowadays some are still in opposition to their national governments, even though they may have helped to bring them to power. This political opposition may take various forms, sometimes directly related to the kind of materialism mentioned before. This may lead to africanised versions of agrarianism, spartakism, etc. reminiscent to some extent of similar phenomena in the theological field: a sort of economic ethiopianism.

This combination of economic aspirations amounting to a kind of materialism with political subversion has led a few observers to trace a marxist influence—or the direct action of Soviet agencies—in some of the syncretistic cults. There have been lurid descriptions of NKVD witchcraft schools for the training of Mau Mau or UPC (Union des Populations du Cameroun) terrorist leaders. While the extent of Mr Jomo Kenyatta's or the late Ruben Um Nyobe's marxian convictions remains an open question, it is a fact that there were and are some people with good marxist training among their followers; yet these are the very people not likely to be found in the terrorist gangs. Communist support for these movements (especially noticeable in the case of UPC) is given from the outside rather than in the field. The initiation ceremonies, the gruesome magical aspects of the insurrections, take place among people who have not reached the level of political consciousness where marxian doctrines could be of significance to them.[8] Of course Marx advocated recourse to violence; but he meant violence by an organised and conscious proletariat. That anarchistic colonial and post-colonial rebellions may have their impact on the cold war does not mean that the rebels are necessarily marxists.

However, the adepts of syncretistic cults rarely resort to large-scale violence: the cult often seems to be in itself a substitute for it. If such is the case, syncretism is a typical example of 'opium for the people', and as such to be rejected by the marxist. Indeed, the governments and parties under the strongest marxist influence have no connection with syncretistic cults, except to fight them.

Messianistic or millenarist syncretism seems to lead its adepts into

[7] The less frequent symmetrically reverse tendency towards a refusal of modern technique and a return to a pre-technical golden age where, for instance, magic would replace European technology could, perhaps, be interpreted as an anti-cargo-cult, a cargo-cult with a minus sign.

[8] What is known of UPC profanation rituals among the Bamileke is strikingly reminiscent of similarly oriented rites among the Mau Mau. Spontaneous diffusion through the whole breadth of Africa being improbable, this must be explained by sociological convergence. The hypothesis of a common training school probably belongs to the realm of whodunnits and spy-thrillers. Still, the European press may have played a part in the inspiration of UPC leaders.

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blind alleys; it is generally more regressive than progressive. Insofar as it often has politically subversive aspects, it may be used as a convenient tool to aggravate contradictions and precipitate crises. But in the long run it is even less compatible with a marxist organisation than any other religious system. This, nevertheless, does not absolutely preclude the use of some drops of Marx as aromatic bitters in a syncretist cocktail.

THE lack of social and cultural homogeneity in today's Africa often seems paralleled in the minds of individual Africans, especially as regards religious feelings and beliefs. There are Christian priests and marxist leaders who still believe in magic, devout Moslems who still sacrifice to their ancestors, and so forth. The famous 'acceleration of history' is giving rise to a degree of confusion that makes things difficult not only for the sociologists, but even more for the Africans themselves, many of whom are acutely conscious of it and groping to find a way out. The growing incidence of mental disease among them may be a by-product of this situation.

The phenomenon is, indeed, rather different from the general Western trend of historical acceleration, although a partial consequence of it. It is not quite true to say that Africa has run through four whole centuries of historical evolution within a space of one generation; African history has, in fact, taken short cuts, missed beginnings, jumped over revolutions and evolutions, left out details; it is not a digest of European history, neither are its decades worth more than centuries in other climates. Yet it is true that Africa knew the steam-engine before the windmill and the water-wheel, Dr Livingstone without the Constantinian era, marxism after the Russian revolution, and Marx at the same time as Mao Tse-tung. Europe has been exporting ready-made systems and not bothering to tailor new ones for the special needs of Africa; it is up to the Africans themselves to attempt this adaptation—not by any means an easy task.

However, the novelty of European ideological systems may well be an asset in this reconstruction. To African eyes modern European ideologies do not appear so much the end products of protracted intellectual and socio-historical evolution, as the starting point of new and still unpredictable evolutionary processes. Not to have gone through the great ideological and social battles makes Africa freer than we can be from the momentum of tradition. Africa has been and is being showered with a stream of imported ideologies of widely differing bases, assumptions, ages, aims, and degrees of evolution and elaboration. These are being grafted on to a stock of native concepts at various stages of degradation. And the graft is taking place in a wholly unique and unprecedented political, social, and economic context. Finally, while the influence of those ideologies certainly reacts upon the evolution within the context (economic development, political organisation, international relations, etc.), their ultimate fate is, at the same time, conditioned by this context and its needs.

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Any long-term prophecy would certainly be unwise today. For the time being, it seems that the dominant trend is towards a kind of original synthesis, particular to Africa, between certain corollaries of marxism in the field of political and economic organisation, and a continuation of non-materialist, non-rationalistic (in the European sense) attitudes where the *Weltanschauung* and philosophy of action are concerned. A number of Africans reject atheism, although they claim to be marxists and do, indeed, use dialectical methods of reasoning, try to construct a socialist economy in their countries, and favour a neutralism hostile to the Western bloc. China is often their ideal, because they admire its achievements in the economic field and also, and chiefly, because they believe that the Chinese have succeeded in acclimatising marxism and in assimilating it while retaining their own cultural originality in its integrity.

On the whole, the ideal of the contemporary African elite most often seems definable as the will to achieve a working synthesis of all positive imports—idealism *and* materialism, marxism *and* jeffersonism, and so forth—by africanising them into an original whole. It will be a welcome —and, perhaps, not quite unlikely—surprise if they can succeed.

(*continued from page* 9)

Many studies have already been written on Soviet and communist policies towards and in the developing countries, about their failures, successes, and opportunities. It is not intended to stress these commonplaces once more in this volume. It is obvious that the Soviet Union was relatively slow in adjusting itself to the new situation, or even in grasping the fact that it was new, despite its forty odd years of preoccupation with the ' colonial question '. It is equally clear that since 1954 a new strategy of indirect thrusts at the imperialist ' soft underbelly ' has been applied, and that all sorts of means are now being systematically developed to make it more effective in the future. But there would be little point in repeating what has already been said so many times before, although in places it may of course be unavoidable. Nor can the subject be treated exhaustively in a single symposium. The most that can be done is to attempt to deal with specific subjects in a more or less comprehensive way. The idea here, then, has been to concentrate on certain selected topics which are strategically paramount and to supplement them by an analysis of some rather neglected aspects of the general question of the communist attitudes to the ' new countries ', particularly in relation to different cultural backgrounds. But if comprehensiveness is beyond its scope, this volume is almost as much concerned with the universal as with the specific elements of the problem.

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AFRICAN PROFILES

Franz Ansprenger

THE latest communist offensive in Africa, which began after Stalin's death, is well known to employ a strategy involving a pincer-movement. The two attacking 'columns' are marching at present in formations that are still strictly separate, although they no doubt intend to join forces some day. The first (and at present most forceful) line of attack consists of generous offers of bilateral development aid; in this, Moscow and its east European satellites as well as Peking (notwithstanding different ideological nuances) co-operate with African governments of all colours, even with those which, by the greatest stretch of imagination, can hardly be labelled 'national-democratic'. The second line of attack is the training of young African cadres at the universities, trade union colleges, etc. of the Eastern bloc. Publications of converted African students [1] go to show the patient and careful but unswerving way in which the 'befriended guests' are being enlisted in the service of Marxist-Leninist teaching which alone can bring happiness. The constant care for Africans studying in the West by the communist parties or front organisations in the respective countries comes into the same category; what is more, at the moment Moscow evidently considers the time ripe for beginning to build up communist cells inside Africa itself, not yet formally called political parties.[2] A German expert, Fritz Schatten, has judged the chances of success for the communist cadre-offensive as quite good: 'Ideally, then, the person trained in the East returns to his homeland as so-to-speak a missionary for a world-wide movement carrying a historical mission—he becomes, voluntarily or not, a communist functionary'.[3] In actual fact, communist party organisations that could be taken seriously have still to be created throughout the African continent, including those states (such as Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, South Africa), in which formally such parties have already existed for many years. They are all more or less illegal, it is true; but this alone does not sufficiently explain why they have remained so insignificant: after all (leaving South Africa aside), the great national liberation movements succeeded in asserting themselves victoriously against the colonial power everywhere, and had been subject to equally

[1] See Andrew Amar, *A Student in Moscow* (London, 1961); Michel Ayih, *Ein Afrikaner in Moskau* (Cologne, 1961).

[2] '*What is evident is that the extension of the understanding of communism, the study* of Marxism-Leninism or of such journals as *The African Communist* and *World Marxist Review*, and through these the developing of corresponding political organisation, whether finding its fulfilment in the immediate formation of Communist Parties or through the development of parties advancing to acceptance of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, has become a vital need for future political development in Africa.' R. Palme Dutt, 'Africa and Communism,' in *The African Communist* (London), January 1962, p. 46.

[3] Fritz Schatten, *Africa—schwartz oder rot?* (Munich, 1961), p. 359.

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hard administrative pressure for more or less extended periods. At the same time, a revolutionary situation does exist in Africa. In the opinion of many African politicians a revolution is necessary not for the attainment of political independence but for the achievement of economic independence, an aim which is put forward everywhere, that is, to overcome the state of economic backwardness and to integrate the masses of the people into the modern world. *Les Damnés de la Terre* is the title of the last book by the psychiatrist Frantz Fanon of the West Indies, who died in 1961 at the age of 37, who fought on the side of the Algerian FLN and who was perhaps the most passionate theoretical exponent of this anti-colonial revolution.[4] Despite this Fanon was no communist; his book—though not explicitly—is implicitly nothing but a rejection of communism. Obviously, despite its efforts, communism is not readily able to capture the revolutionary forces in Africa, to canalise them for its own purposes. Why?

This question cannot be answered in a short essay. But one cause among several is to be found in the disadvantageous heritage of past communist policies: the wooing of Africa initiated since the death of Stalin is, after all, not the first offensive in this direction. A number of politically conscious Africans of the older generation have their experiences with communism already behind them, and it is not without interest to glance briefly at the personality of some of these Africans. None of them could put up with communism for long. That their story is not irrelevant, but typical, is demonstrated by the mere fact that no effective communist parties are in operation anywhere in Africa.

Messali Hadj

The twenty-eight year old former French soldier, Messali Hadj, who, after demobilisation worked in a Paris industrial concern, was elected chairman of the organisation *Etoile Nord-Africaine* in 1926, just as the Communist International was preparing a new offensive in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. This took the form of founding the ' League against Imperialism ', a ' front ' organisation, disguised by the participation of prominent non-communists, the management of which was at first largely in the hands of the German Communist party, with Willi Münzenberg pulling the strings. This appeal to the widest possible masses and to as many groups as possible amongst the people under colonial rule was in full accord with the well-known theses which Lenin drafted for the second Comintern congress of 1920, stating that ' we as communists must and will support the popular freedom movements in the colonies only if these movements are truly revolutionary, if their representatives do not obstruct us in educating in the revolutionary spirit the peasantry and the broad masses of the exploited and in organising them '. This represented a modification of Trotsky's conviction expressed officially as recently as the year before in the manifesto of the first

[4] Frantz Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre* (Paris, 1961).

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congress of the Communist International in 1919, that 'the workers and peasants not only of Annam, Algiers, and Bengal, but also of Persia and Armenia, will gain their opportunity of independent existence only when the workers of England and France have overthrown Lloyd George and Clemenceau and taken State power into their own hands'. But in fact the Comintern concerned itself even after 1920 only very marginally with the colonial question, so that the Indian delegate M. N. Roy at the third congress in 1921 bitterly criticised the opportunism of the Soviet government and the lack of interest in the commission on the Eastern question set up by the congress shown by the European and American delegates. The demand of the fourth congress of 1922, that 'every communist party in the countries possessing colonies must take over the task of organising systematic moral and material assistance for the proletarian and revolutionary movement in the colonies . . . European communist workers in the colonies must try to organise the indigenous proletariat and win their confidence', also remained essentially a dead letter: what proved to be a stronger force was the dislike, say, felt by the French workers, however communist-minded they may have been, for Algerian *bougnoules* and similar sub-proletarians. But now the new League was to provide a new beginning, and it is easy to understand that a man like the young Messali should enthusiastically rally to its banner, since his membership of the French Communist party during the past few years had given him no practical opportunity to mobilise his Algerian compatriots.

We find Messali among the speakers at the 'Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism', organised by the League in Brussels in February 1927. His brief address, made in the name of the *Etoile Nord-Africaine,* ended with the words: 'Our fight for independence will be hard . . . French imperialism wants to set brother murderously against brother amongst us. I hope that the victorious struggle for freedom of the Chinese people will be the signal for the liberation of us all, and I assure the fighting Chinese people that they have the support of all oppressed peoples. Through uniting all oppressed peoples, and with the support of the world proletariat, we hope to achieve the destruction of imperialism and to create a truly human society. I greet the representatives of brother nations who are present at this congress. I greet with all my heart the French proletariat which has supported us and still supports us today . . . I conclude my speech with the call: long live the socialism of the oppressed nations! Long live the Soviet Union which is liberating the world! Long live the Chinese revolution! Long live the congress!' [5]

This text contradicts the assertion made in a biographical sketch recently circulated by political friends of Messali: 'In 1925 Messali Hadj completely severed his connections with the communists, in whose organisation he was active as a very young man'. [6] No, in 1927 the chairman of the *Etoile Nord-Africaine* at least still believed that it was

[5] *Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont*, Report of the Brussels Congress (Berlin, 1927), p. 98.
[6] *Réalités Algériennes* (Antwerp), October–November 1959, p. 26.

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possible to advance in close fellowship with the Comintern. But not for very long. When the first wave of police persecution against the *Etoile Nord-Africaine* began in 1929, Messali evidently did not receive the hoped-for support from the communists. In May 1933 he had the party programme revised in order to safeguard his organisation 'from threatening infiltration and underground activities'.[7] It is now that the *Etoile Nord-Africaine* for the first time expressly demands 'complete independence' for Algeria, whereas the communists three years later wrote in the founding manifesto of the PCA (Parti Communiste Algérien): 'If we try to shake off the chains of serfdom and oppression which keep us shackled to imperialist France, we do so in order to create firm brotherly bonds, which will bind our people of their own free will with the great brother-nation of France into a community with common interests.'[8] In other words, a communist France would not think of giving up Algeria!

Meanwhile, at the Moslem congress in Geneva in September 1935, Messali had entered into relations with the Pan-Islamic movement and its leader Cheikib Arslan: the gulf between him and the communists became ever wider. The communist author Egrétaud criticised Messali's demeanour at that time as 'wavering' and 'confused'.

In 1934 the *Etoile Nord-Africaine* participated in the mass Paris demonstrations against the attempted fascist *coup d'état* of February. In 1935 and 1936 Messali offered to join the popular front that was then being created. But even after the election victory of the popular front, the communists had no intention of giving him honest support; on the contrary: together with middle-class moderate Algerian organisations, the PCA at a 'Congrès Algérien' in June 1936 proposed complete assimilation with France. And when, in August of the same year, Messali held his first mass meeting in his homeland of 20,000 people in the stadium of Algiers, drastic measures of suppression became only a matter of time. On 25 January 1937 the *Etoile Nord-Africaine* was declared illegal by the communist-supported Popular-Front Government of Léon Blum.

The same conflict reappeared after the second world war in far more bloody circumstances. Messali's organisation (which now went under the name 'Parti du Peuple Algérien') was made responsible for the riots that broke out during the victory celebrations on 8 May 1945 at Sétif. The communists were participants in the de Gaulle government which ruthlessly suppressed the rising (officially 15,000 dead; according to Algerians 45,000 dead). Consistent with this was the comment by Léon Feix in the communist party organ *L'Humanité* of 12 May 1945: 'It is highly illuminating that the criminal tools of bloated colonialism should be the MTLD and PPA, for instance Messali and the impudent jackals in his pay, who did not utter a word and did nothing when France was

[7] *La Voix du Peuple* (organ of the Mouvement National Algérien, the group in the national movement that remained faithful to Messali), March 1961.
[8] Marcel Egrétaud, *Realité de la Nation Algérienne* (Paris, 1957), p. 173.

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under Nazi domination and who now demand independence. What needs to be done is to punish without mercy the originators of these difficulties'.

The events on which light is thrown by these examples have built a wall—impenetrable to this very hour—between communism and the extreme wing of the Algerian nationalist movement (whether devoted to Messali or not). At the same time Messali and his followers never failed to apply the organisational experience of the communists to the legal, semi-legal, or wholly illegal associations they built up after 1945 in Algeria and among the Algerian emigrant workers in France. For instance, the simultaneous use of a legal and an illegal apparatus, or again the cell-structure, the *Gleichschaltung* of the trade unions, and lastly the coordination in the last stages of the revolutionary struggle of the military and the political and administrative organisations: all these are but the most obvious examples of the debt owed to the communists in the matter of methods by this wing of Algerian nationalism (covering the MTLD and the PPA, the FLN and the MNA); indeed, Messali's fall in 1954 from his earlier position is strikingly reminiscent of a simultaneous trend in communism: the majority of the central committee of the MTLD (Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques) which rebelled against Messali, accused him—probably not entirely unjustly—of encouraging a 'personality cult'!

Nevertheless, it cannot be over-emphasised that the borrowing of communist methods and also the more or less conscious adoption of some of the phraseology changes nothing in the basic immunity to communism of the extreme wing of Algerian nationalism, and the communists themselves referred to it at a meeting of the central committee as early as October 1948, when the secretary-general of the PCA stated: 'We are not closely enough bound to the masses, particularly the Moslem masses, in the workshops and offices, in the cafés and markets. In these conditions it is difficult for our cadres to know what the people are thinking, to be in tune with the people'.[9] On the other side, the FLN treated the isolation of Algerian communism from the living realities of the people to devastating criticism, contained in its first party programme declaration, the Platform of the Soumman Congress of August 1956: 'The communist leadership, bureaucratic, without any contact with the people, has been unable to analyse correctly the revolutionary situation. That is why it has condemned "terrorism" and from the first months of the insurrection ordered its members from Aurès, who had come to Algiers to get instructions, not to take up arms. Its subservience to the CP of France has become the subservience of a yes-man with the silence which followed the granting of special powers in February 1956 to Guy Mollet's government, which the French communists at first did not oppose. The PCA has disappeared as a serious organisation, primarily because of the preponderance in its midst of Europeans; the shock to their artificial

[9] Colette and Francis Jeanson, *L'Algérie hors la loi* (Paris, 1955), p. 110.

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Algerian nationalist beliefs, faced with the realities of armed resistance, brought these contradictions into the open'. [10]

It seems appropriate to close the Messali episode with this quotation from the programme of the FLN. However far the FLN may have moved away from Messali, as regards its relation to communism it is following the route marked out by the founder of Algerian nationalism on the basis of bitter experience. No blasts of propaganda from the communist bloc, no offers of aid or perhaps even of real assistance given in support of the revolutionary war of the FLN (as soon as its success began to come into sight) can wipe out the fact that French communism and its Algerian off-shoot on the whole failed to integrate themselves into the process of emancipation of the Algerian people. They failed because the bonds of nationhood and religion binding the Algerians together were far stronger than the abstract theme of a 'class-struggle situation', because the communists under-estimated these elemental forces, and in particular never believed in the chances of a spontaneous national revolution, which, in 1954 and the years that followed, the FLN knew how to embody and to lead.

George Padmore

Properly speaking, it is too early for this chapter to be written now; but at least attention can be drawn to the gaps that remain. When one day the time does come for it to be written, it is likely to give the most interesting clues to the first encounter between Africa—black Africa—and communism. Unfortunately, the historian needs sources in order to write history. George Padmore's personal papers are not (let us hope not yet!) at disposal for research; the periodical *Negro Worker* he edited in Hamburg 1930-33 is very difficult to get hold of; official communist publications treat Padmore as non-existent (in the two-volume standard work by Potekhin and Olderogge, *The Peoples of Africa*, his name is not mentioned). Thus we are mainly dependent on Padmore's own statements in his book *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* (1956), to which a short note from the pen of the French left-wing socialist Daniel Guérin may serve as introduction. It was written in the year 1939: 'George Padmore . . . is a man of wide Marxist learning and unusual intelligence. For a long time he was a high-ranking official of the Third International from which he was excluded when Stalin sought the friendship of the Western countries. In close association with our friends of the Independent Labour Party, and with all Negro liberation movements throughout the world, he continued the anti-imperialist fight'. [11] Padmore, born in 1903 as the son of a scientist in Trinidad, carried on this fight, as he understood it, until his death in London on 23 September 1959. From the time of the fifth Pan-African congress in Manchester (March 1945), organised by himself and Kwame Nkrumah, he stood as political and

[10] *El Moudjahid* (central organ of the FLN), special supplement on the Congress of 20 August 1956 at Soumman-Tal, p. 16.
[11] D. Guérin, *Au service des colonies* (Paris, 1954), p. 159.

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ideological adviser at the side of the man who was to become the 'Osagyefo' of Ghana.

Padmore himself tells us that he studied colonial problems at the University for Workingmen of the East (KUTV) in Moscow in the year 1930, that at that time he was a member of the Moscow town Soviet, that in the following years he published the *Negro Worker* in Hamburg and was chairman of the Negro Bureau of the Red International of Labour Unions (RILU-Profintern). He must also have cooperated—and, indeed, worked well—with Münzenberg's League against Imperialism, for he sings Münzenberg's praises: 'After all his years in the service of communism, Münzenberg broke with the Russians when Stalin signed his pact with Hitler. Some say he was murdered by the Gestapo, others say GPU agents. I just don't know. One fact I know: the colonial peoples lost a sympathetic friend in this likable German'.

If Padmore was spared Münzenberg's fate, he did share his political disenchantment; the opportunism practised by Stalin in the interest of Russian national goals had several years earlier estranged Padmore from the ranks of the Communist International. Padmore merely hints at what happened. In 1933 he was still marched off as a communist into a Hamburg Gestapo-gaol; he then, presumably, got away to England. In 1935 a number of Africans living in London attempted to organise international aid for Ethiopia, then under attack from Mussolini; at the time, as is known, Stalin supplied the Italians with Russian oil! Padmore mentions these inter-relationships and continues: 'About the same time, the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers, with which I was associated as secretary, was liquidated, in keeping with the pro-League of Nations orientation in Soviet foreign policy.' Probably it was at that moment, when Stalin stopped the whole anti-imperialist campaign in order to endear himself to England and France, that Padmore's bond with the communists finally broke.

This was more than disagreement on tactics: we need only look through *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* to find the judgments passed by Padmore on communism hardened through experience; they are in exactly the same vein as the FLN criticism of the PCA. Here, for example, is his comment on the communist manoeuvre to render ineffectual the non-communist members of the executive of the 'League against Imperialism': 'This is typical communist behaviour. They do not believe in permanent cooperation. Their object is to use their allies to advance the party line at a given time. Alliances, therefore, are temporary; and if their allies prove unmalleable, the communists find ways and means of disrupting the brief united front' (p. 326). 'Doctrinaire Marxism, especially as it is propagated by the British communists . . . has no particular appeal for colonial nationalists. No self-respecting African wishes to exchange his British masters for Russian ones' (p. 339). It is precisely this simple choice of alternatives, which—he thought—Europe wants to force on the colonised peoples, that Padmore repudiated: 'One must be either a communist or an anti-communist. This is typical white man's

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thinking, whether of the left or right. And it is here that the European makes his greatest psychological mistake. He fails to realise that one of the first reactions of politically awakened self-respecting coloured leaders is the desire to be mentally free from the dictation of Europeans, regardless of their ideology' (p. 342).

What Padmore proclaims here as the highest criterion for his political thinking cannot be simply written off as 'racial arrogance'. A trained Marxist will not fall out with the communist party simply because his black skin is dearer to him than ideology. He repudiated the doctrines of the European communists and the nothing-but-anti-communists, not because they sprang from 'white' minds, but simply because they are false, because they do not apply to the modern world.

Basically, Padmore reached the same decision in the 1930s as twenty years later, his French-speaking compatriot, Aimé Césaire, deputy for Martinique in the Paris National Assembly, who explained why he had left the French Communist party: 'I have often asked myself the question . . . whether, instead of rejecting *a priori* and in the name of an exclusive ideology, men who are after all honest and basically anti-colonialist—it would not be better to seek a form of organisation as wide and flexible as possible, a form of organisation that could inspire the many rather than drill the few. A form of organisation in which the Marxists would not be submerged but would act as a yeast, a source of inspiration and leadership, and not play the part which, in truth, they play today, that of dividing the popular forces . . . I opt for the wider as against the narrower; for the movement which places us shoulder to shoulder with the others against the movement which leaves us to ourselves . . . for a movement which liberates the creative energy of the masses, against the one which channels it finally into sterility.' [12]

Again and again there is the same accusation: the communists do not understand anything about the spontaneity of the masses, they do not function from within the roots of the peoples, they are a cold and foreign organism.

The RDA—Gabriel d'Arboussier and Sekou Touré

It is not surprising that in the last years of the Stalin era, the rule of a man suspicious and bureaucratic-minded by nature, relations should turn out even less happy between communism and African nationalism than in the era of the Comintern and of Münzenberg's League. After 1945 Stalin could, it is true, once more embark on anti-colonialist propaganda: Hitler was dead, the Soviet Union was no longer in need of an alliance with the Western democracies. On the contrary: the cold war had emerged, and as part of it there was from the beginning the striving for an anti-colonialist 'second front' as rear-action against England, France, and the United States. But Stalin was not prepared to let himself

[12] Aimé Césaire, *Lettre à Maurice Thorez* (Paris, 1956), p. 9.

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in for an organisational experiment. The 'national-democratic' anti-colonialists seemed to him highly unreliable. He tried to keep them fast to the party-line in accordance with the Comintern conception, i.e. to direct them via the Communist parties of the respective mother countries. In this tactic lay the seed of failure. The French party especially failed in this (perhaps too contradictory) task.

When the deputies representing black Africa, who had entered the National Assembly in Paris for the first time in 1945, were considering a plan in the autumn of 1946 to call for a large congress to assemble the many regional political associations, this policy received the support of the PCF. Some of these deputies were already in contact with the communist fraction: the outstanding political figure among them was Félix Houphouet-Boigny, today President of the Ivory Coast; but the man intellectually most familiar with Europe and European politics was at that time without doubt Gabriel d'Arboussier, today Minister of Justice of Senegal. He was to become the most important channel between the communists and the new mass movement created at the Bamako Congress of 18–21 October 1946: the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA).

D'Arboussier did more than cultivate relations with the PCF. He travelled on behalf of the RDA to Moscow; he became Vice-President of the 'World Peace Council.' D'Arboussier is the son of a Sudanese mother and a high French Colonial official. He had studied in France and had become a career colonial official himself. Whether he was ever converted to communist ideology (unquestionable in the case of Padmore) is doubtful; he himself denies this. What is certain is that d'Arboussier took in hand the building up of the RDA party machine and adhered strictly to the communist model: the creation of a network of cells, right into the last village, disciplined 'democratic centralism', the *Gleichschaltung* of trade unions, the creation of specialised youth and women's organisations, subordination of the parliamentarians (who had initiated the formation of the RDA) to the leadership of the central organ of the member organisations, the so-called Coordinating Committee. Thus far the development was parallel with, say, the Algerian organisations of Messali Hadj. But in the case of the RDA, there was also direct PCF 'development aid' in helping to build it up: PCF functionaries not only appeared at RDA congresses, they also travelled as instructors through Africa; a French communist holding the position of *chef de cabinet* of the Governor worked for the RDA to take root in the Ivory Coast; the RDA paper *Réveil*, published in Dakar, reads for many years almost like any regular communist party paper, often reporting more about the brilliant successes of the Soviet Union than about Africa.

Why did this apparently quite ideal marriage break up? The chief reason would seem to be the mistakes made by the communists themselves. When the RDA was being created, the PCF was a government party (it was, indeed, for this reason, namely, to gain the support of a government party, that Houphouet-Boigny and other African Deputies

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joined forces with the communist fraction). As long as this was so, the PCF emphasised in its Africa policy not the principle of anti-colonial struggle, but the 'united front of the working classes of the colonising and the colonised peoples in the common fight against imperialism.' As recently as 1947 the newly-created constitutional instrument, the 'Union Française', was defended by Etienne Fajon at the French CP congress as a 'favourable framework for the realisation of your (i.e. colonial peoples) aspirations'. When, however, in the same year the PCF was turned out of the government of the Fourth Republic and embarked on an energetic attack against the State ('insurrectional strikes', etc.), it seemed natural to the party to draw its African comrades of the RDA into this kind of action as well: the RDA of the Ivory Coast and elsewhere in West Africa was to march in step with the campaign of the PCF inside France, notably against the NATO alliance which was then being created! The first important RDA leader to protest against this role of serving as cannon-fodder (for of course the Colonial Administration, long since cleared of communists, was taking sharp counter-measures) was Houphouet-Boigny. As early as 1950 he broke away from the alliance with the PCF, effected a reconciliation with the left-centre parties then in power in Paris, and embarked on the course which has given him the reputation today of being the most loyal friend in Africa of France and Europe.

But Houphouet-Boigny is of less interest in this context, because for him the alliance with the communists was certainly always simply a tactical manoeuvre. The bonds of Gabriel d'Arboussier were deeper. He opposed Houphouet's change of course, wanted to hold fast to joint action with the communist fraction, lost his position over this as Secretary-General of the RDA, and almost his entire following within that party, and nearly shipwrecked his whole political career. The quarrel reached its height in an open exchange of letters between Houphouet and d'Arboussier in 1952. But in 1957 d'Arboussier—in the meantime likewise committed to the Houphouet line—reappeared in a leading position in the RDA. That d'Arboussier, too, should eventually place African solidarity above the attractions of communism is only of secondary interest here; of primary interest is it that, as Secretary-General, he set about from the first to construct the RDA in such a way as to differentiate it in important respects from the communist party (despite the similarities already mentioned).

In October 1948 d'Arboussier submitted a lengthy report to the Coordinating Committee, which is one of the most important sources for an understanding of the radical revolutionary political parties in Africa today. In it the alliance with the PCF was, it is true, justified, the world divided in accordance with the communist view into a 'democratic anti-imperialist' camp and an 'imperialist anti-democratic' camp. But it is not these phrases, nor the long quotations from Marx and Engels and Zhdanov (even though quoted side by side with Pope Pius XI and Bossuet) that catch the eye, but rather the clearly delineated limits:

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above all, even then, the RDA was for Gabriel d'Arboussier not a political party, i.e. not the 'expression of a certain class', but a 'union of all classes'. It was to be 'as broadly based a mass-movement as possible, at one and the same time the expression of the masses and the embodiment of the masses, not an avant-garde political party'. The reason for this is clear: a class society does not in fact exist in Africa. In a polemic against the present President of Senegal, Léopold Senghor, who at that time gave himself out as a 'class-conscious' marxist-oriented socialist, d'Arboussier declared: 'While in France the special interest of the working class, which forms the most important class, happens to coincide with the national interest and justifies their fight against capitalism, in Africa the special interest of every class and social stratum is dominated by the common interest of the entire population subject to colonial rule . . . As far as we are concerned, we do not content ourselves with mere words, we are not a proletarian party, but a democratic organisation, the economic and social basis of Africa, within which people of varied origin, of every condition, people with all kinds of philosophical or religious ideas, have their place, and which has a concretely realisable programme'.

This statement implicitly precludes the PCF demand for the leadership of the new African movement although it was made at a time when the African leaders themselves were still clinging to an alliance with the communists. Anyone who puts forward d'Arboussier's arguments and means them to be taken seriously, could not in earnest lend himself to the role in which he is cast by the CP. This, it would seem, is the reason, articulated and theoretically thought out, which also prompted the withdrawal from communism of Messali and Padmore, neither of whom may have given it in so many words.

A number of leading politicians of French Black Africa came out of the RDA, and it would seem to have given them a sound practical schooling, from which they acquired a certain immunity to communism. The Western observer finds it difficult at times even today to distinguish between the genuine African revolutionary dynamic based on the broad masses of the people prone to using Marxist vocabulary, on the one hand, and communist infiltration on the other. The classical example of this confusion is Sekou Touré's Guinea, a country in which the attempt has been made, since 1958, to apply to the government of a sovereign state, in as pure and unaltered form as possible, the old concept of the RDA as expressed in d'Arboussier's report. Guinea was already more or less branded as a 'People's Democracy', and there was great astonishment when in December 1961 Sekou Touré ruthlessly suppressed a communist plot.

Sekou Touré, born in 1922, took his first steps into politics in the years of alliance between RDA and PCF. He was trained in the French CGT, the largest and communist-led trade union federation of France and is thought to have taken a course also in Prague. He is unquestionably a man of revolutionary temperament and strong will-power. When

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he was the only head of government in French West Africa (long before independence, and with the agreement of the French Governor), he set about solving the problem of the traditional chieftain-aristocracy by simply abolishing the local chieftainships by means of short and sharp legal decrees! There is no doubt that Sekou Touré is a 'collectivist': the people and the party, which is identical with the people, concern him more than any form of freedom of the individual. He calls his party's regime a 'communocracy', a term which can be translated as 'socialism' without perverting its meaning—so long as we do not automatically associate with it 'belonging to the socialist camp'! After all, the same Sekou Touré, when it seemed he would be lost without communist economic assistance, stated unambiguously as early as April 1960: 'I refuse to allow the Guinean democratic party to follow the line dictated by communist ideology. If there are some people who want that, let them establish a Guinean communist party, but let them know that the PDG-RDA will bar their road under my own leadership. Communism is not the road for Africa. The class struggle is an impossibility here because classes do not exist.' At the time these remarks were dismissed by the world with a shrug of the shoulders. Since then Sekou Touré has reminded us of them, and it would be to underestimate him to believe that he turned against the communists and expelled the Soviet Ambassador for the sole reason that the Eastern bloc had supplied him with economic assistance in the form of snow ploughs and the famous 3,000 water closets! No; in Sekou Touré there lives (as there does in Modeibo Keita, the President of Mali) the spirit of the old RDA, formulated by Gabriel d'Arboussier in 1948 in the words already given here: Emancipation of the African peoples through a movement, which, at one and the same time, is the expression of the African masses and the embodiment of their situation. This is a far cry from Leninist communism.

Whether this concept will fulfil the promise it holds for many African politicians, is again quite another question; whether the 'one-party-democracy', which not only Sekou Touré but nearly all African politicians are trying to construct, is realisable or simply a phantom of the imagination. The scales hang in the balance, and may well come down on the side of dictatorship, even of totalitarianism; it may be that the Africa of tomorrow will resemble the Latin America of yesterday, with a thin upper crust of new masters, comic-opera dictators, with regular military coups d'état and huge and completely senseless expenditures on armies and navies but no enemy to fight. This possibility appears at least as real as the danger of a communist take-over.

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LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNISM

Robert J. Alexander

LATIN AMERICA as a whole is going through a profound social, economic, and political revolution. This upheaval, arising from the impact of the Industrial Revolution, aspires to abolish semi-feudal and semi-servile social systems, to end the oppression of one race by another which had its origins in the European conquest of the New World, and to make effective the juridical independence which most of the Latin American republics have enjoyed for almost a century and a half.

Competing fiercely for leadership of this revolution are two types of political parties; one seeks to lead it in a democratic direction, with economic and social changes accompanied by the establishment of governments chosen by the majority and protecting the rights of the minority to continue to agitate to become the majority. The second type includes those parties which are trying to lead the Latin American revolution towards totalitarianism. Of these, the communists are the most significant, though, as this article will indicate, not the only totalitarians.

If the communists and other totalitarians are to be dealt with it is essential that they be identified. It should be borne in mind that not all Latin American revolutionaries are communists, indeed, that most of them are not; but here we are concerned with those parties which were members of the old Communist International or would have been if they had existed during the years in which it was officially functioning.

There is today a communist party in every one of the twenty republics of Latin America. There is also one in Puerto Rico, separate from that of the United States, and communist parties also exist in several of the British, French, and Dutch non-self-governing territories in and around the Caribbean. Most of these are called communist parties, although those of Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic have for more than a decade been labelled Popular Socialist parties, and those of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Panama have borne other names during part of their careers.

A few of the Latin American communist parties antedate the formation of the Comintern in 1919. The socialist parties of Mexico, Uruguay, and Chile changed their names and joined the Communist International. In Argentina a splinter group of the socialist party known as the Partido Socialista Internacional, became a founding member of the Comintern. The rest are of more recent origin, the youngest of them, that of Honduras, having been established during the 1950s. It must be clearly understood that these communist parties of Latin America are the real thing. The argument sometimes heard that, because they are Latin American, they are not 'real' communist parties is absurd, as recent events in Cuba amply indicate. These parties are not (as some ill-informed people said of the Chinese communists during World War Two)

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'just agrarian reformers'. They are orthodox communist organisations, with leaders who have been trained by the Comintern and its successors, and they share the objectives of communist parties throughout the world.

In essence, the Latin American communists have followed two basic objectives. In the first place, they have sought to serve the interests of the Soviet Union. Secondly, they have sought if possible to establish a communist dictatorship in their respective countries. Not infrequently, the second objective has been sacrificed to the first. These parties have followed all the twists and turns of international communist policy through four and a half decades. When Comintern policy was one of extreme isolationism from other political groups, super-revolutionary attitudes, and dual unionism, the Latin American communists followed this line. When the Popular Front was the order of the day for the international communist movement, so was it with the Latin American members of this movement. The Latin American parties have faithfully denounced all dissidents within the International, whether they were Trotskyists, right-wing oppositionists, or Titoites. They tend to appeal to two principal groups, the organised labour movement and the intellectuals. In recent years they have also sought to gain the support of the peasants and of the growing industrialist class.

THE labour movement has been a political power of growing importance and of vast potential during the last two generations. It has represented a group dissatisfied with the status quo, and anxious for rapid and far-reaching change. The trade unions have a unique position in this part of the world. In an area in which the armed forces have traditionally been the ultimate determinants of power, organised labour represents the first effective challenge to the role of the military. Relatively well disciplined, and able to bring economic activity to a halt, the trade unions have been in a position to thwart attempts by the military to overthrow one regime and put another in its place.

This power has been demonstrated upon a number of occasions in recent years. Juan Domingo Peron was brought back from prison to power in October 1945 by a movement of his organised labour supporters. The government of President Juan Arevalo was saved from overthrow in Guatemala in 1949 through the general strike and armed support of the labour movement. Upon several occasions since the overthrow of the dictatorship of General Marcos Perez Jimenez in Venezuela in January 1958, general strikes by the trade unions have been the key to thwarting attempts by dissident military men to seize power once again.

For reasons of power, then, as well as those of ideology, the communists have sought influence in the Latin American organised labour movement. It is notable that the only cases in which the communists have gained really significant influence have been those in which they first gained control of the organised labour movement. In Chile, Ecuador, and Batista's Cuba, where the communists first became ministers in national governments, they dominated the labour movement at the time.

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In Guatemala, their first step towards power was to capture the trade unions; in Castro's Cuba, too, capture of the Confederation of Workers was the first stage of the communist drive towards the seizure of the government itself.

On balance, the communists have, surprisingly, had little success in penetrating the labour movements of Latin America. Although for a short time during and just after World War Two they dominated most of the central labour bodies, they lost this control within three years of the end of the war, and have never been able to regain the ground then lost. Even after the advent of Castro, they made virtually no gains elsewhere in the hemisphere's organised labour movement.

The second group which the communists have sought to penetrate from the beginning of their activities in Latin America has been the intellectuals. Here, too, the reasons have been mixed. First of all, the Latin American intelligentsia has contained a disproportionately large number of people discontented with the status quo. These people have in recent decades been the leaders of all the movements for social change. For many of them, communist ideology, with its apparent certainty and its claim to answer all the complex questions facing not only Latin America but the world at large, had its attractions, but it is interesting to note that the intellectuals who have been recruited into the Latin American communist parties have produced few if any theoreticians of significance. Their usual fate, if they stayed long in the movement, was to lose their originality and inventiveness. A prime example of this is the famous Chilean poet, Pablo Neruda, who before joining the party ranks was rated as one of the greatest contemporary poets in the Spanish language, but who has spent most of the last twenty years writing Odes to Stalin and Hymns to Khrushchev.

The intellectuals have been the more interesting to the communists because of their position in political life. The highly educated are a small proportion of the population of Latin America, and belong to the ruling group, having power out of all proportion to their numbers. Although relatively few have actually become members of the communist party, the communists have over four decades found thousands of them ready to lend themselves to the communist cause as fellow travellers or simply political innocents. One group of particular interest to the communists are the students. Traditionally, the Latin American student has been active in politics, and he has usually been an advocate of reform. In recent years, an attitude which may be described as left Jacobin has been particularly prevalent among the students. In many of the countries of the area the communists have been able to gain control of the student movements, a control which has been exceedingly useful in the organisation of demonstrations and even riots.

INCREASINGLY in recent years the communists have turned their attention to the peasants. This does not represent a change towards 'Maoism' on their part, as some people have argued. Rather, it reflects

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a change in the political situation as they see it. Communist interest in the peasantry goes back many years; during the 1920s they were particularly active among the agricultural workers of Mexico, and to a less degree those of Central America. However, in Mexico, where they were most important, they lost out to indigenous revolutionary leaders because of the highly irrelevant and extremist policy which the Mexican communists were called upon to adopt as a result of the super-revolutionary Comintern policies of the so-called 'third period' of the late 1920s and early 1930s.

Until recently the peasants have not been a particularly attractive target for the communists or any other left-wing political group. Except in Mexico and one or two other countries they have been politically inert and have played virtually no independent role in civic life. Usually of American Indian or Negro origin, they were often unaware even of the existence of the nations in which they lived. Their loyalties were local and parochial, to their tribe, locality, or nearby landlords. In most cases they were barred from active participation in political life because they were usually illiterate. Insofar as they voted at all, they were more often than not marched off to the polls to vote as the local landlord or political boss told them to do. But since World War Two the Latin American peasant has begun to enter political life. In several Central American countries, as well as in Venezuela, Cuba, Colombia, Bolivia, and Peron's Argentina, economic changes and political developments have brought into existence peasant organisations, and have extended political rights to farm workers and small landowners. This explains the greater attention paid by the communists to the peasantry. In Guatemala, during the middle 1950s, in Cuba since the advent of Castro, in Colombia since the civil war of the early 1950s, in Chile since the late 1940s, and most recently in Brazil, the communists have sought to organise peasant groups or to penetrate those already established under other leadership.

Finally, the communists have since World War Two devoted some attention to the industrialists. This turn, too, is not the result of any shift in communist ideology, but reflects changes within the Latin American economy and political life.

The development of industry has given birth to a powerful new industrialist class with interests to protect, and the communists have sought to recruit their support by seeming to align themselves with the defence of these interests. Their usual line is to represent the incursion of foreign capital into Latin America as a serious menace to indigenous industrial development and to form a united front with the industrialists to fight this incursion.

The particular appeals which the communists have used in Latin America have been many, and they have varied in different countries and at different times, but some themes have been consistently advanced. A fundamental appeal has been to social revolution. Throughout their history, the Latin American communists have presented themselves with more or less emphasis as the only true advocates of social transformation;

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they have advocated agrarian reform, social and labour legislation, extension of education and so on, and have preached the need to destroy the institutions of the old order and reorganise society on a completely new basis.

Their emphasis on this theme has varied; it was perhaps most prominent during the ' third period '. During the ' Popular Front ' period it was almost completely lacking from communist propaganda in Latin America. After World War Two it appeared again in the Guatemala of President Jacobo Arbenz, and has generally come to the fore throughout the hemisphere since the advent of Castro to power in Cuba.

Nationalism, too, has been a constantly recurring theme in communist propaganda, especially marked since the war. As the cold war deepened, the communists of Latin America became particularly concerned with stirring up hostility to the United States, and the emphasis on nationalism has been of particular value in developing this anti-Yankee campaign. Anti-Yankeeism is in any case widespread in Latin America and it has been growing in intensity; this would have occurred quite apart from the communist movement, but though they did not create it, the communists have encouraged this growing dislike of the United States. Their arguments in their nationalist anti-United States campaign have sometimes been internally contradictory. They have at one and the same time said that United States private investments and loans to Latin America by the United States Government are ' imperialistic ' and dangerous to the sovereignty of these countries; and they have also attacked the United States and private interests in that country because they would not lend to or invest in Latin American enterprises.

MUCH of their attention in this nationalistic campaign has been concentrated on ' the defence of the national patrimony '. Thus, they have led campaigns in Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia against permitting foreign companies to exploit the local oil resources. In Brazil they also organised a successful attack on the export of uranium to the United States, which was of rising importance during the early 1950s. In addition, they have conducted campaigns in several countries for the confiscation of United States-owned mining enterprises. Of particular importance have been their efforts to have the Chilean Government take over the United States copper mining interests which are of key importance to that country's economy, a campaign which has been joined by most of the rest of the Left in Chile, and has even found recruits among more conservative elements.

With industrialisation virtually an article of faith in Latin America, as elsewhere, the communists there have constantly emphasised the fact that the Soviet Union was able to convert itself from a third-rate industrial power into one of the world's major manufacturing nations within a generation, and that China is successfully following the same path. In this campaign political tourism has been widely used. Thousands of Latin American trade union leaders, peasant league officials, intellectuals,

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industrialists, and politicians visit the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China each year, while a growing number of Soviet and Chinese intellectuals, commercial officials and political leaders have been visiting the Latin American countries. The Latin American communists have carried on constant campaigns in favour of trade with the Soviet bloc, drawing an alluring picture of the advantages which will accrue to the Latin American countries from such trade. It will, they argue, end once and for all Latin America's difficulties in finding adequate markets for the raw materials and foodstuffs which it exports, contending that the Soviet Union and other communist countries are willing and anxious to make long-term, low-interest loans for Latin American economic development ' without political strings '.

So far, this appeal has had relatively little concrete success. Although, as a result of the shift of Cuba towards the Soviet bloc, almost all of that country's trade is now with the communist countries, the rest of Latin America still has relatively little commerce with them.

WHEN one studies the trend of events in Latin America during the period in which the communists have been active, the surprising thing is how little success they have had. Other things being equal, it would seem that the area has long been ripe for strong communist advances, in view of the widespread poverty, social injustice, and the growing desire radically to change existing conditions. However, the fact remains that only in few instances were the communists able to make a serious bid for power. Through their first two decades they had little more than nuisance value; although they attempted insurrections in Mexico in 1929, in El Salvador in 1932, and in Brazil in November 1935, these were easily suppressed and resulted in the virtual disappearance of the parties in these countries for a considerable time. The communists remained minority political elements in the labour movements of virtually all the Latin American countries, but during the Second World War their influence increased. They supported practically all the governments in the area, so long as those governments supported the war effort. Within the labour movement they were the most ' moderate ' element, seeking to prevent any movements which might imperil shipments of needed raw materials and foodstuffs to the Soviet Union and its allies.

In this ' co-operative ' phase communist ministers entered cabinets of Latin American countries for the first time. For a short while in 1944–45 a communist sat in the cabinet of Ecuador; while two communists, Juan Marinello and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, served as ministers in the government of President Batista of Cuba from 1942 to 1944. Under Castro, Rodriguez became head of the National Agrarian Reform Institute and Marinello President of the University of Havana.

Immediately after the war, the Chilean communists made a serious bid for power. From November 1946 until April 1947 three communist ministers sat in the cabinet of President Gonzalez Videla. During this

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period their party acted as if it were already in command of the administration, seizing control of parts of the labour movement by force, and even killing some left-wing opponents. However, in April 1947 the President asked the communist ministers to resign, reorganised his government, and shortly afterwards turned sharply against the communist party, which was outlawed in 1948.

The next serious communist bid for power occurred in the early 1950s in Guatemala. During the administration of President Arevalo from 1946 to 1952, the Communist party of Guatemala had gained substantial influence in the labour movement and in the public administration. Under Arevalo's successor, President Arbenz, it won the upper hand in the government; its secretary-general, José Manuel Fortuny, was the president's closest adviser, and with his aid secured complete domination of the labour movement and brought under its control the Peasant confederation. Arbenz was overthrown in July 1954 before the communists had achieved complete power in Guatemala, and it was not until Fidel Castro and his forces overthrew the Batista dictatorship that another Latin American communist party got a chance to make a serious bid for power.

Castro's movement was certainly not communist when it gained control of the republic in January 1959. It was a heterogeneous movement, including people who had belonged to most of the former Cuban parties, and many young people who had never been affiliated to any. The great majority of its leaders and rank and file were democratic and anti-communist. The communists' Popular Socialist party had opposed the Castro movement until after the failure of the April 1958 general strike, only eight months before Fidel's victory.

Of the divided leadership of the 26th of July movement of Fidel Castro one part was democratic in orientation, seeking fundamental economic and social reforms and favouring the re-establishment of the democratic form of government which had existed before Batista seized power in March 1952; the other was totalitarian if not avowedly pro-communist in outlook, holding that only through a revolutionary dictatorship which broke violently with the United States and aligned itself with the Soviet bloc could the necessary economic and social changes be brought about. For nearly a year Castro did not definitely give his support to either tendency. The struggle between them was fought out behind the scenes, with the 'Supreme Leader' of the revolution first throwing his weight in one direction, then in the other. It was not until the decision to jail Major Hubert Matos for seeking to resign from the Rebel Army in protest against what he thought to be growing communist influence in the regime that Fidel seems finally to have made up his mind. At the same time, Camilo Cienfuegos, head of the Rebel Army and leader of the anti-communist faction within the 26th of July movement, disappeared in an alleged airplane accident, the details of which remain obscure.

From the end of October or the beginning of November 1959 there

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was a decided change in the policy of Castro and of the Cuban Government generally. Internally, freedom of speech, press and organisation was progressively suppressed; the labour movement was turned over to pro-communists, and was purged of any leaders who resisted this trend. (The process was completed in November 1961 when Lazaro Pena was appointed secretary-general of the Confederation of Workers of Cuba; this was the post he had held in the early 1940s, when the communists dominated the Confederation as a result of their alliance with Batista.) At the same time Castro turned violently against the United States. He began a series of unremitting and unrestrained attacks, largely unprovoked, on Cuba's northern neighbour; the United States did not act against his regime until March 1960, when Congress first cut the Cuban sugar quota—completely abolished later that same year. This cutting of ties with the United States was accompanied by the first steps to tie Cuba economically to the Soviet bloc.

Eventually, Cuba became the first officially proclaimed Marxist-Leninist state in Latin America. There is only one legal party, the *Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas,* formed by the merger of the remnants of the 26th of July with the old PSP. Cuban agriculture is organised principally into state farms and virtually all industry is owned by the government. The labour movement is little more than a tool of the government; typical of its actions was the resolution of the November 1961 congress of the Labour Confederation to 'voluntarily' end the legal two weeks paid vacation, payment for overtime on weekends, the Christmas bonus of one month's wages, and practically all the other gains which Cuban workers had made in the previous quarter of a century. Economically, Cuba has become part of the Soviet bloc. Some 80 per cent of its foreign trade is now with the communist countries; Soviet and East European experts and technicians by the thousands have come to Cuba to help run its industries and its farms in the face of the flight abroad of most of the country's managerial class. Cuba is infinitely less independent economically now than it was in the worst days of Yankee imperialism.

IT is significant that in each case in which the communists were able to enter a government or to make a serious bid for power, they have done so as a result of deals made with those in charge of the government, not as a result of having won a majority (or anything like it) of public opinion. This was the case in Chile in 1946–47; it was notoriously true in the case of communist participation in the government of General Batista in the 1940s in Cuba, where a deal made as early as 1937 gave the communists control of the labour movement in return for support of Batista's campaign for the Presidency.

This same phenomenon characterised the two serious communist bids for power in Latin America after the war. Until a few months before the overthrow of President Arbenz, the Communist party had a few thousand members and a voting strength of only a small fraction of the

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Guatemalan electorate; its presence in the government was due entirely to its influence with the President. In Cuba the Communist party, which had less support in the late 1950s than it had had for twenty years, owed its quick rise to power virtually exclusively to the support of Fidel Castro and the small pro-communist coterie around him.

The situation of the communists in Latin America has changed fundamentally with the rise of the Fidel Castro regime in Cuba and its turn towards the communist camp. Until he became a self-proclaimed communist, Fidel served as a catalyst for an important element in Latin American public opinion which hitherto had not found a spokesman or a rallying point. In spite of his open communist affiliation, those organised in his name between 1959 and 1961 remain a factor of importance in Latin American politics. For the time being, it constitutes an element of strength for the communists, though in the longer run it may prove to have certain drawbacks for them.

The element which gathered around Castro, which we shall call the Jacobin Left, did not originate with his victory. It had been developing for more than a dozen years before his advent to power, and it had had at least one important leader before Fidel. The Jacobin Left is the result of a growing feeling of frustration and even desperation throughout Latin America. This feeling has a number of roots; one is the slow pace of Latin American economic development in the face of the most rapidly rising population of any part of the globe. Although for a decade after the war development was very rapid, as a result of the high prices received for exports, and the resultant high imports of capital equipment, prices fell drastically after 1955, and economic growth slowed to a crawl. In the last few years it has been proceeding at the rate of about 1 per cent per capita for the area as a whole, which has meant that several of the countries have been stagnant or worse. Combined with this has been the slow rate of social change. In the face of growing restiveness among the urban working class and the peasants the democratic governments which have come to power since the dictatorships began to collapse in 1955 have on the whole moved with extreme slowness in the direction of agrarian reform, revision of the tax structure, redistribution of income.

Finally, the attitude of the United States has been very important in the development of the Jacobin Left. While presenting itself as the defender of political democracy, in Latin America the United States supported virtually every military tyrant who came upon the scene (or was there already) between 1945 and 1960. Furthermore, although pouring out seemingly endless resources for the economic recovery of Europe, and lesser but still large sums for help to the new Asian nations, it did relatively little to promote the economic development of its Latin American neighbours. These neighbours felt particularly bitter about this because they believed that during the war they had received promises of substantial aid.

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THE growing feeling of frustration arising from these factors has resulted in the development of parties and groups which we have called the Jacobin Left. Like the Jacobins of the French Revolution, they are xenophobic nationalists; and their nationalism is so extreme that it pays little heed to the economic results of their policies. They turn with particular bitterness against the United States.

The Jacobin Left favour not only extreme nationalism, but also rapid social change. They want to get rid immediately of the old institutions of large landlordism and other legacies of the semi-feudal and semi-servile past. They are little concerned with the cost of this change, in terms of human suffering, disorganisation of the economy, or individual liberties. The Jacobin Left have little regard for political democracy. At best they feel it to be ineffective; at worst, they look upon it as a means by which the supporters of the status quo defend their property and their interests.

For the most part, the Jacobin Left remained widely dispersed into relatively small parties and groups; but in the early 1950s the Argentine dictator, Juan Domingo Peron, sought for a short while to build a hemisphere-wide political movement. He had considerable success among the labour movements of several countries, and in organising political groups in a few of them. However, the fear in neighbouring countries of Peron's political ambitions and of his military origins aroused suspicion; and the Soviet Union was not yet ready to come to his aid. Finally, the weakness of the Argentine economy defeated Peron's hemispheric political ambitions even before he was overthrown in September 1955.

To a large degree Castro succeeded where Peron had failed. As a civilian who had overthrown one of Latin America's most powerful dictators with a handful of guerrilla warriors, as a first-class actor and a Cuban, not an Argentine, Castro was a more appealing figure than Peron had ever been for people outside his own country. Initially, his appeal was that of a native Latin American revolutionary who was doing the things which people all over the hemisphere wished that they could do. The reforms which he was carrying out in agriculture, housing, education, and other fields were fundamental. The young leaders of the Cuban revolution were not afraid to tackle even the most firmly entrenched interests. Furthermore, he expressed the kind of anti-Yankeeism which had become very popular throughout Latin America.

Castro and his movement served as catalyst for the Jacobin Left everywhere. In some cases, already existing parties declared their support of Castro and aligned themselves with his movement. In others, pro-Castro elements split away from the parties of the democratic left, as happened in Venezuela, Peru, and Costa Rica. In still others, completely new groups came into existence. Some of these Fidelista groups of the Jacobin Left are worthy of mention. In Venezuela, a small but noisy group, consisting mainly of students, broke away from the Democratic Action party, to form the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revo-

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lucionaria. The already existing Union Republicana Democratica also came out in support of Fidelismo. In Peru, a group broke away from the Aprista party to form the so-called Apra Rebelde; while a new party, the Partido Social Progresista, also came into existence. In several countries the existing socialist parties became part of the Fidelista movement. This was the case in Chile and Uruguay, and of two of the three factions into which the Argentine Socialist party split after 1958, as well as of one faction of the Ecuadorean party. In Mexico a new Fidelista group, the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional, was formed; while in Brazil, the leaders of the new federation of Peasant Leagues, in the north-eastern part of the country, proclaimed themselves Fidelistas.

Throughout Latin America similar groups of more or less importance rallied around Fidel's banner. There is no doubt that many, if not most of them, have received financial and other aid from Cuba. Although few of them now constitute major parties in their respective countries, taken together they represent an important factor in Latin American politics. They are not official communist parties; in some cases they find it difficult to explain the differences between themselves and the communists, but both they and the communists are definite about the fact that there are differences, and there are sometimes differences of opinion and even outright public controversy between the official communists and the Fidelistas. The relationship has been clouded by Castro's recent open affiliation with the international communist movement, and the conversion of the Cuban government into a frankly communist regime. However, this process in Cuba has not resulted in an absorption of the Fidelistas into the various national communist parties elsewhere in Latin America; nor does there seem to be any move in this direction.

* * * *

It is impossible to say what the future holds for the communists in Latin America. With the exception of Cuba, they have had remarkably little success in their four and a half decades of activity. However, the tempo of change in the area has risen sharply, and although the government of the United States is now on the side of social change and rapid economic development in Latin America the final outcome of the struggle will depend not just on the Kennedy programme of the Alliance for Progress, but on the strength of the local democratic forces who alone can compel the old ruling classes to abandon their positions of privilege and bring about the long-overdue social and economic reforms. Foreign economic aid will be wasted if the local political situation prevents its rational use for democratic ends; if, as in other instances, instead of leading to a modernisation of the country, it is diverted by the local reactionary politicians for their own purposes and for maintaining the status quo. Thus, ultimately, communist chances in Latin America will depend less on Soviet policy and on American economic aid than on the ability of the local political elites to cope successfully with the forces which are bringing Latin America into the twentieth century.

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THE LEFT WING IN JAPAN

Robert A. Scalapino

MARXISM is in serious trouble in Japan. It is probably unwise to insist that the Japanese extreme left has reached its high-point and is destined for gradual decline. Many signs point that way, but the variables involving both Japan and the world are such as to make predictions hazardous. There can be little doubt, however, about current trends: Japanese Marxism is involved in extensive fragmentation; it is being pushed further onto the defensive; and despite some sallies and efforts at invigoration, it is in a general state of retreat.

When one examines the political spectrum in Japan, these facts become evident. In academic and literary circles, it is generally an older generation that now guards the Marxian citadels. Most younger intellectuals have either abandoned their battle-stations, or, at the very least, have insisted upon the right to modernise the weapons and reorganise the troops. In political circles, similar tendencies are operative. The Japanese 'left' has always been deeply divided, but fragmentation has recently developed at an accelerated rate and *within* the extreme wing. Once again, differences of generation are important. The old stalwarts of the Socialist party may cling tenaciously to the traditional tenets that they have held for forty years, but a younger group is beginning to insist upon fresh approaches. While these approaches still, in most cases, bear the Marxian label, in fact they represent forms of revisionism, some of them with far-reaching implications. The current controversy over 'structural reform' in the Socialist party should be read in this light.

Further to the 'left', the Marxist forces are also in a state of confusion. The young radicals who lead *Zengakuren*, the National Students' Federation, are deeply divided over major ideological issues. Actually, the importance of Zengakuren has been exaggerated. The militant activist group is small and generally confined to the leadership. Rank and file students in Japan, including many members of Zengakuren, are normally apolitical. The activists, however, are zealous and they gain headlines. Occasionally, moreover, they are able to influence or direct significant protest movements involving other elements.

At present, the 'main current' or majority leaders of Zengakuren represent an angry young generation of Japanese Marxists who have rejected all international communist authority. For some years they have spoken and written against Stalin, Khrushchev, and Mao. They have charged both Russia and China with bureaucratism. In modern communism as it actually operates, they have recognised an undesirable and seemingly permanent statism. When one reads their fiery little journals or listens to their speeches, one detects certain similarities with the anarchist protests against Bolshevism that poured forth in the early

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years after the Russian Revolution. It should not be forgotten, incidentally, that anarchism in that era had a substantial impact upon the Japanese ' left ', an impact never entirely lost.

The opponents of the ' main current ' leaders, however, charge them with ' Trotskyism ', not anarchism. Here too there are some parallels, both in the anti-stalinist position of the main current, and in their antipathy to the kinds of compromises involved in any ' two-stage revolutionary theory ' or united front tactics. These young men want to be known as militant revolutionaries. They are dedicated to the immediate march toward world socialism. Most of them, however, have declined the Trotskyite label and show no interest in the international Trotskyite movement.

A minority of the Zengakuren leadership is affiliated with the Japanese Communist party, but this party itself is deeply divided. In 1961, for example, Shojiro Kasuga and six other members and candidate members of the Central Committee left the party in the midst of violent charges and countercharges. The Kasuga group was charged with various ' crimes ' by the party regulars: Kautskyism, petty-bourgeois revisionism, and—naturally—anti-party and anti-class activities. In fact, Kasuga and his followers in certain respects are ideologically related to the old *Rono* group of pre-war Japanese Marxists, once led by Yamakawa Hitoshi; in other respects, their theories parallel those of the ' structural revisionists ' of the contemporary Socialist party. Yet they fiercely proclaim their orthodox communism and struggle with the JCP to capture the movement.

WHAT lies behind this picture of fragmentation throughout the ranks of Japanese socialism and communism? Let us first seek out the origins of Japanese socialism, and, more especially, the reasons why Marxism had an appeal to the Japanese intellectuals. Japan was the first society in Asia to feel the Marxist impact. Marx was introduced to the Japanese intelligentsia at the end of the nineteenth century, along with other Western socialist writers. Small intellectual socialist study circles were formed among the *avant garde*. But in the period prior to World War I, Marxism enjoyed no special vogue, not even among the tiny community of Japanese socialists. The social-democrats of this early period generally derived from Christian humanist training. The radicals moved into anarchism or anarcho-syndicalism, and other theories then enjoying some popularity among European and American socialist circles. Japanese ' progressives ' have always scanned the horizon to discern the latest trends. How else, it might be asked, does one catch up?

Marxism made its first significant gains among Japanese intellectuals in the period immediately after World War I. Building upon that background, it had an even greater influence in the years immediately after World War II. Incidentally, the term ' intellectual ' is used here in the same sense that the Japanese use it, namely as an occupational designation. The Japanese intellectual is an academician, a journalist, a member

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of the *literati,* a professional man of certain categories, or a university student.

At no time did a majority of the Japanese intellectuals affiliate themselves to either academic or political Marxism. By a considerable margin, the intellectual community as a whole was apolitical, liberal, or conservative in the Japanese style. Yet it cannot be denied that a small ' vanguard ' of Marxists, flanked by those upon whom Marxism had had a definite influence, tended to dominate the Japanese intellectual world in many respects. It was this group that often occupied the strategic heights—whether of ' progressive ' politics, ' scientific ' methodology, or publication.

To understand the appeal of Marxism to the Japanese ' progressive ' is to explore many fascinating problems relating not only to Japan but to the whole emergent non-Western world. Japan partakes of both the unique and the universal, and both factors were involved in the Marxian appeal. Let us first recognise the enormous problems faced by an intellectual class born into that society and in those times. The Japanese intellectual had only about forty years (1880-1920) in which to be introduced to the whole range of Western thought. He made no less a forced march than his society toward modernisation. Ideas flashed across his stage in kaleidoscopic fashion and not always in proper sequence. The order in which Western thought reached Japan was centrally connected with the particular timing of the Japanese emergence into the world stream, but it was also related to the more trivial accidents of random discovery and translation. Burke followed John Stuart Mill. For a time Samuel Smiles competed for popularity with men like Rousseau. But all—Mill, Rousseau, Smiles, Burke, Darwin, Spencer, Marx, Lassalle, and hundreds of others—both giants and pygmies, made their debut in the Japanese intellectual world within a very short period of time.

One can scarcely over-estimate the difficulties faced by those Japanese who were seeking to break out of their intellectual isolation quickly, to conduct a one-generation assault upon all citadels of Western political thought. Diverse ideas poured in with a rapidity that made adequate understanding and systematisation almost impossible. More serious than this for the Japanese intellectual, however, was the fact that Western ideas did not necessarily relate to the nature and proclivities of contemporary Japan. What was one to do if the ideas borrowed from the advanced West and believed to be the wave of the future (' progressive,' ' scientific,' and ' true '), did not fit the capacities of one's society? It was easy enough to talk of adaptation or synthesis, but that was an extraordinarily complex task.

This problem, together with the cultural legacy that helped to produce it, did much to shape the nature, function, and ideological predilections of the modern Japanese intellectual. Speaking broadly, the function of the intellectual has been to be dissident and non-participant. By classic definition, the intellectual thinks; he does not act. Or if he does act, it

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must be with signs of great reluctance, as if he were doing a necessary but vulgar thing. Otherwise, self-respect and even status are threatened.

In modern times, the risks of action have in some respects increased. To move from thought to action requires a certain compromise with one's personal value system. It involves one in procedures and decisions not wholly of one's own choice. This universal problem has been especially acute for many Japanese intellectuals because of the wide gap between their value system (derived from the West) and the institutions and processes of their society. How could the modern intellectual support whole-heartedly the Imperial myth? How could he operate within the factional groupings that called themselves political parties? The basis for intellectual criticism and non-participation was thus strengthened. The intellectual was sustained in his seeming determination to be apart from, rather than a part of, his society.

Non-participation in turn underlined the Japanese intellectual penchant for theory. There is nothing unique about intellectual interest in theory; to proceed beyond mere description to analysis, conceptualisation, and model-building is a universal quest. In Japanese intellectual circles, however, there has been a tendency to avoid empirical research, to impose theory upon fact in such a fashion as to make the latter obedient to the former.

IN seeking to draw a rough profile of the Japanese intellectual, perhaps one additional feature should be added. In the modern era, he has generally lived a highly compartmentalised life. His ideas have been liberal or radical; his pattern of life traditional and conservative. It is by no means unusual to find a staunch Marxist maintaining a strongly status-conscious relation with colleagues and students and managing his family in paternal or authoritarian fashion. Perhaps, indeed, the word is a substitute for the act. In many ways, the intellectual writes or says what he does not dare do.

It is against this profile and the accompanying background of modern Japan that the emergence and growth of Japanese Marxism must be seen. A wide range of stimuli were involved. For some intellectuals, Marxism satisfied both negative and positive impulses. It was a response to both intellectual and emotional needs; it played upon both the rational and the irrational elements within this gifted, frustrated group, which found in Marxism an analysis of prevailing social ills that was comprehensive and easily understandable, and that not only contained within it significant elements of the truth, but also fitted in well with the proclivities of the modern Japanese intellectual. Both his new learning and his old function equipped him to be a part of the protest movement. Yet he could not accept the type of protest represented by the traditionalists of his society. These types were anti-modern and often anti-intellectual as well. Marxism, on the other hand, championed both modernity and intellectualism.

Clearly, in the process of Japanese modernisation, there was much

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against which to protest. The development of modern Japan represented one of the earliest experiments in the forced-march technique. Later, Soviet Russia utilised statism and mass mobilisation in much greater degree, but Japan, like all other societies intent upon a rapid industrial revolution, used the means conducive to that end: a great increase in centralised power, with a corresponding decline in local autonomy; a constant exhortation to discipline and sacrifice in the name of national unity and patriotism (with the imperial institution the central nationalist symbol); and the rise of new privileged classes, inheritors of wealth and power. Marxism provided a more basic challenge to these trends in Japan than any other force. In its Japanese form, Marxism played upon the themes of social and economic justice for the lower classes, the rapid and full consummation of democratic freedoms, and the realisation of popular sovereignty. Only Marxism openly attacked the Emperor system. Only Marxism did full battle with Japanese militarism, and the expansionist tendencies that grew with the maturation of modern Japan. Only Marxism questioned the fundamentals of Japanese constitutionalism as it operated in the period before World War II. Perhaps it is not surprising, therefore, when the events of that war seemed to prove the validity of some of the Marxist charges, that many intellectuals looked at Marxism with increased respect. Here was a form of thoroughgoing protest that had shown neither the ambivalence of Japanese liberalism nor the forlorn backwardness of the agrarian-military primitivists. The Marxist protest, moreover, was not confined to the Japanese scene. Like the nationalist movement with which it competed, Marxism attacked Western imperialism and promised its destruction in Asia.

Marxism, of course, was more than a mere method of protest. It was also a modern technique of revolution, especially when Leninism was added to it. Its cultivation and use of mass organisation, its skilful combination of military and political tactics, and its central emphasis upon all forms of propaganda, acted as heady wine on those intellectuals who had for so long been frustrated by their isolation, weakness, and seeming helplessness. Relying upon Marxian tactics, perhaps the intellectuals could become participants, even leaders in the great political upheaval that would produce a 'truly democratic society' in a new, twentieth-century democracy. This was especially important to men who were already becoming disillusioned with parliamentarism. Japan was the first country in Asia to experience failure in its efforts to make Western-style democracy work. The experiment with parliamentarism in Japan began in 1890. Within a few decades, in many minds, parliamentarism had become synonymous with corruption, political parties with privilege, and Japanese-style democracy with fraud. In intellectual circles, hopes remained high that universal suffrage might make major improvements possible, but in time these hopes diminished. The Japanese common man proved consistently to be more backward, more difficult to reach, and less rational than the 'progressive' intellectual cared to admit. Gradually, however, the 'progressive' became discouraged with

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democracy Western-style and began to search for some short cut, some method whereby his faith in democracy could be retained, but the procedures could be altered to fit the contours of his society. Somewhat unconsciously, the Japanese intellectual began to search for a system of tutelage, an elitist rule that would guide the masses towards what was good for them. This search for an appropriate system of tutelage, incidentally, is now almost universal throughout the non-Western world. A theory of tutelage is the one broad ideology that most nearly unites all emergent societies today.

THUS Marxism-Leninism spoke in the name of *avant-garde* democracy, but it operated in fact on the basis of a strict elitist tutelage over the masses. It used all the terms to which the intellectual was committed : progress, democracy, science and freedom. But in operation it was not impeded by these terms. It could aim at monolithic unity, and not be plagued by diversity. It could try to mobilise and solidify the masses for any national purpose, without being hampered by a recalcitrant individual or group. It could promise rapid progress on its own terms, and not be worried about an opposition. Was this not a suitable—even a necessary—system for societies that wanted to kindle a one-generation modernisation drive based largely upon the sacrifices of their own people? To be sure, in the case of Japan, modernisation was already in progress, and the tutelage was in other hands. The Japanese Marxist was thus in the position of rebelling against one form of tutelage while favouring another.

There are also certain other psychological aspects of the Marxian appeal which cannot be ignored. To the Japanese intellectual, Marxism was a philosophy of optimism. It was a doctrine of inevitable progress, a promise that societies like Japan would catch up with the West and join in the universal stream. Almost more than anything, this was a goal of the Japanese ' progressive.' He wanted desperately to be relieved of his isolation, of the sense of always being behind, of the feeling of inferiority towards the advanced West. Liberalism made no promises. Its doctrine in effect was: work as hard as you can and hope for the best. There was no assurance that salvation would come, or even relief. Indeed, liberalism in action seemed to generate a rising tide of criticism covering every aspect of the society, a kind of rolling pessimism within the intellectual world. The Japanese intellectual, in many cases, seemed to need a set of firm beliefs. Thus Marxism had an appeal as a faith. But this appeal is stated more accurately if one suggests that Marxism represented a combination of faith and science, or perhaps faith in ' science.' The Japanese Marxist stood his ' science ' against the superstition, the error, and the ' retarded ideologies ' with which he was surrounded. In the progressive world, ' science ' swept all before it. Like democracy, it was a concept that could not be challenged. And the science of society was economic determinism. Who could question

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the truth of Marxism as revealed in its scientific approach to man in society?

It is here that a very different aspect of the Marxist appeal should be introduced, namely, the appeal of Marxism as a methodology. In Japan, academic Marxism has always been at least as powerful as political Marxism. The Japanese intellectual did not enter the universal stream with any complex or sophisticated methodological apparatus. Essentially, he was dedicated to descriptive writing. It is important that the 'science' of Marxism is relatively simple, easily comprehended and applied. Moreover, it has its greatest validity when applied to a society in the early stages of industrialisation. Thus conditions conducive to the use of Marxism as an advanced and scientific methodology were present in greatest degree from the late Meiji to the early Showa periods, roughly from 1910 to 1940. And it should be added that in those years, methodological developments in Western social science did not offer any major competition. What was posited against Marxism? Generally, rather formal and legalist concepts in the political field, and economic doctrines that were specially attuned to the nature and problems of advanced industrial societies. During this period, the limited degree to which Western social science theory encompassed the emergent societies, especially those having different cultural traditions, is striking.

BEFORE surveying the present, we must note a few of the basic weaknesses that Marxism betrayed in prewar Japan. First, it is significant that Marxism has succeeded in Asia only where it has been able to capture and use the nationalist movement. Where it has been forced to fight that movement, it has invariably been weak. In prewar Japan, Marxism had to fight nationalism, and this was a heavy burden, however 'correct' its position. Moreover, in fighting nationalism in their country, the Japanese communists of this period revealed themselves completely dependent upon the Soviet Union. Indeed, Soviet control of the Japanese communist movement proved so onerous that a considerable number of 'progressives' became independent Marxists after 1925, and challenged the orthodox communist views. Thus the fragmentation of Japanese Marxism had begun long before the postwar era.

But why has that fragmentation been accelerated in recent years, and why have a younger generation of Japanese intellectuals begun to turn away from Marxism? There is no simple or single answer to these questions. In the immediate postwar era, indeed, Marxism achieved a new prominence in Japanese intellectual circles. As noted earlier, many of the Marxist theses about prewar Japanese society had proven to be correct. Moreover, the intellectual now had a new freedom. He used this freedom to explore hitherto dangerous subjects and to engage in intensive criticism of his society and the whole of its past. Once again, Marxism was convenient as a weapon of social criticism. Some international factors also aided Marxism. The new prominence of the Soviet Union, the wartime and immediate postwar alliance between the 'old

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and the new democracies,' and the victory of Mao Tse-tung in China were all events that abetted the Japanese Marxist cause in some measure. At the very least, the wave of the future seemed to be rolling leftward. Within a few years, moreover, Japanese Marxism had obtained a weapon that it had never possessed in the prewar period, namely, nationalism. After a brief honeymoon period, American policy came under increasing attacks from the Marxists, who saw in it a direct challenge to the sovereignty and independence of Japan. Now Japanese Marxism had its first real opportunity to capture and use nationalism in the manner of other successful Marxist movements.

Meanwhile, however, other, less favourable trends were developing. Some of these trends pertained to Japan; others to the external world. There have been two internal trends of central importance: the reshaping of Japanese democracy and the extraordinary economic development of Japanese society. Under the aegis of the American occupation, the old Meiji Constitution was scrapped and a new Constitution providing all formal democratic safeguards was enacted. This new Constitution has survived for nearly fifteen years and gradually garnered strength, albeit not without serious challenge. Japanese society has never been so free in terms of its formal political institutions. The problems of Japanese democracy come primarily from those continuing organisational and behavioural patterns of Japanese society that contradict these institutions. Nevertheless, the stereotyped Marxian theses about a revitalised Japanese militarism and fascism have been too exaggerated to gain widespread intellectual support. The Japanese intellectual—especially the older intellectual—is still extremely sensitive to these dangers, but the consistently emotional hyperbole of the postwar Marxist movement has gone far towards destroying its claim to 'scientific analysis,' the credit that it had built up as a result of its opposition to militarism in the prewar period. In short, while Japanese democracy is far from perfect, there has been sufficient democracy to challenge the accuracy of Marxian analyses that in fact are geared entirely to the period before World War II. This is but one indication among many of the innate conservatism that has characterised Japanese Marxism in recent years. The professional Marxists continue to argue the same issues, employ the same conceptual devices, and hold the same positions as they did thirty or forty years ago. And in many cases they are the same men! It is not surprising that such exercises become tiresome to a younger generation.

Marxism is also placed on the defensive because of the rapid economic development that has occurred in Japan during the past decade. Once again, the more extravagant Marxian charges are refuted by the evidence, especially when comparisons are made between Japan and the communist societies. But more importantly, Japan is moving into an economic stage where Marxism is less relevant, and where intellectual interest can no longer be confined to such simple theories. Economic development in Japan has reached a point where the Japanese economist can engage in much more sophisticated, complex forms of analysis and

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conceptualisation than Japanese Marxism has been able to advance. Perhaps a new, creative Marxism could encompass this new stage in some degree. But it has not appeared. Instead, the Japanese economist is turning increasingly to the West, where economic development and economic methodology now offer more comparable opportunities than at any time in the past. Communication between Japanese and Western economists has become increasingly meaningful—and the historic quest for the universal stream is being attained by the Japanese intellectual via a non-Marxian route.

THIS same trend is emerging in other social science fields as well. Empirical studies are beginning to flourish in Japan, and methodologies more appropriate to them are much in evidence. Thus the old monolithic Marxian approach is faced with an unprecedented challenge in intellectual circles, especially from the younger generation. The young intellectuals see Japanese Marxism not as a science but as a dogma, not as dynamic but as stagnant, not as progressive but as old-fashioned. Some of them are now searching among the Marxist movements elsewhere to see whether a new and creative Marxism can be discovered that will breathe fresh life into the Japanese movement. But most are searching more broadly, surveying the whole field of methodology, with a keen eye towards empirical research.

In part, this development is a product of trends abroad. The Japanese intellectual of today is aware of the fact that both academic and political Marxism have suffered substantial losses among the intellectuals of the advanced world. He knows that Marxism is no longer the ideological base of the European socialist movement, and that Western social science is almost devoid of prominent Marxists at present. He is thus aware of the fact that among the nations at his own level of development, Marxism gives no current sign of being the wave of the future. It is still of enormous significance in the world—but essentially it is of political significance, and in terms of the late-developing world. It actually has a much narrower *intellectual* representation now than it had fifty or even twenty-five years ago.

In the field of political Marxism, moreover, there have been world events of great importance. Since 1950, the whole nature of the communist world has been altered. The Empire centred on Moscow has been shaken, and today a new Byzantium is emerging in the East. Marxism in its statist form no longer has a single Pope or centre of authority. Recent events, moreover, such as the Hungarian uprising, the destalinisation campaign in the Soviet Union, and the widening Sino-Soviet cleavage have had a profound effect upon the Marxist movement everywhere. The Japanese intellectual Marxists have been deeply shaken. Under the impact of these events, the process of fragmentation has been accelerated. Younger ' progressives ' in particular are in a mood to challenge all international communist authority and to question many of their senior leaders

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as well. A struggle of the generations is going on in Japanese Marxist circles in an effort to find new paths to the future.

Perhaps, in the long run, this will provide Japanese Marxism with renewed strength. Perhaps a younger generation of Marxists who feel freer to criticise the old dogmas will have an appeal which those subservient to Moscow or some foreign theorist could not. In part, no doubt, that will depend upon future economic and political trends within Japan and in the world. But even if a new generation of Japanese Marxists manages to liberate their doctrine from the fetters of the past, they will face many obstacles. Marxism can no longer have the same appeal to the Japanese intellectual that it had even fifteen years ago. The nature and problems of Japanese society have changed. Thus it will be difficult, if not impossible, to re-create many of the old appeals: Marxism as 'science,' 'truth,' the only advanced methodology: Marxism as a necessary technique of rapid modernisation; Marxism as the most feasible method of change in Japanese society. In socio-economic terms, and perhaps in political ones as well, Japan in these respects has passed beyond the Marxist stage.

There remain, however, enough problems to make the future of Marxism uncertain. If Japan has passed beyond Marxism, the world has not—and Japan lives in a part of the world that is clearly going to be heavily influenced by the 'practising Marxism' of China and Russia for the foreseeable future. Nor is the long-range future of Japanese democracy clear. There are enough weaknesses in the Japanese democratic system to lend strength to protest movements, and Marxism remains a likely weapon of such movements. Moreover, the emergence of a truly independent Marxist movement, shorn of international control, might enhance its appeal and abet its creativity. Finally, the Japanese intellectual continues to face many problems that make him susceptible to this kind of movement: he remains more apart from, than a part of, his political society; his main function is a negative one; and thus he continues to be essentially restless and dissatisfied with trends in his society. As long as these conditions prevail, Marxism will remain a force in the intellectual world of Japan. But it will not soon, and probably not ever, regain the prestige which it had in the period immediately after 1945. Asia today stands in various relationships to Marxism-Leninism. Nearly one-half of East Asia is under Marxist-Leninist rule. Another portion of this vast area might be considered pre-Marxist in terms of its stage of development and basic characteristics. But Japan is probably post-Marxist unless external forces intervene.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR KURDISTAN

S. E. van Rooy

HOWEVER widely expert opinion may differ about the number of Kurds in West Asia, there can be little doubt about the strategic importance of their mountainous country.

Geographically, Kurdistan is West Asia's heart: land-locked and partitioned, Kurdistan lies between Turkish Anatolia, the Iranian plateau, and the Arab plains; ethnically, the Kurdish area is a wedge between the Turks and Persians (both members of CENTO) and at the same time a bridge between the Soviet-held Caucasus and the vast zone of neutral Arab countries. Politically, Kurdistan is not only divided between four states (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria) and ruled by three (ethnic) nations (Turks, Persians and Arabs); it is also divided between the Central Treaty Organisation (formerly the Baghdad Pact) and the neutral or non-aligned.

Before World War II, West Asia's main centres of Kurdish emancipation were in the then Western-dominated part of the area: Syria/Lebanon and Iraq respectively. Under French mandatory protection, the well-known Kurdish princely family of the Bedir-Khans developed the first successful (modified) Latin alphabet for (Kurmanji) Kurdish and newspapers using it were published until 1946. Two Arab transcriptions for (Sorani) Kurdish were developed in Iraq under British aegis.

The aim of national self-determination proclaimed by the Allies during World War I encouraged the movement among the Kurds for emancipation from Ottoman rule. The peace treaties of Sèvres (1920) and Lausanne (1923) and the 1925 Turkish-Iraqi boundary agreement produced among the Kurds profound disillusionment about the West and its political sincerity. This feeling was reinforced in subsequent years and has persisted till the present day, creating an ideal atmosphere for anti-Western propaganda.

What happened during and especially after World War II shaped much of the present Western image of the Kurdish movement, which is thought in many quarters to be exclusively a Soviet affair. It is known that Mir Djanar Bagirov (Stalin's and Beria's strong man in Soviet Azerbaijan) had a conference in Baku in November 1945 with Azerbaijani and Kurdish leaders from Iran. Next month, both groups proclaimed autonomous republics within the Persian empire. The Azeri one was within the Soviet occupation zone, and the Kurdish one in a sort of no-man's-land between that zone and the Anglo-American one. When the end of his short-lived state was near, President Khazi died, a Kurdish national martyr, on a Persian gallows; his chief military aide, Mustapha Barzani, fled north into Soviet Transcaucasia. In Iraq he would have

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faced death and Turkey was the traditional enemy of everything Kurdish, so there was no other road to survival left than that via the USSR. The Russians treated their Kurdish guest well. Barzani was made a Soviet Army general and given the opportunity to speak over Soviet radio stations. The fact that Barzani, now the unchallenged leader of all nationalist Kurds, had been in the USSR a dozen years is, in the eyes of most Westerners, the main argument for linking the Kurdish movement with communism. The few convinced anti-communists among the Kurds long used as their main argument that the USSR dropped the Kurdish Mehabad Republic without a tear in 1946, when Stalin's troops evacuated Iran and the East-West split opened. That the argument was not as successful as those Kurdish anti-communists may have wished and hoped can be explained in several ways. One of the more important is that Kurds have a romantic, medieval inclination to hero-worshipping. Barzani had become a symbol, and a living symbol at that, and so his image was easily linked with that of 'Sovietistan' where he was living. The West organised CENTO, among whose members were the very states oppressing Kurds, and who was more opposed to CENTO than the Soviet Union?

THE main agency of communist influence among Kurds in the years preceding Qassim's seizure of power seems to have been the General Union of Iraqi Students. *Ti Koshin Kotabian,* its stencilled Kurdish journal, was probably the only Kurdish underground paper during the Nuri es-Said regime. The Union, however, was led by Arabs, and by communist or pro-communist Arabs at that. Iraq's small communist party, composed mostly of intellectuals, was willing to meet Kurdish demands, but was certainly not in favour of complete autonomy, let alone independence for Kurds. In 1958 there was no effective Kurdish party apparatus in any part of Kurdistan, Turkish or Persian, Syrian or Iraqi. Mobilisation for the Kurdish uprisings between 1946 and 1958 took place on the traditionally local basis via the tribal-feudal structure.

An industrial proletariat hardly existed, not even in the oil industry. Kurds—unlike Arabs—were not very willing to become oil-workers. The bourgeosie was only in its beginnings and a high illiteracy rate restricted the effectiveness of any printed material. So students played an important part in the Kurdish movement, even more important than their colleagues did and do in many other Afro-Asian revolutionary currents.

In 1958, Kurds rallied with much enthusiasm behind Qassim; Barzani was repatriated from the USSR to Iraq with some thousand of his followers in Soviet ships. Barzani explicitly subordinated himself to Qassim and the reborn Kurdistan Democratic Party stressed its loyalty to the Iraqi Republic. In foreign policy matters good relations with the communist countries had priority over those with Afro-Asian ones. For the first time Kurds were allowed to work legally in party politics, and the response was very enthusiastic, not only in the new Iraq but also in the neighbouring states co-habited by Kurds. Iran increased its radio

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propaganda in Kurdish (now conducted from Teheran and half a dozen other stations) and founded a weekly, *Kurdistan*. Like Turkey, however, it soon (1959) started to arrest hundreds of Kurds. In Syria, Dr Nureddin Zaza (who had studied in Switzerland) founded a Democratic Kurdistan Party of Syria. A similar organisation was set up in Persian Kurdistan: reportedly it still publishes an underground (anti-Shah) weekly (also called *Kurdistan*). Abroad, the Kurdish Students Society in Europe KSSE (founded under another name in 1949 by Zaza and some Marxist-minded Kurdish students) reorganised itself. In Iraq the Kurdish students society followed Qassim's wish and stopped its activities, and all Kurdish students joined the new students' organisation which had succeeded the old Union, and which was to embrace all Iraqi students; this was one of the first disappointments under Qassim. At the communist Youth Festival held in Vienna in 1959, Iraq had a strikingly big delegation of 600, and its Kurdish members there met Kurds in Europe, Iraqis and non-Iraqis, students and others. All decided to continue to follow Qassim, though discussing among themselves the disappointing symptoms already visible in Iraq.

In the same year, feudal-tribal Kurdish leaders hostile to the Barzani family started minor raids into the latter's area and against Mustapha's political followers. First they got Persian backing; in the next year they got it nearer home, from Qassim himself. The pro-Faisal chief Mullah Hussain (who had fled to Iran after July 1958) seems to have been the first to open anti-Barzani hostilities. In May 1959 Zibari-chieftain Mahmud Khalifa of Rawanduz, who had also fled to Iran, returned to Iraq and got Qassim's support; so did Herki-chieftain Fattah of Erbil, and Rashid Lolan of the Baradost tribe. Zibaris had been relatively influential under the Nuri administration and resented their loss of influence and Barzani's growing popularity. Mahmoud's desertion from Barzani's rebel army in August 1945 had been the main cause of the latter's defeat and subsequent flight to Persian Kurdistan in the same year. Baradosts and Zibaris started their war against the Barzanists, with encouragement from Iraq. During the same period, the Kurdish students congress in West Berlin still expressed hopes for a federal Iraq, with cultural, educational, and administrative autonomy in it for Kurds.

The Berlin congress marked a milestone in Russian Kurdology—a 60,000-word Kurdish-Russian Dictionary written by the Soviet Kurdish professor of Kurdology at Leningrad University, Kurdoev; the script used was not the Cyrillic one introduced for Soviet Kurds in 1945, but a Latin alphabet very similar to that developed by the Bedir-Khan family and unlike the Latin transcription for Kurdish used in the USSR before 1945. The language used was Kurmanji. It was the third Kurdish dictionary published in the USSR—all after Stalin's death—and by far the best. Russia's early attention to Kurdology (which had been studied at the University of St. Petersburg since 1856) and the work of Soviet orientalists since the mid-fifties are certainly a great Soviet asset in dealing with Kurds.

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IN September 1960, inter-tribal fighting increased in Iraq. Barzani's followers were being attacked by Qassim-backed chiefs. In December 1960, the first Western press reports appeared on the growing rift between Kurds and Qassim. Barzani himself was at that time in the Soviet Union; he had been invited to attend the October Revolution celebrations. *Pravda* reported that he had a talk with Mukhitdinov. During his absence, the Baghdad Military Governor, Abdi, a convinced anti-communist, began to withdraw, one after another, the privileges Qassim had bestowed on Barzani, his family and party since 1958. Some Western journals wrote that Barzani was supplying the Soviet radio with anti-Qassim material, others reported that Barzani had simply 'fled' to the USSR and was going to stay there for an indefinite period. But in February 1961, the Kurdish party leader turned up again. In an interview with the Beirut paper *Al Nahda* (20 February 1961) he was asked whether he wanted an independent Kurdish state. Diplomatically, Barzani replied that he wanted legitimate Kurdish aspirations to be realised without harming 'the existence and integrity of the Iraqi Republic'. He also stressed Kurdo-Arab brotherhood, as he had done since the 1940s. On his return to Iraq, Barzani hastened to his native Barzan, surrounding himself with tough warriors willing to die for their leader if necessary.

Little is known of what happened between that moment and the outbreak of full-scale hostilities in July 1961, but it is of the utmost importance for the genesis of the 1961-62 revolt in Iraqi Kurdistan and for reconstructing Barzani's political mood after his second stay in Russia. All that can be done here is to collect indications, and it is of interest to recall that a year earlier a German journalist had written in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (21 March 1960):

> Kurdish politicians are speaking openly of their disappointment with the Soviet attitude; the promise of effective help in establishing a Kurdish national state has not been kept. The enthusiasm for Qassim has also diminished . . . Barzani, the recognised leader of the Kurdish party, now indignantly rejects any idea of a close alliance with the communists. He wants to be known, first and foremost, as a Kurdish patriot. There is good reason to take this seriously. Some months ago he refused to add his signature to the communist-inspired manifesto for a 'National Front', and called those members of his party who had done so to account.

In the organ of the Kurdish Students Society in Europe, *Kurdistan*, published in London, a staunch supporter of Barzani, the Society's President Ismet Sherif Vanly, stressed the need for specific Kurdish organisations, describing communist policy towards Kurds in states with Kurdish minorities as follows:

> Kurdish objectives do not figure in the programme, old or new, of the Iranian Tudeh party. In Syria, the Syrian Communist party also totally ignores the Kurdish question. In Turkey we have never heard of a progressive Turkish movement struggling also for the solution of the Kurdish national question. In Iraq, the mixed

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> (Arabo-Kurdish) Communist party practically ignored the Kurdish national question until 1956. In that year, at its second congress, and under the pressure of its Kurdish elements, the Iraqi party recognised that Iraqi Kurdistan is a part of the Kurdish nation, divided by imperialism, and that Arab Iraq is a part of the Arab nation. That was a very good resolution. But, curiously enough, this party continued to consider Iraq as an exclusively Arab State. More curiously, this party later withdrew many of its concessions to the Kurdish national liberation movement. In July 1959, it was considered in some Iraqi communist circles that to pronounce the name 'Kurdistan' was prejudicial to the Iraq Revolution, to Iraqi democracy, and to the Arabo-Kurdish brotherhood. This attitude could be explained by the desire of those leading circles to fight the growing influence of the Kurdish Democratic party.

In the Spring of 1961 the Kurdish Student Union of Iraq resumed its activities, the various Kurdistan Democratic parties of Iraq, Syria, Iran, etc. were merging into one nationalist party, and Kurdish student organisations, including that in Europe, made preparations to unite in an 'All-Kurdish Confederation of Student Organisations'. This latter project (realised in August 1961) met with tough communist resistance at the Kurdish students' congress in Muenster. The communist minority was led by Dara Tewfziq, an Iraqi Kurd working at the headquarters of the World Federation of Democratic Youth in Budapest.

A month later the Kurdish students' society in Europe informed the Iraq students' union that only Kurdish student organisations had the right to represent Kurdish student organisations at home and abroad, and asked the International Union of Students to issue a special declaration on Kurdistan (as it had done on several occasions for other countries). To this request the Union turned as deaf an ear as Khrushchev did to the three appeals sent to him by the Kurds in connection with the uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan (others were sent to UNO, the International Red Cross, the Socialist International, President Kennedy, President Tito, and Premier Macmillan). But subsequent moves by the International Union of Students indicated that the communists wanted to prevent the Kurdish movement drifting away from their influence. On 1 December 1961 the IUS suddenly accepted KSSE as an associate member, after ignoring or rejecting similar bids for several years. But so far no IUS publication has made mention of this, and the agreement has still to be ratified by the two organisations.

THE absence of moral support by the communist-ruled countries for Kurds at such a crucial moment in their struggle as the Iraqi-Kurdish uprising and its violent suppression by the Iraqi air force (with Soviet-made bombers) clearly disappointed many leftist Kurds. Communist press coverage of the uprising in countries outside the communist bloc was very scanty. Reports of substantial Soviet material and moral aid to the Kurds fighting in Iraq generally had their origin in West Asian papers and government information services unfriendly to Kurds—Arab,

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Turkish, or Persian. But they are readily believed by many whose image of the Kurds is that of an ever-rebellious bunch of savage tribesmen, and who are then reminded of Barzani's long stay in the Soviet Union.

The Kurds, without an effective publicity apparatus abroad or experience in public relations, cannot do much against this. But much of the communist successes among Kurds can be explained by the West's ignoring of the Kurdish struggle for self-emancipation. How the identification by certain Western journalists of the Kurdish movement with Soviet communism can yield remarkable journalistic results may be illustrated by one recent specimen, taken from the Bonn paper *Civis* (10 July 1961), writing about the Afro-Asian and Latin American students in the German Federal Republic:

> Unquestionably the most radical groups, and those most deeply permeated by communism, are the Iraq and Kurdish students.

This was published six weeks before the 'Kurdistan-firsters' won a clear victory over the communist minority of Europe's Kurdish students during their congress in Muenster.

That this sort of 'reporting' or 'information' causes annoyance among young Kurds studying in Europe goes without saying. The Kurdish intelligentsia is also disappointed by the treatment of Kurdish affairs in the communist bloc papers. Some Kurds studying in Rumania naively called on the editors of the party daily *Scinteia* and asked why it did not apply anti-imperialism by reporting about their oppressed Kurdistan. Having got the answer that *Scinteia* took orders from the Rumanian Communist party only, the young Kurds then showed a pro-Kurdish periodical appearing in Western Europe and asked why such ways of dealing with Kurdish affairs was possible in the West but not in communist Rumania. After that they no longer received copies of this periodical sent to them from abroad.

Since the Qassim coup in Iraq there has been an increase of Kurdish (non-Soviet) students in the USSR (Moscow and Leningrad) and a similar trend in the people's democracies. All of them except Albania now have groups of Kurdish students. From West Germany and Austria there is an eastward trek of Kurdish students (including non-communists) because the Soviet bloc offers more free places at their universities than the West. In Western Europe there are medium-size communities of Kurdish students, in England and West Germany, and there are small ones in Austria, Switzerland, and Italy. In 1959 half of Europe's 250 Kurdish students were still studying in the German-language area (including East Germany), one-third in the Federal Republic, but since then the eastward trend has increased. A case of competition between two communist states (Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia) to get one Kurdish student is known.

In May 1961 'Radio Berlin International' started broadcasting in Kurdish (Sorani) and has since increased each of its four daily

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programmes by five minutes. This was done at the expense of (Tudeh-inclined) Persian broadcasts by the same station. 'Bisim Radio', the communist exile-Turkish radio station said to be in Bulgaria, takes a liberal attitude towards Kurdish claims in Turkey. This has been the line taken by the station's chief asset, the noted poet and exiled CP leader Nazim Hikmet; but according to Kurdish testimony, neither East Berlin nor Bizim Radio nor Erevan said much about the Iraqi-Kurdish revolt. Several Kurds have criticised the East Berlin Kurdish radio programmes. *Riya Taze*, the Kurdish bi-weekly published by the Armenian CP, concentrates on Armenian Kurds only (though it is read by Kurds all over the USSR). Correspondence with young, non-Kurdish residents of Soviet Azerbaijan and Soviet Turkmenistan (which also has a Kurdish enclave) did not yield any sign that they were aware of Kurdish problems at the USSR's very door in West Asia.

Kurdology in the USSR is outstanding and clearly ahead of that in the West (which now seems to be trying to close the gap). So is Kurdish literary publishing in the Soviet Union. The influence of such Soviet scientific and literary activities on non-Soviet Kurds should not be underestimated or thought to be without political repercussions. Western publications on Kurds and Kurdistan, too, are carefully collected and analysed in the Soviet Union, as the bibliography of Kurdological publications there shows. It may be added that Soviet communists early realised the value of poets for propaganda in Oriental countries. Apart from that, the Soviet Union can boast a great number of civilisatory and cultural achievements in its once underdeveloped Asian areas. Some of them immediately border Kurdistan, and the impact of new words in Soviet Kurdish has been traced even on the speech of the tiny Kurdish community in Egypt.

The main thing which makes many Kurds still look to Moscow for support is the feeling that it was the West which divided Kurdistan into four parts after 1918, and that it is the West again which did and does support governments and regimes unfriendly to the Kurdish cause. How far the fact that it was neutral and anti-Western Iraq, not CENTO's Turkey or Iran, that started a merciless bomb-terror against rebelling Kurds has made Kurds think, is an open question.

Another question is whether, and if so how far, the concept of West Asian federalism (and neutralism) now spreading among the Kurdish intelligentsia can be exploited by the Soviet Union and its allies. There are no convincing reasons for believing that this concept was inspired by the Soviet Union itself; Soviet policy towards the Kurds has its natural limits and is simply opportunist. This was made clear during the spring offensive of Barzani's partisan armies, when Moscow continued at one and the same time to support Qassim and to keep a Kurdish iron in the fire. At the recent World Islamic congress in Baghdad the main speaker, together with the former Mufti of Jerusalem and erstwhile ally of Hitler, Al Husaini, was the Soviet Mufti of Tashkent, Ziya-ut-din Babakhanov.

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RUSSIA, CHINA, AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

John H. Kautsky

BY 1949, as a result of the adoption of a new line by Moscow, the Soviet and the Chinese communists had come to agree on the strategy to be followed by communist parties in underdeveloped countries. Until about 1956, their views evolved in parallel fashion. Since then, however, the Soviet view of the role communist parties ought to play in such countries has continued to develop, while the Chinese have reverted to an earlier position vis-à-vis nationalist neutralist governments. The two attitudes have thus increasingly diverged and come into conflict, and it is of interest to trace this development and to attempt an explanation for this important aspect of the current Sino-Soviet dispute.

Within two or three years after the onset of the cold war, communist parties the world over had begun to adjust to the new position of the Soviet Union in world politics by adopting—under Moscow's more or less efficient guidance and undergoing more or less painful internal upheavals—a new strategy.[1] The pre-war 'popular front' and war-time 'national front' had to be abandoned, for the communists' allies under these policies—socialists, liberals, nationalists, etc.—had to be 'unmasked' and fought as stooges of American 'imperialism'. The Soviet leaders now saw the world divided, as Zhdanov put it at the foundation meeting of the Cominform in September 1947, into an imperialist, anti-democratic camp headed by the United States and an anti-imperialist democratic camp headed by the Soviet Union. All forces, including most nationalist movements in underdeveloped countries, that were not pro-Soviet were regarded as pro-American.

In an attempt to create as wide an anti-American front as possible, the popular and national front policies were not replaced by a return of the earlier proletarian anti-capitalist position. Rather, after some uncertainty, communist parties were told to appeal to and to claim to represent all individuals and groups, regardless of social class, who could be attracted by a programme of opposition to American foreign policy objectives. Thus, a communist leader like Ranadive, Secretary of the Indian Communist party, who looked on the native bourgeoisie rather than foreign imperialism as the main enemy and, as late as 1949, attacked Mao Tse-tung's views on the bourgeoisie as 'horrifying' and 'reactionary and counter-revolutionary', had to be dismissed.[2]

[1] The development of this new strategy in Moscow and its adoption in India, where the guidance was particularly inefficient and the internal upheavals particularly painful, are traced in my *Moscow and the Communist Party of India* (New York, 1956).

[2] 'Struggle for People's Democracy and Socialism', *Communist* (Bombay), June-July 1949, pp. 78–79. See also the editorial in the Cominform journal, 'Mighty Advance of the National Liberation Movement in the Colonial and Dependent Countries', *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, 27 January 1950, p. 1.

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The new strategy advocated by Moscow (which I have called 'neo-Maoist') was similar to the 'four-class' appeal developed earlier by Mao when he too sought to unite all strata of the population, including the 'national bourgeoisie', against a foreign imperialist enemy (Japan) and could not do so through a united front with the major nationalist movement (the Kuomintang). The identity of the strategies recommended to the communist parties of underdeveloped countries by the Soviet and Chinese communists was made public to all the world when Peking was chosen as the locale and leading Chinese communists as the main speakers for the conference of the World Federation of Trade Unions held in November 1949. It was there that, with evident Soviet approval, Liu Shao-chi declared the 'Chinese path' to be obligatory for the communist parties of all underdeveloped countries and defined it primarily as one in which 'the working class must unite with all the other classes, political parties and groups, organisations and individuals who are willing to oppose the oppression of imperialism and its lackeys'.[3]

> This nationwide united front must be led by the working class and its party, the communist party . . . and must be built around the working class and the communist party as its centre. It must not be led by the wavering and compromising national bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie and their parties.

For three decades, communist parties in underdeveloped countries had, generally with disastrous results to themselves, insisted on their proletarian character. Now these parties, always led and often largely composed of intellectuals, were to appeal to all classes with an anti-imperialist policy of opposition to the United States abroad and of rapid industrialisation at home. They were thus to be turned into parties very similar, both in their social composition and their appeals, to the major non-communist nationalist movements—but they were to oppose these movements as servants of American 'imperialism'.

SOON after its adoption, the neo-Maoist policy began to be modified. The Soviet leaders evidently gave up or postponed for the time being the hope of communist parties coming to power and accepted, instead, the stability, at least for some time to come, of the nationalist regimes; most important, they recognised that such regimes, even if they would not turn communist, need not be and in fact were not entirely pro-American and could become anti-American.

This change in the Soviet attitude is generally ascribed to the post-Stalin period, when, indeed, it became more and more obvious. There is evidence, however, that its beginnings must be looked for some time before Stalin's death. In December 1950, the Indian communists, who, like the Soviet communists, had been denouncing Nehru for his subservience to Anglo-American imperialism, were told by Palme Dutt that 'indications of a divergence, even though still hesitant and limited, of

[3] *World Trade Union Movement*, December 1949, p. 14.

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Premier Nehru . . . from the reckless aggressive war policy . . . are a very important development '.[4]

Since then Soviet diplomacy and propaganda have more and more emphasised the role of the Soviet Union as the champion of the neutralist nations. Communist parties could consequently no longer be permitted indiscriminately to denounce the governments of such nations. They were now being urged by Moscow to recognise the independence from Western influence of their erstwhile nationalist enemies and to give support to their foreign policies. While they were still adapting themselves to their new role, the Soviet Union began to provide increasing amounts of economic and technical aid to certain neutralist countries, notably India. Thus committed, Moscow had to push the communist parties farther away from their attitude of opposition to the nationalist regimes. R. Palme Dutt, again serving as Moscow's voice guiding the Indian CP, suggested that communist support for Nehru's government was really inseparable from support for his foreign policies.[5] And just before an important electoral contest in the Indian communist stronghold in Andhra between the Indian CP and Nehru's Congress party, *Pravda* (26 January 1955) published an editorial praising the Nehru government not only for its foreign but also its domestic policy.[6]

Moscow's transition from the neo-Maoist strategy of opposition to nationalist regimes in underdeveloped countries to a policy of support for such regimes (which, however, retained the key feature of neo-Maoism, the communist appeal to all classes) was completed by the mid-fifties. In June 1955, Nehru was given a tremendous reception in Moscow where, only five or six years earlier, he had been regarded as a hireling of Anglo-American imperialism. At the end of the same year, Khrushchev and Bulganin made their famous visit to India (as well as Burma and Afghanistan) offering friendship and economic aid to Nehru's neutralist government. Finally, Zhdanov's two-camp concept was officially buried when, at the 20th CPSU congress in February 1956, Khrushchev recognised ' the emergence in the world arena of a group of peace-loving European and Asian states which have proclaimed non-participation in blocs as a principle of their foreign policy ', and included these, along with the communist countries, in ' a vast " peace zone " '.

During the first half of the fifties, the attitude of the Chinese communists towards the nationalist governments of neutralist countries paralleled that of the Soviet communists. Chou En-lai's visit to New Delhi in June 1954, when he and Nehru agreed to the ' five principles of peaceful co-existence ', and the moderate role he played at the Bandung conference in April 1955, made it amply clear that at that time

4 *Cross Roads* (Bombay), 19 January 1951, p. 7.

5 ' New Features in National Liberation Struggle of Colonial and Dependent Peoples ', *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, 8 October 1954, p. 6.

6 A well-documented account of the CPI's slow and reluctant adjustment to Soviet policy changes appears in Marshall Windmiller, ' Indian Communism and the New Soviet Line ', *Pacific Affairs*, December 1956.

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the Chinese communists supported the neutralist governments of Afro-Asian countries. This policy implied that the communist parties there should, under communist leadership, form a united front of all anti-imperialist forces regardless of their class character and lend support to their governments' anti-imperialism.

AT the 20th congress in 1956, Khrushchev asserted that ' in all the forms of transition to socialism, an absolute and decisive requirement is political leadership of the working class, headed by its vanguard. The transition to socialism is impossible without this '. But in the same year this traditional doctrine, which provides much of the *raison d'être* of communist parties, was beginning to be modified in Moscow with respect to underdeveloped countries.

The doctrine of communist party leadership in all conflicts in which communists are engaged has occupied such a central place in their ideology that it has not been openly thrown overboard all at once. Soviet leaders and writers keep repeating it, as Khrushchev did at the 20th congress, to provide symbolic reassurance to their followers. They may continue to do so also in response to the pressure of the Chinese communists, who, for reasons to be indicated, insist on communist party leadership. Communist parties all over the world, too, cling to the concept, actuated not merely by doctrinal orthodoxy and habit but, more obviously, by the desire for self-preservation. But repetition of old formulas cannot conceal the marked shift in Soviet behaviour. It is most clearly visible in the changing foreign policies of the Soviet Union during the past decade, which increasingly rely on the non-communist nationalist leaders and movements more heavily than on the communist parties to support the Soviet Union in its conflict with the United States, i.e. to assume the leadership in the ' struggle against imperialism '.

The change is also reflected in the less well-known area of international trade union politics. Not only have communist-dominated trade unions in underdeveloped countries, like the communist parties themselves, been directed to make no trouble for nationalist governments, but, beginning in 1956, a number of them, frequently in the face of local communist resistance, were dissolved and merged with their rival trade union organisations dominated by the nationalist movements. This happened in Tunisia, in Algeria, and in the former French West African colonies, and pressure in the same direction was apparently exerted by Moscow in India as well. Equally significant is the support extended by the WFTU to the establishment of the nationalist-neutralist International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions created by Nasser in 1956, and the all-African Trade Union Federation, founded in Casablanca in 1961.[7]

Though still relatively rare, statements more or less openly recognising the leading position of the non-communist nationalist movement and

[7] George E. Lichtblau, ' The communist labor offensive in former colonial countries ', *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, April 1962.

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suggesting the subordination to it of local communists have appeared in communist writings of the past few years. Some Soviet statements on Africa contain no class analysis or any claim to the existence of communist parties, but speak merely of conflict between 'the people' and 'imperialism'. Where class analysis is provided, the bourgeoisie seems to be expected to be more effective in that conflict than the proletariat. Thus, one article, after ritually stating that 'the working class is the most active and consistent force in the national liberation struggle', immediately admits that that class accounts for only 1.5 to 5 per cent of the population in the African countries it mentions and goes on to speak of the national bourgeoisie as a 'progressive factor' in the struggle against colonialism and as a class 'expressing at a definite stage the interests of the patriotic forces of the nation'. 'Patriotic tribal chiefs' are also mentioned as participating in the national liberation movements, which are described as democratic, anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist, but not socialist.[8] Similarly, a more recent article admits that 'most African countries as yet have no parties of the working class which would be able to formulate the national tasks at the various stages of the liberation movement', but states that 'in a number of countries that have won political independence genuinely national leaders have come to the fore and are leading the struggle for the achievement of complete independence, both political and economic'.[9]

Blas Roca, the General Secretary of the Cuban Popular Socialist (communist) party stated quite frankly that the Cuban Revolution was not led by the communists:

> The armed struggle was initiated by the petty bourgeoisie. The working-class action could not be the decisive factor of the revolution. . . . The revolution marched triumphantly from the countryside to the towns, from the provinces to the capital. The political leadership of the armed struggle was in the hands of the petty bourgeoisie while the rebel army consisted mainly of poor peasants and farm laborers (*World Marxist Review*, August 1959, p. 18).

This admission cannot be undone by Castro's later retroactive claim that he had himself been a 'Marxist-Leninist'.

With respect to India, Soviet statements have gone from finding Nehru's role 'progressive', as they had by 1955, to references to Nehru's 'socialism' in 1956. Thus, an article in *Kommunist* (March 1956) on the second Indian five-year plan says: 'This aspiration towards socialism, concerning which Nehru has spoken so often, is heartily supported by the progressive circles of India . . .' though it adds that Nehru's socialism 'differs from our Marxist-Leninist understanding'. A few months later, another Soviet article praised the Indian Congress party's commitment to a socialist goal and concluded that 'given close

[8] A. Iskenderov, 'A Continent in Ferment', *World Marxist Review*, January 1960.
[9] I. Plyshevsky, 'Some Problems of the Independence Struggle in Africa', ibid., July 1961.

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cooperation by all the progressive forces in the country, there is the possibility for India to develop along socialist lines '.[10]

THAT the bourgeoisie is leading the way to socialism, as this passage might be thought to imply, is not the general theme of Soviet analysis of present political trends in underdeveloped countries. More often, as in the Soviet textbook, *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism*, it is credited with developing ' state capitalism ', which is held to be ' playing a progressive role '. But frequently the attainment of socialism in underdeveloped countries is simply not dealt with at all. The emphasis is invariably placed on the goal not of social revolution but of national independence, on conflict not with capitalism but with imperialism, i.e. American foreign policy—and there the bourgeoisie is seen as capable of playing a ' progressive ' role.

The policy of cooperation with nationalist movements was strongly defended by E. Zhukov, a leading Soviet expert on underdeveloped countries, in an article in *Pravda* (26 August 1960):

> It is known that at the head of the majority of new national states of Asia and Africa stand bourgeois political leaders who usually take a position under a nationalistic flag. However, this cannot belittle the progressive historical importance of the breakthrough that has taken place on the imperialist front. The working class is the most consistent enemy of imperialism. Nevertheless Lenin considered it natural that *at the beginning* of any national movement the bourgeoisie plays the role of leading force and urged that in the struggle for the self-determination of nations support be given to the most revolutionary elements of the bourgeois-democratic national-liberation movements . . . An arrogant slighting of anti-imperialist actions when in certain historical conditions non-proletarian elements appear at the front of the stage, is a most dangerous form of sectarianism that leads to self-isolation.

To be sure, both to maintain their own claims to orthodoxy and as a reaction to Chinese pressure, Soviet communists acknowledge leadership by the national bourgeoisie only ' at the beginning ' or ' in the present stage ' of the national liberation movement. They even invented a new name for this stage, that of ' national democracy ', which is regarded as a transition to the ultimate attainment of socialism. That ultimate goal, however, is in their view too distant to influence Soviet policy decisions in the present, and it is thus the ' transitional ' stage that is decisive.[11]

[10] Modeste Rubinstein, ' A non-capitalist path for underdeveloped countries ', *New Times*, July and August 1956, quoted in Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, *Communism in India* (University of California Press, 1959), p. 326, which also quotes from the Indian communists' furious reply to this ' astounding ' suggestion from Moscow.

[11] As Zhukov wrote: ' For many lagging countries of Asia, and especially Africa . . . the central task . . . remains for a comparatively long period of time that of " struggle not against capital but against survivals of the Middle Ages ". From this stems the possibility of the cooperation over a long period of the workers, peasants and intelligentsia . . . with that part of the national bourgeoisie which is interested in independent political and economic development of its country and is ready to defend its independence against any encroachments by the imperialist powers.'

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The important innovation in Soviet policy since 1956 is the willingness to put the nationalist movements in the position of leaders and the communist parties in that of followers, whether in the march towards 'socialism' or the march towards 'national liberation'. That the idea of the bourgeoisie leading the proletariat towards socialism is a startlingly new one by all traditional communist standards needs no emphasis or elucidation here. However, the acceptance of the bourgeoisie in the leading role of the 'national liberation' movement, too, is a decisive break with the policy advocated by communists until the mid-fifties. To see this, we need merely compare recent Soviet statements on the subject with Liu's insistence on communist party leadership in his 1949 definition of neo-Maoism quoted above.

THE 'arrogant sectarians' whom Zhukov attacked are the Chinese communists. They had never gone as far as Moscow in subordinating communist parties to the nationalists of some underdeveloped countries, and beginning about 1957 or 1958 they reverted more and more to the original neo-Maoist strategy of opposition to nationalist governments.

This is not the place to try to explain this divergence of Chinese from Soviet policy. But just as the Soviet communists' repetition of the doctrine of proletarian leadership obscures their actual policies, so the constant use by the Chinese communists of the Marxian symbols of the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat serves to distort the actual issues in the conflict between Moscow and Peking. That conflict does not turn on the relationship between the proletariat as a class and the bourgeoisie as a class. Both sides are quite agreed on the necessity of communist cooperation with the national bourgeoisie in the conflict with 'imperialism'—though it now suits Peking more than Moscow to stress the vacillating character of the bourgeoisie in its alliance with the proletariat. The difference lies elsewhere: The Chinese want communist parties in underdeveloped countries to cooperate with the bourgeoisie *against* the nationalist governments and even encourage communist-led 'armed struggle' against them, while the Russians want communist parties to cooperate *with* these nationalist governments (whom they identify with the national bourgeoisie). What is at stake, then, is the relationship between the communist parties (often labelled 'the proletariat') and the nationalist governments.

The Chinese evidently no longer trust the anti-imperialism of these governments.

> . . . these states can never expect to effect the transition to socialism, nor indeed can they thoroughly fulfil the task of the nationalist, democratic revolution. It should be added that even the national independence they have won is by no means secure . . . [The bourgeois nationalists] may even pave the way for the emergence of bureaucratic capitalism, which is an ally of imperialism and

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> feudalism. . . . In the final analysis, they can never escape from the control and bondage of imperialism.[12]

To be sure, where the 'anti-imperialist' character of a nationalist movement was beyond doubt, because it was in open conflict with one of the Western powers, the Chinese have supported it, sometimes sooner and more vigorously than Moscow. Generally, however, they insist that the communist parties in underdeveloped countries must remain independent of the nationalist movements, must lead their own united front against these movements, and must themselves eventually seize power—and they imply strongly that this can ordinarily be done only by means of 'armed struggle'. As against Soviet suggestions that communist parties follow the leadership of non-communist nationalists, Liu Shao-chi in 1959 insisted—as he had a decade earlier when he spoke for both the Chinese and the Soviet communists—on 'the firm grasping of hegemony in the democratic revolution by the proletariat through the communist party'.[13] And as against Soviet emphasis on the nationalist movements, the Chinese emphasise the importance of the Party: 'Lenin considered it of prime importance for the proletariat to establish its own genuinely revolutionary political party which completely breaks with opportunism, that is, a communist party, if the proletarian revolution is to be carried through and the proletarian dictatorship established and consolidated.'[14]

To Moscow's suggestion that the non-communist nationalist movements may be leading the way to socialism, Peking replies sharply: 'The modern revisionists and certain representatives of the bourgeoisie try to make people believe that it is possible to achieve socialism without a revolutionary party of the proletariat and without the . . . correct [united front] policies of the revolutionary party of the proletariat . . . This is sheer nonsense and pure deception.' And in answer to Moscow's praise of Nehru's socialism, Peking sneeringly says that a 'motley variety of so-called "socialisms" have emerged from among the exploiting classes in certain countries . . . They only put up the signboard of "socialism" but actually practise capitalism.'[15]

THE reasons for the different policies advocated by the Soviet and Chinese leaders are to be sought in their different attitudes and needs and in the means available to them. The expectation of some analysts that Khrushchev and Mao would always agree and the insistence of some observers that, in fact, they still do, simply because both are communists, rests on a misunderstanding of the role of communist ideology and on acceptance at face value of the communists' own assertion of communism's monolithic and unchanging character.

12 Wang Chia-hsiang in *Red Flag* on the 10th anniversary of the People's Republic, as quoted in Donald S. Zagoria, 'Sino-Soviet friction in underdeveloped areas', *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1961.

13 Liu Shao-chi, *The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China* (Peking, 1959), quoted in Zagoria, loc. cit.

14 Quoted in G. F. Hudson and others, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (London, 1961), p. 84.

15 Ibid. p. 109.

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The prime interest underlying the policies of both the Soviet and the Chinese leaders may safely be assumed to be the consolidation and expansion of their respective power. Furthermore, they are in agreement that these interests must be realised by means of rapid industrialisation at home and the reduction of American power and influence abroad. It is this similarity which permits both to use the same concepts and words, for terms like 'socialism' and 'communism'—in so far as they now have any meaning at all—stand for the transformation of an underdeveloped country into an advanced industrial one, and 'anti-imperialism' means opposition to the Western powers and, above all, to the United States.

Use of the same words, however, can no longer hide the fact that the similarities of both means and ends are only superficial. 'Industrialisation' in China still means creating the bases of an industrial economy; the Soviet Union has gone beyond this stage. This difference may well underlie the different attitudes of the two regimes towards Stalin and the methods of government he represents, for these were associated with the build-up of heavy industry.

More important in the present context are the differences in the approach to the reduction of American influence abroad. The present generation of Soviet leaders inherited a strong and reasonably secure regime; the present Chinese leaders, on the other hand, have spent most of their lives fighting to establish, maintain, and expand their power, and much of the time against 'imperialist' external enemies —first Japan and then, in Korea and Formosa, the United States. To them, the 'Revolution'—meaning not the overthrow of the rule of one class by another, but consolidation of communist power—is still in progress and is likely to be thought of in terms of armed conflict. Thus, when the leaders in Moscow think of expanding their power abroad and reducing that of the United States, they think primarily of relations with established governments; when the leaders in Peking pursue the same goal, they think rather of overthrowing established governments.

However one may regard this difference in attitudes, the means available to the two regimes in their opposition to American policies compel them to assign different roles to foreign communist parties. To both, such parties appear as only one tool of foreign policy; both also rely on 'cultural' contacts, i.e., propaganda, in foreign countries and on economic aid to such countries, and on diplomatic and military pressure. It is the degree to which these various instruments can be effective and hence the relative importance of each in the foreign policy arsenal of Moscow and Peking that makes for the difference between the two.

A recent article in *Kommunist* (No. 13, 1960) is most revealing in this connection. It states:

> The force of the influence of the world socialist system on the liberation struggle does not at all lie in 'spurring on' revolutions, but in something different . . . under the influence of the successes of

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> the socialist countries, *socialism is becoming increasingly attractive to all the peoples of the world*. Capitalism cannot withstand peaceful competition with socialism because of the immeasurably greater opportunities which the socialist system has opened up for the growth of production forces and culture. . . . In the near future, the Soviet Union will have the highest standard of living in the world and the shortest working day.

The Chinese communists, facing the prospect of a low standard of living and a long working day for some time to come, may well be less sanguine about the attractiveness of their propaganda.[16] Similarly, in regard to foreign economic aid and technical assistance programmes, the Soviet leaders are optimistic. The passage just cited continues: 'In the transition to socialism each country can now rely . . . *on the economic assistance of the socialist countries, on close cooperation with them.*' Without much capital or industrial expertise to export, the Chinese cannot hold out such a promise and make the governments of underdeveloped countries dependent on them by this means.

Finally, in the diplomatic and military arena, too, China is not the equal of the Soviet Union, and as long as she is without nuclear weapons and long-range rockets, she can put only her immediate neighbours in the long arc from Korea to India under direct military pressure. Of this, too, the Soviet leaders are aware when they remind the Chinese that 'changes have taken place in the world which no one can today ignore'. They not only take credit for the victory of the revolution in China, claiming that it was their power that prevented American intervention—a direct slap at their opponents in Peking—but point specifically to their possession of atomic weapons and their ability in the recent past to paralyse 'imperialist intervention' in Suez and Cuba—the kind of successes far from their borders which the Chinese communists cannot claim.

In these circumstances the Chinese communists, like the Russians in the early years of their power, think chiefly of the foreign communist parties when they think of expanding their power abroad. If underdeveloped countries are to be brought under Chinese domination, then their present governments must now be opposed and eventually overthrown by communist parties looking to Peking for leadership. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has sufficient strength to orient the non-communist governments of some underdeveloped countries towards Moscow even now, and expects to have more strength soon. Why, then, rely on the uncertain success of communist parties in the relatively distant future when non-communist leaders already in control of their governments can be dominated now or in the much nearer future and used to reduce American influence? That, rather than the establishment

[16] It is conceivable, however, that as the emphasis in the Soviet Union shifts from production to consumption, its example will appear increasingly irrelevant—and hence unattractive, as does that of the United States with its economy of abundance—to the intellectuals in underdeveloped countries who must still solve the problem of industrialisation.

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of socialism abroad, is the operative goal of the Soviet Union; or, rather, 'socialism' has been redefined to mean no more than dependence on the Soviet Union. 'Relying on the economic and political support of the socialist system, any country of the world has the possibility of making the transition to socialism, regardless of its level of development' (*Kommunist*, No. 13, 1960).

In the Soviet scheme of things, communist parties in underdeveloped countries, then, occupy a far less important role than in the Chinese one. They are to cooperate with the nationalist governments, follow their leadership and, if necessary or convenient, they can be sacrificed to them.[17] They may be useful means of pressure on these governments, but they are not to take power in the foreseeable future. No wonder that local communists in many underdeveloped countries—including Ranadive who so vigorously denounced Mao in 1949—prefer the Peking to the Moscow line. It allots to them the role of leading a broad united front against the nationalist governments rather than playing second fiddle to them.

[17] The difference between the Chinese and Soviet attitudes may be illustrated by their reactions to Nasser's persecution of Syrian and Egyptian communists in 1958 and 1959. The Chinese permitted Khaled Bagdash, the Syrian communist leader, to make a sharp attack on Nasser at the tenth anniversary of the CPR which nearly led to a break of diplomatic relations between Peking and Cairo. Khrushchev, speaking at the 21st CPSU congress in January 1959, defended the Egyptian communists, but made it clear that 'differences in ideological views must not hinder the development of friendly relations between our countries and the cause of the common struggle against imperialism'. The Soviet Union proceeded to finance the Aswan Dam and in November 1959 concluded cultural agreements with Egypt and expanded trade relations.

(*continued from page* 64)

transformed Marxism from an economic sub-structure for the Buddhist quest into an ideology monopolising power, thus endangering Burma's cultural traditions. Though U Nu did not abandon Marxist economic goals, he has (since 1958) rejected Marxist political and ideological doctrines. In the elections of 1960 the crypto-communists (United National Front) suffered a crushing defeat, obtaining only about 4 per cent of the popular vote. Their more revisionist Marxist rivals were also rejected by the electorate. U Nu's Buddhist charisma triumphed over the efficiency of a bureaucratic party machine and Burmese tradition over imported slogans. He was recently turned out of office by professional soldiers and bureaucrats, not in the name of democracy but in the name of efficiency. And the superior efficiency of communist dictatorships for purposes of forced modernisation does not cease to attract Asia's uprooted modernisers and managers who have no patience with tradition.

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

In the Soviet Mirror

RELIGIONS OF THE EAST

Walter Kolarz

THE SOVIET *Handbook of the Atheist* (*Sputnik Ateista*) is an impressive volume. It comprises, with illustrations, 628 pages and was published in 180,000 copies. As many as 30 Soviet scholars combined their efforts to produce comprehensive guidance to anti-religious propagandists. The Soviet Ministry of Culture is likewise associated with the venture, for the book was produced by one of the Ministry's printing works. The message which it contains is a very simple one: all religion is bad, all religion is harmful, all religion is unscientific. Communism must fight religion until it is wiped out, but at the same time it may exploit, for short-term political purposes, individual representatives of religious groups provided they are 'progressive'. Because such a large number of writers have contributed to the volume, its various parts are unequal in tone, although all are imbued by the same hostility towards all religion. Thus the book contains both serious descriptions of various religious beliefs, albeit from the Marxist-Leninist point of view, and anecdotes and cartoons which are a significant feature of the atheist propaganda which, in the Soviet Union, is conducted every day at far lower levels. The *Handbook*, despite its tremendous size, does not give the reader the slightest chance to make up his own mind about religion; he is told what he is allowed to think and what he must not believe on any account. Those who study the book in the Soviet Union as part of their ideological duties as good communists and good Soviet citizens have little opportunity to get first-hand information about religious questions from a non-atheist source. There is a virtual ban on religious literature in the USSR, and the few religious books which are printed in tiny editions and mostly with an eye on propaganda abroad, such as a Soviet edition of the Koran, cannot reach the average Soviet man, and not even the average party member. In a non-communist country anyone studying communism would, as a matter of course, resort to the works of communist authors, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev. A Soviet communist who wishes to study the problem of religion can as a rule avail himself only of anti-religious literature. The ten-page bibliography of the *Handbook* shows this very convincingly. It lists only anti-religious books, pamphlets and articles, many of scant ephemeral value, but not a single religious book.

The *Handbook* concerns itself not only with religions represented in the territory of the Soviet Union, but also with religious beliefs practised mainly or exclusively outside its borders, such as the great religions of Asia, Hinduism, Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. From the communist point of view Islam plays an exceptional part among the religions

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of the Orient. Islam is both an internal problem of the USSR and one which occupies the minds of communist leaders in many Asian and African countries.

Buddhism has a similar bridge-position between the communist and the non-communist world. In the Soviet Union itself the Buddhists are only a very small group, but Buddhism is a major spiritual force in other communist countries. Together with Taoism and Confucianism, Buddhism is one of the three religions, or, as some might say, the 'three teachings' of China. In China proper Buddhism may have exercised less influence on the lives and thoughts of the people than the two other religions or other ethical systems, but this is not true of the 'outer territories' of Inner Mongolia and Tibet, which until recently were Buddhist countries in a strict and theocratic sense. In the other Asian countries under communist control—Outer Mongolia, Northern Korea, and Northern Vietnam, Buddhism has also played, historically at least, an important part.

Thus in the case of both Islam and Buddhism an examination of the communist approach towards religion need not and should not be confined to Soviet theoretical writings on the subject, but can easily be supplemented by an account of the treatment which the communist governments have meted out to Moslems and Buddhists living under their control.

Soviet interest in Confucianism, Taoism, and Hinduism is more restricted than that in Islam and Buddhism, and the *Handbook of the Atheist* allocates only limited space to them. The Soviet communists obviously leave it to their Chinese and Indian comrades to come more thoroughly to grips with these religions and philosophical systems which, despite the large numbers of their followers, are more closely tied up with specific national civilisations. Even the little the *Handbook* has to say about Confucianism may be too much for the Chinese communists, who may resent the interference of Soviet anti-religious propagandists in a question which is no concern of theirs. The Soviet attempt to 'debunk' the complex Confucian philosophy in seven pages by denouncing it as an ideological instrument of Kuo Min-tang reaction and Japanese militarism will no doubt be considered utterly inadequate by Chinese communist ideologists. In China the problem of the evaluation of Confucius has not yet been finally resolved. It is still a matter of learned controversy between the old intellectuals who have rallied to the regime and the Marxist scholars. Positive opinions on Confucius and his theories could still be expressed in China in 1960, which was when the anonymous Soviet author must have written his somewhat primitive article on Confucianism in the *Handbook*. As late as the summer of 1960, the Chinese government allowed a public discussion on Confucius to take place in the *Kuang-Ming Daily* of Peking between a 'conservative' philosopher, Fung Yu-lan, and an orthodox Marxist, Li Chi-chien. This alone shows that the Chinese do not believe in any easy settlement of the 'Confucius problem'.

The Soviet editors of the *Handbook* could have avoided hurting Chinese susceptibilities by enlisting the cooperation of a Chinese scholar specialising in the critical examination of the teachings of China's greatest sage. The list of contributors to the *Handbook* indicates that this attempt

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was either not made or that it proved unsuccessful, for scholarly cooperation between Soviet and Chinese is not easily established. More surprisingly, the large team responsible for the writing, editing, and compiling of the *Handbook* consists exclusively of people with either a Christian or a Jewish background.

Islam

ALTHOUGH the nominal Moslem population of the USSR amounts to about 25 million people and has produced many outstanding intellectuals, anti-Islamic propaganda in the Soviet Union is still directed by a non-Moslem, Lutsian Klimovich, the author of countless anti-Moslem pamphlets and articles. He is a member of the editorial board of the *Handbook* and presumably responsible for its articles on Islam, the Koran, and Moslem religious holy days. From these articles the reader will obtain sufficient proof of communist hostility to Islam, although there are many Soviet pamphlets and cartoons which express the communist contempt for the Moslem religion, the Koran, and the Prophet Mohammed in more drastic, disrespectful, and violent terms than the *Handbook* itself. This offensive against Islam is only hinted at; the *Handbook* accuses the Moslem clergy of having opposed various measures and reforms of the Soviet government, such as industrialisation and collectivisation, until it finally adopted a loyal position 'under the pressure of the rank and file believers'. The uninitiated might conclude that this reorientation of the clergy was a peaceful, gradual, and painless process. In reality it was brought about by open anti-religious terror, arrests, deportations, and executions of Moslem dignitaries. The present 'loyal' muftis and sheikhs, who in their public statements identify themselves with the foreign policy of the Soviet government, are the successors of 'disloyal' predecessors who fought Soviet power not only because they were 'reactionaries' but because they realised the irreconcilable conflict between Islam and communism. They were swept away by the communist atheist offensive between 1928 and 1939. It was mainly in these years that the institutions of Islam were destroyed in the Soviet Union, and while Khrushchev's Russia recognises that 'grave mistakes' and 'violations of socialist legality' were committed during this period, it has no regret about the mortal blow then inflicted on Islam and all other religious creeds. On the contrary, the present Soviet regime still benefits from the heavy damage which Stalin caused to the religious and ideological opponents of communism. This damage was a lasting one, despite the slight relaxation in communist religious policy during the war and post-war period, when a number of mosques were re-opened. Figures about the number of mosques open to worship all over the USSR differ greatly, but even if we accept the more optimistic estimates the total number is unlikely to exceed 2,500. This means that over ninety per cent of all mosques existing in Tsarist times—there were 26,279 in 1913—have been either destroyed or transformed into secular buildings, and are now serving as clubs, store-rooms, or libraries, or, at best, as museums.

The Soviet regime has had its difficulties not only with the Moslem clergy and the ordinary Moslem believers, but also with those men of Moslem origin who seemed to have cast off their religious loyalties and

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joined the communist party. Throughout the thirties the Moslem communists were regarded with suspicion by their Russian comrades, to whom it seemed that they had still not severed all connections with the Moslem religion; they were still observing certain religious rites such as circumcision, and even remained favourably inclined towards the remnants of the Moslem clergy. It was this deep distrust of the Moslem communists, who were said to have remained 'prisoners of religious and nationalist prejudices', which determined the particular ferocity of the purge carried out in 1937 in the various Moslem territories in the Soviet Union—in Central Asia, the Volga-Urals region, the Northern Caucasus, and Azerbaijan. But here at least the Khrushchev regime seems to have recognised that injustice was done. Many of the communists who had been accused of supporting or condoning the counter-revolutionary activities of the Moslem clergy, including Prime Ministers, Ministers, and party secretaries, were posthumously rehabilitated—but some only as late as 1961.

Distrust of Moslems was not confined to individual Soviet leaders. Moscow harboured what might be called a collective distrust against entire ethnic groups which, both in Tsarist and Soviet times, were notorious for their stubborn adherence to the Moslem faith, that is the Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Karachay, and Crimean Tatars. These peoples, partly owing to their remoteness from the centres of Soviet propaganda, partly by their natural opposition to an anti-religious regime, and partly because they were under the influence of religious elders and nationalist leaders, had put up particularly stiff opposition to the Soviet government, which in the last phase of World War II decided to take its revenge. They were subjected to wholesale deportation. From their homes in the North Caucasus mountains and the Crimea they were transported in 1944 to Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, and Uzbekistan, until the Khrushchev regime decided to repatriate these nationalities to their original places of residence—an operation which started in 1957, but from which one of the deported Moslem nationalities, the Crimean Tatars, remained exempt.

There is one important lesson to be learnt from the fate of these recalcitrant small nationalities. The harsh treatment they suffered did not break their religious spirit. Official complaints about the survival of religion, particularly among the Chechens, could be heard while they were living the grim life of deportees in Kazakhstan and after they had been resettled in their original homeland. This provokes a more general question: to what extent the whole anti-religious activity of the Soviet regime and the propaganda of the communist State have been able to wipe out Islam. The answer is that atheist education over several decades, coupled with extensive social and economic changes, has greatly reduced Moslem religious observance in the cities of the Soviet Moslem territories, but Islam has nevertheless retained a certain residual influence which the communist authorities view with some apprehension. Official boasts about a 'massive decline of religion among the population' and 'closing of mosques at the request of believers' (*Kommunist Tajikistana*, 17 March 1961), alternate with complaints about the resourcefulness of the apologists of Islam who skilfully adapt themselves to the new times, particularly by re-interpreting the Koran in a progressive, socialist, and revolutionary sense.

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It is these Moslem modernists, anxious to move with the times, whom the communist regime considers particularly dangerous because they might give Islam a new lease of life. The *Handbook* draws attention to these trends, but it might appear from the context that this 'modernism' exists only among Moslems of non-communist countries such as Turkey or the UAR. However, there is increasing evidence from Soviet sources that even in the Soviet Union Islam is assuming a very different physiognomy from the one it had twenty or thirty years ago. The more sophisticated anti-religious propagandists realise now that in fighting Islam they are up against not only outdated customs and rituals, not only 'fanaticism', but also ideas and formulations which appeal to the modern man, although rooted in the Moslem religion. What the propagandists resent in particular is the claim of religious Moslems that the rise of Islam was in itself a social revolution, for it challenges the claim of communism to be the revolutionary force par excellence. The communists also feel uneasy about the stress which modern Moslems put on the brotherhood of all believers in the Koran and the Prophet Mohammed. This brotherhood cuts across all national and social barriers and therefore invalidates the communist idea of class struggle. Thus Moslem brotherhood becomes a rival to communist proletarian internationalism.

Anti-religious propaganda in the Soviet Union is therefore fighting two different types of Islam, the old Islam expressed in pilgrimages to holy places, the tombs of Moslem saints, and the observance of festivals, and the new Islam which tries to move with the times and finds new ways for the expression of old beliefs. The necessity to combat these two aspects of the Moslem religion accounts for the elaborate atheist propaganda efforts which the regime makes in Moslem territories, especially in Uzbekistan, which is the largest of the Central Asian Moslem republics and one of the chief bulwarks of Islam in the Soviet Union. An editorial in the central organ of the Uzbek Communist party *Pravda Vostoka* (12 July 1961), published under the significant heading: 'Atheists, to the attack!', gave the following statistics. During 1960 over 17,000 lectures were delivered in the Republic about anti-religious and related subjects, 243 study groups and seminars devoted to scientific atheism were in operation, and 570,000 copies of atheist pamphlets were produced locally. In the Uzbek capital, Tashkent, as many as 1,200 lectures were delivered during the first five months of 1961. However, the article added that even this very considerable effort was still insufficient, both with regard to quantity and quality, and that atheist propaganda reached more people who had already broken with religion than the actual believers. Unless there is a radical change of present trends, the regime will persist in its attempts to wipe out Islam with the help of propaganda, education, and indoctrination, assisted in some cases by administrative pressure.

Another aspect of Soviet Moslem policy will likewise play a major part in future. The relics of institutional Islam still remain an asset in the attempts of the Soviet government to gain the goodwill of Asian and African countries. The few mosques open to worship in the Soviet Union, the two Moslem ecclesiastical training establishments in Bokhara and Tashkent, the Imams and Muftis associated with the four officially recognised Moslem ecclesiastical administrations of the USSR, and the few Soviet pilgrims allowed to go to Mecca each year, fulfil an invaluable role from the point of view of the regime. Many a statesman from a

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Moslem country, after a fleeting visit to one or two cities of the Soviet Orient, has expressed the view that 'Moslems in the USSR are free to observe their religious rites'. Such statements are made in good faith, because neither the past martyrdom of Soviet Islam nor the present anti-religious campaign in the Moslem Republics is known to many people outside the communist world. Here is a case where ignorance means communist success whereas knowledge would mean communist defeat. Of seventy-six Communist parties operating in the non-communist world, as many as twelve operate in countries where Islam is the leading religion (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Indonesia), two in countries which are half-Moslem (Malaya and Lebanon), and three in countries where Moslems form important minorities (India, Israel, and Cyprus). Most of these parties can achieve power only if a section of Moslem believers supports them and is unaware of the basically anti-religious and anti-Moslem character of communism.

Far from admitting the true nature of their ideology, some of these Communist parties mentioned go out of their way to 'defend' Moslem interests. A case in point is the Communist Party of India, which has frequently taken up the 'genuine grievances' of the Moslem minority and the disabilities 'which exist not so much in law as in fact' (cf. *New Age*, 28 January 1962).

Buddhism

THE SAME policy is pursued by Soviet communism with regard to Buddhism, but here the discrepancies between fact and fiction are even more glaring, for Buddhism in Russia has been almost completely wiped out. There are three Soviet territories where Buddhism used to be the dominant religion, Buryatia and Tuva—both situated on the southern fringe of Siberia—and Kalmuckia, situated to the south-west of the Volga delta. According to an article in the Soviet anti-religious periodical *Science and Religion* (*Nauka i Religiya* No. 6, 1960), the situation in these three territories is as follows: in Buryatia, where there were thirty-six Buddhist monasteries with 16,000 lamas before the communist revolution, two small monasteries and a few dozen lamas are left. In Tuva, which in the twenties still had twenty-two Buddhist temples and over 4,000 lamas, no temples or monasteries have remained; only about 100 lamas still testify to the precarious survival of Tuvinian Buddhism. In Kalmuckia only one small temple is left. Even these insignificant remnants of Buddhist institutions are viewed with suspicion, presumably because the disappearance of monasteries and temples which occurred in the late thirties as a result of administrative measures did not affect the religious beliefs, customs, and rituals of the people. Even the *Handbook* seems to admit this, albeit rather timidly.

As Islam has survived without mosques and mullahs, so Buddhism has remained alive among the common folk without temples and lamas. The man in charge of atheist propaganda in Buryatia, a Russian named Melnikov, complained in a letter published on 21 September 1961 in the Moscow *Pravda* that whole groups of Buddhists were saying their prayers at the time of agricultural work. He suggested that this undesirable state of affairs demanded increased anti-religious propaganda efforts.

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The persecution and decline of Buddhism in Soviet Russia must be contrasted with the intense activities of a few official Buddhists who, with the obvious permission and encouragement of the communist government, are allowed to tour the Buddhist world to spread the legend about Soviet benevolence towards the Buddhist religion. In 1956 a Soviet Buddhist delegation attended the fourth world congress of Buddhists in Nepal. In the following year the Soviet Chief Lama took part in the World Peace Council meeting in Colombo. In 1961 the Soviet Buddhist leaders again toured various non-communist Buddhist countries and also attended the sixth world congress of Buddhists in Pnom Penh. The Soviet Buddhists are not only sent on foreign travels; they are also expected to perform certain political services at home. Whenever a distinguished foreign Buddhist leader visits the Soviet Union, be it President U Nu of Burma or Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, the Chief Lama is summoned to Moscow from his distant headquarters, the Ivolga Datsan in Buryatia, so that the guest can meet him, or at least see him in his colourful robes at an official reception. It has even happened that the Soviet Chief Lama or his deputy has himself acted as host at receptions to foreign Buddhist visitors, for instance when Amritanand Bhikku, President of the Nepalese Buddhist Society, stayed in Moscow in November 1959, no doubt in order to create the impression on the visitor that freedom of religion prevails in the Soviet Union.

The activities in which a tiny number of Soviet Buddhist dignitaries are being constantly involved are in themselves an admission on the part of the Soviet regime that Buddhism is a major spiritual factor throughout Asia. Buddhism confronts communism not only in all Asian states over which communists rule, but also in other parts of Asia where communists are fighting for power and influence, such as Burma, Siam, Ceylon, Laos, Cambodia, Nepal, Japan, and also India, where Buddhism has gained ground among the ' scheduled castes '. Even non-Buddhist Indian public opinion is not unaffected by what happens to the Buddhists in the communist world.

For the communists, and this applies equally to Soviet, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, and Mongolian communists, Buddhism in all its forms is reactionary and will eventually disappear, but individual Buddhists, like individual Moslems or Christians, must not be considered as a ' single reactionary mass '. On the contrary, communist policy aims at dividing the believers and singling out those who might be prepared to cooperate with the communists in certain political issues. In the countries of Asia under communist rule, the men in power do not need to restrict themselves to the more refined procedures of disintegrating the unity of the religious believers or of recruiting agents among them by means of corruption and flattery. In Outer Mongolia and Tibet, physical destruction was the chief weapon which the communist government used to break the power of Buddhism as a spiritual and sociological factor. A number of Soviet writers on Outer Mongolia have been quite candid about the repressive measures which the Mongolian Government has taken against the Buddhist monasteries, although these are not specifically mentioned in the *Handbook*. The backbone of Mongolian Buddhism was broken in the years 1936 to 1939, partly with the help of mass trials, where lamas were charged with counter-revolutionary activities and high treason, partly by full-scale military action against the

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monasteries in which even tanks and aircraft were used. As many as 30,000 lamas were killed in this operation. It is hardly surprising that those Mongolian lamas who survived the massacre and remained faithful to their religion are now expressing loyalty to a regime which has very nearly wiped out all vestiges of Buddhism. Only four small monasteries are left in the whole country, and for this limited token of tolerance the remaining lamas have to pay by participating in the work of Mongolia's 'Peace Committee' and the 'Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee'.

The oppression of the national and religious aspirations of the Tibetan Buddhists by the Chinese Government culminated in the great uprising in March 1959 and in the flight of the Dalai Lama to India. These events are too widely known to require detailed recapitulation. The *Handbook* cannot avoid mentioning them, but it tries to depict the revolt as the plot of a tiny minority of 'reactionaries' which Buddhists in China and abroad condemned.

Hinduism

THE COMMUNIST attitude towards Hinduism, only shortly and inadequately reflected in the *Handbook*, cannot be supplemented by any factual account, for communists are not in power in territories where Hinduism is the religion of the majority. However, the fate of Islam in Russia and of Buddhism in Mongolia, Russia, China and Tibet suggests what might happen to the Hindu religion if orthodox Marxism-Leninism were ever victorious in India. Some of the great Indian temples would be destroyed, or closed to worshippers and secularised. Popular Hindu festivals would be abolished and replaced by the new secular festivals of the communist regime. Pilgrimages or immersion in the holy waters of the Ganges would be prohibited or at least rendered difficult and publicly ridiculed. A new pattern of anti-religious education would be introduced in India, and parents would be largely deprived of any influence in the up-bringing of their children. Atheist agitators in large numbers would travel up and down the country and tell people that all they had believed in for centuries was unscientific and nonsensical, and that the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin must take the place of the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Puranas and all that goes by the name Hindu Scriptures.

The Indian communist leaders would probably deny harbouring such intentions, but there is no doubt that their attitude towards Hinduism is fundamentally negative, even if they do not yet openly champion militant atheism but pretend to fight 'communalism' only. The Indian communists express resentment at 'ceremonies of a pronouncedly religious character, associated with Hinduism, being performed in public functions presided over by officials and even Ministers' (*New Age*, 28 January 1962). However, the real aim of the Indian communists is not a secular republic granting equal respect and rights to all religious communities, but an anti-religious state, such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

It is relevant to recall in this connection that the international communist movement has always considered Hinduism one of the great spiritual forces of Asia which communism will have to eliminate if it wishes to be victorious. Its striving for reconciliation, harmony, and

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peace makes Hinduism the very antithesis of communism, which pursues its political objectives through violence and revolution. Communist attacks on Hinduism were usually disguised as attacks on Gandhism, but it was always made clear that the religious as well as the political content of Gandhi's world outlook provoked their antagonism. The programme which the Communist International adopted at its sixth congress in 1928 contained the express statement that communism must fight relentlessly against Gandhism in India, which is 'permeated through and through with religious conceptions' (*The Communist International 1919–1943: Documents, Vol. II*, London, 1960, p. 519).

This hostility to Gandhism was reaffirmed as late as 1955 by Rajani Palme Dutt, the prominent British communist of Indian origin. In his book *India Today and Tomorrow* he said it was a 'disastrous error' that the preaching of Hinduism and the preaching of general political aims were inextricably intermixed in Gandhi's propaganda (R. P. Dutt, *India Today and Tomorrow*, Delhi, 1955, p. 237). It was to no small extent the religious side of Gandhism which prompted communist antagonism against Mahatma Gandhi as a political and historical personality. The Soviet communists in particular were not able to grasp Gandhi's greatness simply because they deny a priori the possibility of a connection between greatness and religion. Academician Zhukov, Soviet expert on the problems of underdeveloped countries, admitted this when he stated, long after Gandhi's death: 'Gandhiji's leadership differed in many ways from similar movements in Europe. The Soviet observers found it difficult to understand this movement particularly because it developed under ethical and religious slogans . . . It seemed to them that the ethical and religious slogans advanced by Gandhiji could not assist the cause of achieving Indian independence' (*Link*, 2 April 1961).

This lack of understanding explains the many Soviet statements denouncing Gandhi as a traitor to the Indian independence movement, and as an agent of the British. In recent years many authoritative Soviet spokesmen, including Khrushchev himself, have withdrawn these absurd denunciations because they proved to be an obstacle to Soviet policy in India. Although the communists have revised their attitude towards 'the great humanist, Gandhi', as they now call him, their hostility towards the spiritual content of his message, which was in essence Hinduism, remains as great as before, for this hostility is an inseparable part of Marxist-Leninist teaching.

Wherever the communist party has established its rule, it has brought untold harm to the religious heritage of the people. This can easily be proved by what has happened in Tibet, Mongolia, China, and in the oriental republics of the Soviet Union. It is in the interest of Asia as a whole that the list of these examples should not be added to. Whether the communists can score further local successes may depend to no small extent on whether the lessons implied in the *Handbook of the Atheist* are properly heeded.

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NATIONALISM RE-EXAMINED

David Morison

IT is remarkable how far Soviet writers on Asian and African countries manage to avoid any direct examination of the role played by nationalism, as such, in the political development of these countries. For them the 'national liberation movement' is not the urge of a nation to assert itself as a nation; it is a struggle of the masses for emancipation. The latter's goal is, indeed, *national* liberation (but only their first goal, since class liberation must follow); in this first stage nationalism can be used as a slogan by 'bourgeois' leaders, but it cannot represent fully the political and social aspirations of the masses. Is nationalism then, in the Soviet view, invariably 'bourgeois,' and something to be discarded as soon as possible?

The 1956 edition of the Soviet *Political Dictionary* defines nationalism as 'a bourgeois ideology and policy hostile to the proletariat' which seeks to strengthen one nation at the expense of another, to substitute national and racial hatred for international friendship and co-operation, and to turn the workers from class struggle towards national and racial enmity. 'The revolutionary aims of the working class—the liquidation of exploitation and the building of socialism—can only be achieved through the unification of the workers of all nations and the pursuance of a policy of proletarian internationalism.'

The entry in the 1958 edition of the *Political Dictionary* contains an additional paragraph, on nationalism in colonial and dependent countries. This states—quoting Lenin—that 'the bourgeois nationalism of an oppressed nation' has a 'democratic content' which, in so far as it is directed against oppression, earns the support of communists in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. However, it should be noted that, even in this special category of countries, nationalism is still referred to as 'bourgeois', and it is only one aspect of it which earns communist approval.

The changed ideological climate after the 20th Soviet Communist party congress of February 1956 led Soviet writers to concentrate on this particular aspect of Asian and African nationalism—its 'anti-imperialist' aspect. While other aspects of nationalism came in for Soviet criticism, in relation to particular countries, any full-scale examination of nationalism seems to have been avoided. A long chapter on the subject in a recent Soviet book (K. N. Brutents, *Against the Ideology of Present-day Colonialism*, Moscow, 1961) is therefore of some interest. In this chapter, entitled 'The Character and Some Peculiarities of Nationalism in Countries of Asia and Africa in the Present Stage', Brutents makes it clear that in his view this nationalism, although it has 'peculiarities', can be judged by the same criteria as nationalism in general. 'Contemporary nationalism in the countries of Asia and Africa cannot be a "special" nationalism', he insists. Evidently, in dealing with a subject which is so full of pitfalls for the communist, Soviet writers cannot allow themselves to stray from Marxist-Leninist first principles (such as those embodied in the *Political Dictionary* definition). Thus at the outset Brutents defines nationalism in the following terms:

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> Marxism-Leninism sees in nationalism the ideology and policy of the bourgeoisie, which, setting up the nation as the highest and immutable form of social unity with identical, harmonious interests of all its representatives, present the class aspirations of the bourgeoisie as the interests of the whole nation. Nationalism in the theoretical and practical field is the basis on which the bourgeoisie attempts, within the framework of national ' unity ', to deny or at least to push into the background in any given case the class struggle of the workers and to ' unite ' any given nation, in opposition to other nations.

Further on Brutents states: ' The main principles of all bourgeois nationalisms as an ideology are (1) the concept of the nation as the highest form of social unity, and (2) the ideal of national exclusiveness and national superiority.'

However, these uncompromising pronouncements are not intended to be the last word on the subject. Asian and African nationalism has aspects which earn Soviet approval, and, from the theoretical point of view, these can be presented as the exception which proves the rule. Thus in an earlier chapter (p.158) Brutents says that ' bourgeois nationalism does not always express narrow class interests ':

> The character of nationalism as the ideology and policy of the bourgeoisie changes according to the historical stage of development of capitalism, according to the social role of the bourgeoisie and its links with the people's masses, according to the relations between the class forces in any given country, and according to the international situation of the nation in question.

It is the present ' historical stage of development ' in eastern countries, in Brutents' view, that accounts for favourable, but temporary, trends in the nationalism of these countries. ' The necessity of developing productive forces and the striving to break off colonial relationships in the political and economic sphere are the bases for the unification of all patriotic sections of the nation in these countries.' The national bourgeoisie opposes both imperialism and feudalism, and in this ' is still capable of reflecting to a certain or limited degree the interests of the whole nation '. Not having exercised power during the years of colonial rule, it was not compromised, and ' has not yet exhausted its " credit " in the eyes of the people's masses '.

The change in the relative strengths of the socialist and capitalist systems, Brutents adds, is another factor which favourably influences ' bourgeois nationalism ' in Asia and Africa. The growing ascendancy of the world socialist system ' leaves its imprint on the ideology and political programme of the bourgeois nationalists '; many of them are keenly interested in the experience of the Soviet Union in eliminating economic backwardness. It is also very important that the young national states look to the socialist countries for economic aid. Moreover, the masses themselves, with their revolutionary and democratic ideas and their leaning towards socialism, exert a favourable influence on the policy of the bourgeoisie. Being still comparatively weak, the bourgeoisie is forced, at least in the first years after its accession to power, to listen to the voice of the masses.

All this, however, Brutents accompanies with a warning. The bourgeoisie, he says, is inconsistent, ' pursues self-interest even in the

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solution of national problems, and strives for their fulfilment mostly behind the backs of the masses and at their expense, being afraid of the rise of consciousness and activity of the people '; but progressive workers are aware of this class weakness of the national bourgeoisie, and ' being a sincere ally of the national bourgeoisie in the anti-imperialist struggle, they strive to neutralise these tendencies and to ensure the full victory of the national democratic revolution '.

Having thus explained how nationalism, in the countries in question and in existing conditions, can have, albeit temporarily, a ' liberating ' function, Brutents takes a closer look at Asian and African nationalism and some of its exponents.

> Nationalist leaders and ideologists in the countries of the East consistently portray the idea of national unity and national community as that of some sovereign community, which sweeps aside social and class barriers. Even anti-imperialist unity is reduced by them to the expression of this community—and only that. Nationalism claims to be an ideology of the whole people, and is identified with national consciousness.

Brutents then quotes statements by Nehru, Nasir, and Sukarno upholding nationalism and national unity as the primary aspiration of the whole people, and goes on:

> All these pronouncements contain one of the fundamental specific ideas of bourgeois nationalism—the idea of a national community which is above class. However, the concrete historical conditions of the former colonial and dependent countries, where national ties are formed in the struggle against colonialism and the feudalism it supports, give the idea a certain progressive meaning. This idea gains in the first place an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal direction, appearing not only as the idea of class cooperation, but also as the idea of the sovereignty of the nation in the political and economic field.

Brutents next quotes statements by Asian and African leaders identifying nationalism with anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. ' Nasir has emphasised that the idea of Arab nationalism means the brotherhood of the Arab peoples in their struggle against exploitation and imperialist rule, the sovereignty of the whole Arab nation, the independence of the Arab peoples, and the raising of their standard of living.' Brutents comments:

> Thus there is a foundation for asserting that, in the ideology of nationalism in the contemporary East, the principle of the national community also has an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal content. In this context nationalism itself acquires some features of anti-imperialist ideology.

But this ' progressive ' aspect of nationalism, Brutents goes on, is counterbalanced by ' the side of this principle which is already reactionary at the present time '. Bourgeois nationalism uses the idea of the national community ' to prevent the class self-determination of the masses and the awakening of their political consciousness, in order to win and consolidate the rule of the bourgeoisie over the rest of the nation '. This finds its expression in ' the preaching of class peace and class cooperation '. Brutents quotes, with disapproval, statements by Nasir such as ' the

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foundation of society is social solidarity', and 'our way of building society is the peaceful way, which knows no conflict between classes and parties'. Statements by Indian Congress party leaders are also quoted, such as that of G. Jayahandran: 'Indian ideology ought to be the maintenance of sincere relations between capital and labour in the interests of the progress of the country.' Brutents comments:

> The more conservative the nationalists are, the more active they are in bringing forward the reactionary side of the principle of national community, and the more obvious is its anti-democratic character. This is done with the intention of hiding social contradictions and of exploiting the workers without interference in the name of 'national progress'.

Brutents then turns his attention to the religious element in eastern nationalisms:

> Trying to find a more profound basis for the idea of class cooperation, the nationalists often try to prove that its sources are to be found in the national traditions of the eastern peoples in question. In India 'patience' and 'non-violence' are put forward as such a traditional principle, in Burma 'philanthropy', and so on.

Exponents of nationalism, Brutents admits, insist on its secular character; but this cannot be allowed to pass unquestioned.

> Religious ideas, as nationalist ideologists and also many specialists on Asian and African countries themselves admit, adapt themselves to the needs of nationalism, playing the part of a disguise in which the political and economic programme of the nationalist occasionally appears . . . The fact is that some bourgeois nationalists try to retain the elements of a religious outlook on life for a more 'solid' foundation and propaganda of the ideas of class harmony and the rejection of class conflict. It is in just this point that the connection between nationalist and religious ideology is the closest. For instance, the affinity of the ideas of class co-operation in Indian nationalism and the philosophy of Hinduism, that is Gandhiism, is undoubted. Ideologists of the Indian national bourgeoisie, having given nationalism a secular character with the years, at the same time do all in their power to keep these principles in the consciousness of the people. It is also no coincidence that the Right wing of the nationalists, with very few exceptions, leans upon religious principles. Religion is also used by certain nationalist circles, for instance in the UAR and Morocco, for the struggle against democratic forces.

It may be noted that, as a reference for his statement about 'religious ideas . . . playing the part of a disguise in which the political programme of the nationalist occasionally appears', Brutents quotes, in a footnote, Nasir's *Philosophy of the Revolution*, p. 104.

National exclusiveness and national superiority, says Brutents, is 'the other central idea of bourgeois nationalism'. However, he admits, leading Asian and African nationalists vehemently deny that this idea is present in nationalism. Sukarno has said that 'nationalism is fruitless if it does not live in the bosom of internationalism'. Nasir has said that Arab nationalism is not directed against any particular country, so long as it does not interfere in the internal affairs of Arab countries

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and respects their independence. These statements claiming that internationalism is a characteristic of Asian and African nationalism, says Brutents, 'have a definite content', like the ideas of national anti-colonial unity and national sovereignty. The fact that chauvinism and national exclusiveness 'used to be the hallmark of the colonisers' has to some extent made the nationalists wary of them. Nevertheless, they are not themselves exempt from such failings.

> It must be remarked that the idea of national superiority is already making itself felt. It appears for instance in discussions on the special historical mission of the Arabs, and in attempts to represent the unity of the Arab people as a unification under the aegis of one of the Arab states, which is sometimes represented as 'the chief and moral leader of the Arab East'. (Brutents here cites, in a footnote, Anwar as-Sadat's *Revolte sur le Nil*, Paris 1957, p. 142.) It is not at all unlikely that the idea of national superiority might appear in the near future in nationalism in Asian and African countries with even greater force.

Summing up, Brutents says that in present-day Asian and African nationalism 'the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal side is predominant'. Nationalism expresses the idea of national liberation, but 'in a form inevitably limited as a result of the bourgeois nature of nationalism'. For that section of the masses which has not yet achieved class consciousness, nationalism 'appears as a primitive, undeveloped form of anti-imperialist consciousness, which develops in the course of the struggle with the colonialists'. It owes its temporary 'progressive' content to the anti-imperialist strivings of the masses: but, even for the aims of national liberation, it is inadequate. Owing to its bourgeois nature, it cannot consistently express the 'ideas of social and public progress' which are fundamental to the national liberation movement. The identification of the aspirations of the bourgeoisie with the interests of the whole nation means that the class interests of the workers are ignored, and this may well lead to a conflict with the masses and a split in the national liberation movement. Fear of the masses and a tendency to cooperate with the imperialist Western powers may be accompanied by anti-communism and anti-democratic measures.

At this point Brutents states the case for 'socialist ideology', for which he claims all the advantages that are absent in nationalism:

> Being the expression of the interests of the proletariat, socialist ideology is of the whole people and directed against all forms of oppression and exploitation. National enslavement and racial discrimination, national privileges and national egoism are incompatible with a socialist outlook on life. Socialism assumes the full liberation, social progress and national prosperity of all peoples. Thus the socialist ideology consistently carries out the idea of national liberty. . . .
>
> The masses are beginning to be convinced that at this stage nationalism is less and less able to come forward as a form of anti-imperialist national consciousness and is becoming more and more limited. In search of a philosophy which would consistently

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> express their anti-imperialist strivings, they are turning ever more frequently to the socialist ideology, the genuine bearers of which are the communist parties.

It will be seen from the above that, in the Soviet view, nationalism is invariably a 'bourgeois' ideology. It is perhaps rather grudgingly admitted that it can exert a certain hold on the less class-conscious masses, but it is claimed that for the more class-conscious 'national liberation' implies something much more comprehensive than nationalism can give them. Socialism, in fact (in the Soviet sense), is presented as the genuine philosophy of 'national liberation'. It will be noted that the appeal is still to a national sentiment; it is as if socialism were being presented as more truly nationalist than nationalism. It is 'of the whole people', and 'consistently carries out the idea of national liberty'.

In an earlier chapter of his book, Brutents examines at length the conclusions of Western students about the origins and character of Asian and African nationalism, and finds these either inadequate or erroneous. One might therefore have expected that his own treatment of the subject would be correspondingly more understanding than that of his 'bourgeois' opposite numbers. He does indeed appear to have made the most of the loophole in Soviet doctrine by which Asian and African nationalism can be considered 'progressive' in so far as it is 'anti-imperialist'. But the whole tenor of his argument, and especially its conclusion, suggests that when the book was written Asian and African nationalism was already considered out of date. The book went to press in August 1960. Soviet thoughts on the supersession of nationalism —already discredited in Soviet eyes by its anti-communist manifestations in various countries—must by then have been taking shape, prior to the formulation of the comprehensive 'national democratic revolution' ideology which was presented to the world at the Moscow conference of communist parties of November 1960.

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IN BRIEF

Rabochoe dvizhenie v Kapitalisticheskikh stranakh 1959-61 (The Labour movement in the capitalist countries). Chief Editor, A. A. Arzumanyan (Moscow, 1961), 12s.

ACCORDING to the foreword, this is the first of a projected series of studies of 'the main events, processes and tendencies in the contemporary labour and communist movement of the capitalist countries'. It was produced by the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (in the USSR Academy of Sciences), the equivalent, *mutatis mutandis*, of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The contributors include B. N. Ponomarev, long a leading Soviet authority on the international labour movement and, since the 22nd CPSU congress, one of the secretaries of its central committee.

Since this is a marxist-leninist analysis, as the foreword somewhat superfluously reminds us, we can be sure of meeting some old friends. 'The sharpening of the contradictions of capitalism', 'a new upsurge in the class struggle in the capitalist countries', 'the crisis of social-reformism', 'the struggle against imperialism' and similar concepts all make their reappearance in these pages and must impart to at least some Soviet readers a comforting sense of continuity with the past. Whatever else changes in the Soviet Union, its commentators evidently cannot or will not look with a fresh eye on events in the non-communist world.

Separate chapters are devoted to the labour movement in Western Europe, Britain, Cuba, Latin America, the United States, South-East Asia, Japan, and Africa (Central and South). The Middle East and Australasia are not reviewed, though they make an appearance in the chronology at the end of the book. Throughout there is heavy emphasis on the strike movement, the general strikes in Italy, Japan and Belgium in 1960 affording particular satisfaction to the compilers. A further source of gratification to them was the unilateralist vote against the Labour Party leadership at Scarborough in October of the same year—'the first time in the history of the Labour Party that the leaders have been defeated at a conference and opposition left-wing elements have gained a victory' (p. 135).

The chief interest of the book is provided by brief glimpses of Soviet opportunism behind the ideological jargon. Despite the USSR's readiness, even eagerness, to have cordial dealings with the bourgeois governments of newly-emergent and non-aligned states, we read on p. 21 that the local communist parties must engage in flexible tactics towards the ruling 'national' bourgeoisie, noting 'in good time' when the latter shows signs of temporising in the struggle against imperialism and forcing it 'under pressure from the popular masses' to enter upon a resolute fight against imperialism for the attainment of full sovereignty for their country. In the specific case of India, the Congress party's policies are stated to be arousing growing dissatisfaction and disillusionment (p. 30) and, in view of the 'danger of an increase in the forces of reaction', the advantages of a national-democratic front consisting of workers, peasants, the progressive section of the national bourgeoisie and the communists, are in the author's view patently incontestable. Similarly *realpolitik* is not far below

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the surface in the account of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (p. 192 ff.). Lord Russell, who is held in such current esteem in the USSR, would doubtless be interested to read that 'from being an apolitical, non-class movement at its inception, the CND, putting forward ever clearer and more concrete aims in the struggle for peace, has started gradually to move away from its apolitical stand and to come out not only in support of general nuclear disarmament and of the unilateral renunciation by Britain of atomic and hydrogen bombs but also against the policy of NATO, against US bases in Britain, etc.' (p. 193).

Time has also altered the Soviet assessment of the veteran Cuban communist leader, Annibal Escalante. He is quoted with approval on p. 226 for the statement, originally made in *Noticias de Hoy* of 9 May, 1961, that Cuba has entered upon the gradual transition from capitalism to socialism and that this will be 'a rather prolonged process'. The reader must now make some adjustment to this statement in the light of *Pravda's* bland acceptance in April this year of Escalante's dismissal by Castro, ostensibly for 'sectarianism'.

The book is on stronger ground when dealing with purely factual data (most of it drawn from Western sources) on pensions, family allowances, unemployment relief, social insurance, etc. in Western countries. It contains on p. 485 the only published Soviet tribute to the British Health Service this reviewer has ever seen, but does not omit to mention immediately afterwards the slowness in building new hospitals 'which means that some patients have to wait two or three years for a hospital bed'. There is a useful chapter on national communist parties and the chronology contains a meticulous record of strikes during 1959 and 1960 from plantations in Costa Rica to the docks at Pusan.

A. R.

Harry Hamm, **Rebellen gegen Moskau.** Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Cologne. 1962. 194 pp.

N. D. Smirnova, **Obrazovanie Narodnoy Republiki Albanii.** Akademiya Nauk SSSR. Moscow. 1960. 196 pp.

Enver Hoxha, **Report on the activity of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania.** Tirana. 1961. 196 pp.

These three books have something in common: all of them devote about 195 pages to Albania. But although they were published within the two last years, only Mr. Hamm's book has a chance of reprinting. The reasons are not too far to seek. The Soviet book ends with the following passage:

> Stressing the new prospects which the epoch of the transition to an extended construction of communist society in the Soviet Union opens before Albania and other countries of people's democracy, the first secretary of the Albanian Party of Labour, Enver Hoxha, declared on 16 February 1959 at a meeting in Tirana: 'The words of Comrade Khrushchev at the 21st congress that the socialist countries, successfully exploiting the possibilities of the socialist system, will more or less simultaneously go over to the higher stage of the communist society, embody the scientific development of Lenin's brilliant ideas, and express the genuine essence of proletarian internationalism which permeates all the relations between the

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> socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union—relations of a new type, not known previously in history' (*Pravda*, 20 February 1959).

Exactly two years later, on 13 February 1961, Hoxha declared in his *Report* (p. 191):

> The aid and the backing of the Soviet Union has been one of the most important factors, outside ones, for the attainment of our great victories in the field of socialist construction. In this great invincible friendship, which no force and intrigue in the world can weaken, in friendship with all the other peoples of the socialist camp, our people also in the future shall find support and inspiration for new victories in the struggle for socialism and communism.

Not long afterwards, Khrushchev declared at the 22nd congress that 'the Albanian leaders have succumbed to all the negative methods in party and state work which accompany the personality cult. . . . Trials are staged and accusations concocted in the Beria way . . . an atmosphere of terror and spying, of fear and cruel repression, has been created.' This reference to the execution of Liri Gega (in November 1956!) and other victims of Hoxha, elicited the charge from Tirana that 'Ever since the Bucharest meeting of June 1960, N. Khrushchev has pursued a systematic and deliberate policy of blackmail and pressure to make the Albanian Party of Labour yield and force it into submission' (*Zeri I Popullit*, 10 December, 1961).

Harry Hamm's is a first hand report, based on his visit in 1961 to Albania as a correspondent of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, describing the scene before the break. He was told by a party functionary that 'Stalin is and remains our guide,' and found a good deal of supporting evidence in the Albanian political atmosphere. One chapter analyses the ideological conflict in the light of the 22nd congress.

The Polish Sociological Review. Vol. XV. 1961. Lodz.

With the fifteenth annual volume, 1961, *The Polish Sociological Review* begins its thirty-first year. It was started in 1930 with Florian Znaniecki, at that time Professor of Sociology at Poznan University, as editor-in-chief. The *Review* was not published in 1932 and 1933, nor from 1940 till 1945, and again from 1949 till 1956. In 1950 it was replaced by the *Polish Review of Historical and Social Sciences*, of which seven annual volumes were published for the years 1950–1956. It is because of these breaks in continuity that the 1961 volume is the fifteenth. Beginning with 1957, the *Review*, with Jozef Chalasinski as editor-in-chief and Jan Lutynski and Antonina Kloskowska as deputy editors, has been published as a semi-annual journal with English summaries; since 1946 it has been published by the Sociological Institute at the University of Lodz.

The latest volume is devoted mainly to social anthropology. Formerly, the term 'social anthropology' was not in use in Poland, although the social-anthropological approach has been significant in the development of Polish sociology. For the leading scholars in Polish sociology—Ludwik Krzywicki, Florian Znaniecki, Stefan Czarnowski, Bronislaw Malinowski—the subject matter of sociology was society and

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culture. Ludwik Krzywicki (1859–1941) represented the Marxist intellectual tradition, Stefan Czarnowski (1879–1937) Durkheim's sociological school. Znaniecki never regarded himself as an anthropologist; the book he co-authored with Thomas, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (*1918–1920*) now belongs to the common intellectual heritage of sociology as well as social anthropology. Personality approach has influenced the development of Polish sociology through Znaniecki's writings and the Malinowski school of anthropology.

The articles published in the 1961 volumes of the *Review* include J. Lutynski, 'Ludwik Krzywicki as seen by Polish Sociologists today'; J. Czekanowski, 'The Feudal Pastoral Kingdoms of Interlacustrine Africa'; J. Chalasinski, 'The African Intelligentsia and the Birth of Nationalism in Black Africa South of the Sahara'; A. Zajaczkowski, 'Ashanti Tribe in Transition'; J. Chalasinski, 'Social Anthropology'; A. Kloskowska, 'Ethnic Concepts of School Children in Poland'; W. Piotrowski, 'Some Problems of the Ecological Structure of Lodz'.

L'URSS, Droit, Economie, Sociologie, Politique, Culture, Tome I. Centre de Recherche sur l'URSS et les Pays de l'Est. Faculté de Droit de Strasbourg. Editions Sirey, Paris. 1962. 704 pp.

Edited by professor Michel Mouskhély, this is the first volume of a yearbook on Soviet affairs published by Strasbourg university centre of Slavic and Soviet studies. It deals with constitutional and administrative developments, social and economic life, culture, and foreign policy. The documentary part reproduces some important constitutional texts. With few exceptions (these being mainly the Soviet contributions), the level of the studies is consistently high. The emphasis is on the constitutional aspects of Soviet life, which reflects the interest of the editor and most of the contributors. But there are also informative chapters on other subjects: one can mention here the essay by M. B. Kerblay on the evolution of the collective farm, and the description by M. R. Triomphe of the post-Stalin discussions in Soviet linguistics. There is no index.

Louis de Villefosse, **L'oeuf de Wyasma.** Juillard, Paris. 1962. 244 pp.

How an intelligent, upright, and sensitive man, with a right-wing family background, who started his career as a naval officer, could have gone through all the rigmarole of the Stalinist 'front' campaigns is described with unforced candour in this personal memoir of one of the victims of the contemporary Potemkin technique. It is an engaging book, which does not try to play down the political naivete of the author's past; nor does it contain a false note of artificial contrition. It just tells the story of one man's experience, and it should be instructive to others; there is never a shortage of innocents. The most interesting thing in the book is its representation of the Stalinoid milieux among the French intellectuals.

Konstantin F. Shteppa, **Russian Historians and the Soviet State.** Rutgers University Press. 1962. 437 pp.

A somewhat sketchy survey of developments on the 'historical front' between 1917 and the fifties by the late emigré scholar who was a Professor at Kiev until 1938. It contains interesting material on the question of periodisation and the anti-Americanism of the late Stalin era.

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